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Abstract 
There is a strong role for local health care organisations to manage and deliver 
care for their local population. Within this context, rationing is inevitable, since 
there will never be enough resources to cater for all needs. Economic evaluation 
is proposed as one way to achieve explicit rationing, acting as a useful aid to 
decision-making. The Government promotes use of economic evaluation and 
millions of pounds are spent on the production of economic evaluations each 
year. How, and whether, economic evaluation actually aids local decision-
making in practice is a relatively under-researched area and further research is 
required. 
In this study, qualitative methods were employed to explore the views and 
perceptions of decision makers. 29 interviews were conducted with health care 
commissioners and providers, and 12 priority setting meetings for cancer care 
were observed. 15 interviews were also conducted with health economists. 
Findings suggest that economic evaluation is not used. It appears that there is 
an informal process of decision-making in which use of evidence is 
marginalised. Further, economic evaluations are rarely relevant to the type of 
decisions made locally, which tend to concern implementing national decisions 
and making 'management decisions' about the employment of extra staff and 
new equipment. The study also found that some health economists might also 
have the incentive to produce work that allows them to progress 'up the career 
ladder', rather than work that is useful to local decision makers. 
Economic evaluation intended for local level population I decision-making' may 
therefore have no clear audience. Economic evaluation should perhaps be 
reserved for situations where it will clearly influence national level decision-
making. At the local level the more flexible tool of programme budgeting and 
marginal analysis may be better able to meet the requirements of local resource 
allocation. 
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Comparison of alternative options in terms of costs and outputs. 
Synonymous with pursuit of efficiency 
The relationship between inputs and outputs. To be efficient means 
maximising outputs in relation to inputs. There are two types: 
Technical efficiency: addresses whether production of output occurs in 
the best way possible without wasting any resources 
Allocative efficiency: addresses whether production of the pattern of 
output best satisfies consumer demand (assuming that prices reflect 
consumer demand in perfect markets) 
The value of foregone benefit which could be obtained from the next-
best alternative use 
All resources are limited in supply 
Economists are typically interested in marginal or incremental changes 
(for instance, what are the costs and benefits of expanding an oncology 
unit in a hospital?), because of the relationship with efficiency. So, for 
instance, the average benefit can increase from expanding a unit, but the 
marginal benefit of expanding the unit to the nth degree might not be 
worth the cost 
Measure of satisfaction, well-being, or pleasure 
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Executive summary 
Health economics is the discipline of economics applied to the health care 
system. Health economics rests on the fundamental economic principles as the 
rest of economics: scarcity of resources, opportunity cost, and the margin 
(defined in the list on the previous page). Health economics research typically 
examines areas such as: health system planning; demand for and supply of 
health care; determinants, and valuation, of health; and evaluation of diagnostic 
and therapeutic procedures. Economic evaluation can potentially advise 
decision makers on how to achieve the greatest health gains within available 
resources. Without an appropriate economic basis for decision-making, it could 
be that services and treatments that are not proven to be efficient are commonly 
delivered, whereas those that are proven efficient are not delivered. Economic 
evaluation is seen to be increasingly used in the health sector, particularly in the 
Western World (North America and Western Europe)! partly due to the 
evidence-based decision-making environment in these areas.2 
There has been an increasing number of economic evaluations performed in 
health care over the past thirty years.3 For instance, there were approximately 
one hundred evaluations of tuberculosis (TB) control between the years 1982 
and 2002, compared to the relatively small amount of work in previous years.! 
However, little is known about the influence of economic evaluation on health 
care decision-making,4, 5,6, 7 although there is a growing concern that it is, in 
practice, limited?,8 Use of economic evaluation in local and national health care 
decision-making has been widely debated at health economics conferences in 
the UK and internationally} 
i For instance, the Health Economists' Study Group (HESG) and International Health Economics 
Associations (IHEA) have devoted entire sessions to this topic. 
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The overall aim of this thesis is to explore stakeholders' (local decision makers' 
and health economists') views and opinions about the use of economic 
evaluation. The use of economic evaluation has not been previously 
investigated in-depth using satisfactory methodology/methods, enabling 
decision maker's perceptions to be assessed. Further, health economists' views 
and opinions have not been solicited on this topic in a comprehensive way. 
The focus is on the local level where decisions are made for the provision and 
commission of health care services to a community, for instance by a Primary 
Care Trust (PCT). Specific objectives of the research were: 
1. To explore decision-making at the local level; 
2. To investigate what factors decision makers perceive to be relevant to 
decision-making; 
3. To ascertain whether economic evaluation techniques and practice is 
used in decision-making; 
In relation to the local study, the sequence of events which occurred during the 
fieldwork is represented in Figure A: 
Figure A: design of study 
LOCAL STUDY: 
Observation, doc. analysis, and in-
depth interviews 
1 
Workshop - data collection on 
attempted use of economics 
1 
Observation, doc. analysis, and in-
depth interviews 
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The initial stage of the project, which took place over a period of approximately 
twelve months, involved observation of a commissioning group for cancer care 
(the Cancer Group, or CG). This group was part of the PCT at the local level, 
although the geographical area has been anonymised. In addition to 
observation, documentary analysis of reports or papers brought to/referred to 
during the meetings as well as in-depth interviews were also conducted. 
Following this, a workshop on economics was held upon the request of the 
chair of the CG (and was delivered by an outside speaker). The local study 
differs from what appears, in a quantitative paradigm, to be a 'before and after' 
study, where an intervention is deliberately constructed, and the aim was not to 
try to determine whether changes resulted from this workshop. Instead, the 
workshop not only allowed the researcher to observe decision makers trying to 
prioritise but subsequently provided the opportunity to explore their feelings 
about the role of economics in further interviews, which had not been 
previously possible. Decision makers who were interviewed in this second 
round were selected to include those who had attended the workshop, but also 
those important to the process of decision-making as perceived by those already 
interviewed. 
The work conducted with health economists comprised a parallel project, 
involving interviews with senior UK health economists, purposefully selected 
according to their role. The aim of these interviews was to explore their views 
of use of economic evaluation in local decision-making in the NHS. This is 
important since it is necessary to find out how far their views and opinions 
differ from local decision makers and to be able to reflect on the work 
undertaken by this group (as the main producer of economic evaluations in the 
UK). 
The thesis is structured as follows. The first two chapters provide a literature 
review of the main topics in this thesis. Chapter one of this thesis explores the 
literature on the context and structure of National Health Service (NHS) 
decision-making. The first section of the chapter examines possible 
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organisational structures for delivering health care, and the background to the 
NHS in terms of policies, institutions, and actors. The second section then 
moves on to explore models of decision-making (grouped into broad categories 
of rational and non-rational models), which can be used to examine the 
behaviour of decision makers within organisations such as the NHS. The third 
section investigates rationing or priority setting, where decisions are made for a 
group of patients, and where the basis for decision-making can be implicit or 
explicit. The fourth section examines how research evidence might be used in 
decision-making (being closely related to the models of decision-making) and 
provides an interpretation for some of the findings in chapter 2. The final 
section of this chapter provides a conclusion, drawing together the main 
arguments. 
Chapter two focuses on the literature on the use of economic evaluation in 
deciSion-making. The chapter begins by exploring recent developments in 
economic evaluation. Subsequent sections assess the use of economic 
evaluation, barriers to use, and incentives for greater use in health care decision-
making. Findings are drawn from a systematic review, focusing on literature 
exploring use of economic evaluation at the local level. A methodological 
appraisal of the empirical studies examined is also provided. The final section 
provides a conclusion, summarising the main points of this chapter. 
Chapter three presents the background to the approach taken in this study, as 
well as the specific methods used. The chapter begins by discussing the 
ontology, epistemology, and methodology associated with two research 
paradigms: positivist (typically used by economists) and 
constructivist/interpretivist (commonly used by qualitative researchers). It 
concludes that a qualitative approach will most successfully achieve the aims of 
this thesis. A modified' grounded theory' approach was used to investigate the 
research question, combining observation of 'real-life' decision-making, 
documentary analysis, and in-depth interviews, some on more than one 
occasion, with those involved in decision-making for cancer services within one 
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area in the NHS. The chapter moves on to describe the methods used in this 
thesis to examine the views and opinions of health economists, as well as the 
qualitative analysis performed for the empirical work. 
Chapter's four to six contain the findings from the empirical work. Chapter 
four focuses on decision-making at the local level. Here it is suggested that, 
although decision-making appears to be relatively dear and structured, there is 
an informal process revealing a far more complex system. With this in mind, 
chapter five investigates local decision makers' use of economic evaluation. 
Although the initial concern of the thesis was to examine the use of only 
economic evaluation in health care decision-making, the research conducted 
here goes beyond this and explores understanding of economic concepts and 
ways of thinking associated with economics. Chapter six examines health 
economists' perceptions of the use of economic evaluation by decision makers. 
The final chapter of this thesis explores the main findings in the light of other 
research on this topic. This chapter is divided into six sections. The first section 
compares and contrasts views and opinions of decision makers and health 
economists' about local health care decision-making. This section further 
examines findings in relation to the organisational and decision-making models 
in chapter 1. The second section discusses the focus of this thesis: the use of 
economic evaluation; barriers to use; and incentives for greater use; according to 
decision makers and health economists and in conjunction with the literature in 
chapter 2. These findings have important implications for health care priority 
setting and the work undertaken by health economists, explored in the third 
section of this chapter. The fourth section evaluates the success of the studies 
on local decision-making and health economists. There are suggestions for 
researchers wishing to conduct any future work in this area in the fifth section. 
The final section provides a brief cond usion to this thesis. 
This thesis makes an important contribution to health services research in two 
main ways. First, it provides insight into how priority decisions are made (or 
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equally not made, or avoided) in the NHS. Second, it provides further and 
unique evidence of the growing concern that I technical' health economics 
approaches to priority setting do not fit well with the culture and management 
processes of the NHS. 
Throughout this thesis, the terms meso and local level are used interchangeably, 
as are the terms priority setting and rationing. In addition, the term informant 
is often used to denote the individual researched in this thesis. On other 
occasions, they are labelled" decision maker" or "health economist", although it 
is acknowledged that these terms are limited and they are used only for analysis 
purposes. 
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Chapter 1: Decision-making in the NHS 
This chapter covers a number of seemingly diverse areas, yet all enlighten 
different aspects of the context facing decision makers in the NHS. That is the 
purpose of this chapter. It begins by examining the organisational structures 
within which decision-making takes place. In this section, theoretical 
organisational structures are described and the current organisation of the NHS 
is both described and assessed in terms of these models. The second section of 
the chapter explains the different theoretical models of decision-making. The 
third section of the chapter looks at the nature of decision-making where the 
rationing of interventions is involved. Here relevant empirical evidence of 
decision-making in the NHS is examined in relation to the models of decision-
making. The fourth section considers the nature of the use of research evidence 
in decision-making. The final section of this chapter provides a conclusion, 
drawing the main arguments together and exploring the differences in context 
between those faced in the NHS and those that form the basis of economic 
thinking. 
1. Organisation of health care 
1.1 Models 
It is important to understand the models of health care organisation to be able to 
gain insight into the overall context and structure in which decision-making 
takes place. In this section, organisational models for delivering health care (or 
indeed any product or service) are commonly referred to as the market model,9 
the command and control model9 (or hierarchical modeIIO), and the network 
mode1.9 Each is discussed in turn, although more than one of these models can 
exist at the same time. 
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a) Market model 
A market is essentially an adjustment mechanism for demand and supply, 
freely permitting the exchange of goods and services between consumers and 
producers without the need for intervention from the Government.ll The 
market adjusts using price signals (where prices determine the allocation of 
resources or production of goods or services) and, at a given market price, 
producers offer their goods or services for sale and consumers purchase these 
according to their desires.12 Market equilibrium is reached when producers are 
able to sell all they want (to maximise their profits) and consumers are able to 
buy all they want (to maximise their utility or satisfaction).12 These notions are 
present in Smith's famous 'invisible hand' theorem13 which suggests that this 
situation occurs even though it is not intentional and consumers and producers 
have no knowledge of it (hence 'invisible'). 
A perfect market system, which describes an ideal (theoretical) system, delivers 
maximum consumer satisfaction within the available resources. The economy 
will be in a pOSition of 'Pareto' optimality (named after the famous Italian 
economist), because it will be impossible to make one person better off without 
making someone else worse Off.14 However, this system can only work under 
certain conditions (Table 1.1).11 
Assumption 
Certainty 




Table 1.1: conditions of a perfect market system 
Explanation 
Consumers know exactly what goods or services they want and where 
they can get them from 
There are no 'spillovers' from production or consumption of 
commodities, since these cannot be accounted for in the market as 
everyone considers only the costs and benefits to themselves 
There is perfect knowledge of the market (in health care this implies that 
the patient is aware of his or her health status and the relevant 
treatment options) 
ii An externality exists when one person's consumption of a good or service has an effect on another's.14 
An example of a positive externality is a household in a neighbourhood maintaining their garden, which 
has an (unintended) positive effect on those who see the garden (hence an increase in another person's 
utility), An example of a negative externality is pollution to a river, which harms the fish, and reduces the 
stock of fish for fishmongers in the area (hence a decrease in another person's utility), 
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The consumer acts in their own interest about what to consume (in 
Consumers act freely health care, independent of doctors for instance) 
Numerous, small Competition occurs only on the basis of price and producers keep prices 
producers with no as low as possible to attract consumers (in health care this would mean 
market power that no one decision maker has power over another) 
(Adapted from Donaldson and Gerard, p.2111) 
In practice, there are likely to be violations of the conditions in Table 1.1, leading 
to market failure.15 For instance, monopolies or duopolies have considerable 
market power. There are five major violations of the conditions for perfect 
markets in health care (Table 1.2). Arguably, the case for market failure in 
health care is greater than in other markets (for example, food) because of 
limitations in knowledge about health care among typical citizens (hence the 
role for doctors or specialists in health care). 








producers with no 
market power 
Violation 
Although some items of health care consumption (such as purchasing 
of spectacles once vision becomes deteriorated) can be planned, many 
items cannot be planned, since deteriorations in health are often 
sudden or unexpected 
There are various positive and negative externalities in health, which 
mean that others benefit from people's consumption of health care 
For minor common ailments, such as colds, consumers are likely to be 
aware of their health status and treatment options. However, for more 
acute conditions, consumers are unlikely to be aware of their health 
status and the treatment options available (for instance, in the case of 
treatments for cancer). In addition, knowledge of the health care 
market is likely to be less than knowledge of other more commonly 
used markets (such as food) 
Doctors are placed in a position of providing expert advice to patients, 
because of a lack of perfect knowledge of health care. The demand for 
health care can be influenced by the supply of care 
Entry to the market for health care is guarded by requirement for 
licenses for doctors and other medical professionals to practice 
(Adapted from Donaldson and Gerard, p.20-2511) 
There are ways of overcoming these problems within a market-based system. 
The market response to uncertainty in health care is to develop insurance 
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mechanisms to account for the financial costs of ill health. However, even then, 
market failure can arise from two sources: moral hazard and/ or adverse 
selection.ll Moral hazard arises because insurance reduces the cost of treatment 
at the point of consumption and so the individual might have less incentive to 
take care of themselves in order to prevent ill health.Is Moral hazard can be 
countered, to some extent, by the use of co-payments, where the individual 
pays a certain amount of the supplier's charge. In practice, however, total 
health care expenditures may not change if doctors provide similar total levels 
of service but to a smaller group of patients who can afford it.HAdverse 
selection occurs because purchasers of insurance tend to be more informed of 
their risk status than insurance companies.IS In a competitive market, 
premiums could be set to reflect the general health risks of the population, but 
this may lead to two groups being left uninsured: individuals with lower than 
average risks who find the insurance premium too high and so leave the 
market; and individuals with a higher risk (and are subjected to a tailored 
insurance premium or I experience rating') who find the premium too high 
and/ or cannot obtain insurance.IS This is not an efficiency problem, but an 
equity problem. However, adverse selection can also be seen as presenting an 
efficiency problem because of caring externalities (or the notion that individuals 
care about the health status of others and not just themselves). An individual's 
well being could therefore be affected by knowing that other individuals are not 
receiving adequate health care. 
An alternative version of the market model is called the quasi-market9 ,which is 
more likely to be used in health care in developed countries. Quasi-markets 
differ from conventional markets in that: they tend to be non-profit making and 
compete for public contracts; purchasing is often through a single agency; and 
consumers might be represented as agents rather than representing 
themselves.16 In health care, a quasi-market could involve the Government 
retaining purchasing of services, but separating purchasers from providers and 
encouraging competition between providers of care for service delivery.9 The 
Government provides money to purchasers of health care, who then purchase 
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on behalf of consumers or patients from the producers of health care. However, 
there has been little discussion so far on the exact role for the Government in 
quasi-markets, an important omission since the Government is integral to the 
quasi-market.17 It is not known for instance, whether the Government should 
intervene to ensure the market operates appropriately. Nevertheless, because 
there is a more controlled market situation, some of the problems associated 
with less restricted markets are potentially alleviated. 
b) Command and control model 
For Coase18 and Williamson,19 the fundamental question was: 'why do firms 
exist if the pricing system provides all of the co-ordination necessary for 
economic activity?' Coase argued that price-guided co-ordination is not 
costless, as typically assumed. It is proposed that there are transaction costs 
associated with the acquisition of information about prices and the process of 
exchange. Transaction costs can be defined as "any activity which is engaged in 
to satisfy each party to an exchange that the value given and received is in 
accord to his or her expectations" (Ouchi, p.13020). From a transactions cost 
perspective, markets fail when the price mechanism does not allocate resources 
effectively and the costs of completing contracts become too high (hence 
promoting the role of an organisation).20 The market is only efficient when 
there is little ambiguity over individual performance.2o Williamson has 
helpfully categorised market failure into "human factors" (bounded rationality 
and opportunistic behaviour) and II environmental factors" (uncertainty and 
small numbers) [Williamson, p.21-4019]. Bounded rationality refers to limits to 
the amount of information reasonable individuals can store (discussed further 
in section 2.1). Opportunistic behaviour is an extension of self-interest to allow 
for strategic behaviour, which can involve selecting or distorting information, or 
making calculated promises about future behaviour.19 Environmental factors 
include uncertainty [which arises because decision-making is not 
"deterministic" (Williamson, p.2319), since it cannot be specifically planned and 
mediated before-hand] and small numbers (referring to a less than competitive 
situation due to a limited number of buyers of sellers). However, only a 
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combination of two or more of the individual attributes in the factors can cause 
market failure.19 For instance, opportunism itself does not imply that markets 
fail and it is the opportunism together with small numbers that can lead to the 
problem of bilateral monopolists. 
Hierarchies can exist in an organisation, as an attempt to reduce transaction 
costs. Firms will organise themselves internally when the transaction costs are 
lower than when activities are organised through markets. Here the 
Government is a large organisation, perceived as being bureaucratic in nature 
and operating through command and control. A bureaucracy has been defined 
as "a corporate body which mediates the relationship by placing a value on each 
contribution and then compensating it fairly" (Ouchi, p.13020), where the 
relationship is between the organisation and its workers. This distinguishes 
bureaucracies from markets, where transactions are mediated by the price 
mechanism.2o 
In health care, externalities are strong arguments for the Government's role in 
resource allocation. Positive externalities may accrue, as in the case of 
vaccinations, as vaccinating one individual prevents transmission of the virus to 
others.ll In such situations, there is a role for the Government to subsidise or 
provide, free of charge, immunisations, since this would need to be delivered on 
a national scale.14 In addition, people might care about other people's health 
care needs as well as their own, which can be seen as a positive externality .14 
For instance, some people would have a greater utility from knowing that a life-
saving technology was available not just to them, but also to others who could 
not afford to use it. Here, the market response would be to distribute resources 
efficiently, and then employ the right amount of taxes and subsidies to 
redistribute income.14 However, the problem is that it is virtually impossible to 
establish the appropriate level of taxes and subsidies.14 
Although bureaucracies are typically introduced when markets fail or need 
supplementing, they are not always a perfect solution. Bureaucracies can fail 
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when /I ambiguity of performance evaluation becomes significantly greater than 
that which brings about market failure" (Ouchi, p.13420). The final part of this 
section discussed an alternative model. 
c) Network model 
A network has been defined as: 
A spedfic type of relation linking a defined set of persons, objects or events ... The set of 
persons, objects, or events by which a network is defined may be called the actors or 
nodes. These elements possess some attribute(s) that identify them as members of the 
same equivalence class for purposes of determining the network among them. 
(Knoke and Kuklinkski, p.17521) 
Examples of networks include labour unions20 and health care systems 
comprising interactions between doctors, nurses, and patients21 • Differences 
between networks can exist with regard to the way they are internally 
organised. Williamson has defined networks as "wheel" or 1/ all-channel". A 
wheel, often referred as a hub and spokes system, refers to a series of 
hierarchies controlled by a single unit. In an all-channel network, all bodies are 
connected to each other in the organisation, so that there is no hierarchy.22 
Networks emphasise the organisation of social relations and the behavioural 
implications for individual units and for the whole network. Essentially, 
networks rely upon relationships that foster trust and co-operation.9,20 Trust has 
been defined as the expectation that a person or institution will respond in an 
appropriate manner, consistent with their roles and responsibilities.23 Trust 
appears to be particularly important when there is uncertainty and the level of 
risk is high, because there needs to be a minimum level of understanding in 
such circumstances between co-workers.24 
In health care, there is a need for trust to exist between the purchaser and 
provider of health care, where they are separated from each other, since there 
are likely to be problems in measuring and monitoring quality of care.25 This 
means that purchasers might rely on information relating to reputation and 
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trust that providers will deliver appropriate care when assessing provider 
performance.25 According to Arrow, using a trusted agent can economise on 
transactions costs,26 although there appears to be little investigation into the role 
of trust in modern (neo-classical) economics25 or the role of networks. 
However, networks do not appear to offer a complete solution to the problems 
presented by markets or hierarchies. Williamson27 suggests that networks are 
unstable in the long run because of co-ordination problems. He argues that 
because decisions require consent, the decision-making process is likely to be 
costly.27 
It is difficult from the arguments presented so far to conclude that one model of 
health care organisation is better than another. In reality, all are likely to face 
problems. As evidenced by a typical market-based system, the US, there are 
problems associated with inability for some members of the population to 
afford basic health care and increasing health care costs. In the UK, which 
might be seen as a traditionally command and control system, difficulties are 
associated with long waiting lists, rising costs to the Government, lack of patient 
choice, and a perception of ratiOning. 





The organisational models are, however, theoretical. This section explores their 
applicability to the NHS, beginning by describing how health care is typically 
organised in the NHS. Although there are variations in England, Wales, 
Scotland, and Northern Ireland,28 the focus here will be on England. This 
section first discusses the organisations and actors involved at various levels of 
decision-making. It then moves on to examine the corresponding applicability 
of the models of organisation. The final part of this section addresses agency 
relationships, which are crucial to the understanding of any health care system. 
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a) Organisation and actors 
The NBS provides health care for all citizens, with the aim to achieve the 
highest level of health for citizens, within available resources.29 There are three 
commonly used terms in the literature which describe the levels in health care 
decision-making (the macro level, the meso level, and the micro leve130,31) and 
these relate to the organisation of health care (Figure 1.1). 
Figure 1.1: overview of the NHS organisation in England 
Macro level Department of Health Modernisation 














Provision of care 
Micro level 
(Adapted from www.doh.co.uk) 
The macro level 
Although the macro level is not the focus of the empirical research presented in 
this thesis, it is important to understand the way in which decisions that are 
made 'higher up' in the hierarchy might affect policies or actions taken at either 
the meso or micro levels. The Government, through the Department of Health 
(DoH), is responsible for leading the direction of the NHS. Essentially, the 
health service is a national service and is accountable to Parliament.32 At the 
macro level, decisions are made by politicians to determine the level of 
resources for the health care system. Currently, the DoH has decided upon five 
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specific clinical priorities, in cancer, Coronary Heart Disease (CHD), mental 
health, older people, and children.33 The general direction in which policy 
should develop is contained in the recent White Papers and subsequent acts of 
Parliament.34 Also at the macro level, the Modernisation Agency advises NHS 
managers and clinicians to deliver improvements (or modernisation) to their 
services29 and they work directly with the DoH. 
Two other agencies are also part of the macro level and have had increasing 
importance in the last few years: the National Institute for Health and Clinical 
Excellence (NICE) and the Health Care Commission (HCC). In England and 
Wales, NICE has the role of assessing drugs and medical devices based on 
evidence about their clinical effectiveness and cost-effectiveness.35 One of the 
main reasons for establishing NICE was to curb "postcode prescribing" 
(patients in different geographical areas receiving different treatments or 
services based on their location).35 As from April 2005, NICE has also taken on 
the role of evaluating public health interventions. The HCC is essentially an 
inspectorate, since it is responsible for evaluating the performance of NHS 
institutions and monitoring adherence to Government policy, such as the 
National Service Frameworks (NSFs), which specify good practice in different 
speciality areas. In addition, the HCC is responsible for monitoring and 
controlling a I star system' whereby Trusts and PCTs are awarded points (from 
zero to three) depending on their performance.36 Process indicators, such as 
compliance with targets, largely determine the number of awarded stars. The 
targets, set out in the NHS Plan,37 are in terms of meeting required clinical 
standards, such as the number of hospital beds and medical staff, as well as 
maximum waiting times. For many interventions, waiting lists are used to 
determine the order in which patients receive services. Patients needing certain 
procedures or interventions within the hospital are put onto a list and called 
forward to receive the intervention when there is a space for them. Certain 
waiting time targets exist for patients with urgent conditions. For instance, the 
waiting times for diagnosis and treatment for suspected cancer cases, as 
specified in the Cancer Plan (2003),38 are as follows: 
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o Maximum two-week wait from an urgent GP referral for suspected 
cancer to date first seen for suspected cancers by end of 2000; 
o Maximum one-month wait from urgent GP referral to first treatment for 
children's cancers, testicular cancer and acute leukaemia by end 2001; 
o Maximum one-month wait from diagnosis to first treatment for breast 
cancer; 
o Maximum two-month wait from urgent GP referral to first treatment for 
breast cancer by 2002; 
o Maximum two-month wait from urgent GP referral for suspected cancer 
to first treatment for all cancers by 2005; 
o Maximum one-month wait from diagnosis to treatment for all cancers by 
2005. 
The meso level 
At the meso level, decisions are made on behalf of the local population about 
the amount of money that should be assigned to programmes or to specialties. 
Strategic Health Authorities (SHAs), which typically cover an average 
population of 1.5 million39, develop strategies for the NHS and performance 
manage their local NHS organisations, involving overseeing activities among 
peTs and Trusts (or hospitals).32 Special Health Authorities (Special HAs), of 
which there are almost twenty in England, including the National Blood 
Authority (NBS), provide health services to the whole of England, rather than 
specifically to a local community. 
Below the SHA and Special HAs, Primary Care Trusts (PeTs) are responsible 
for providing and commissioning local services, as well as developing primary 
and community health services and improving health in their areas32 (where an 
area typically consists of about one hundred thousand people40). PeTs 
generally commission from secondary care Trusts; they are responsible for 
ensuring that services they offer are delivered to a high quality.29 Typically a 
PCT is run by a board, including a chairman, chief executive, finance director, 
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director of public health, and non-executive directors or lay people.32 The day-
to-day operation of the PCT is the domain of a professional executive 
committee, comprising a majority of professional members such as GPs and 
nurses, and members from the PCT.32 
Formal policy at the local level is largely guided through Local Delivery Plans 
(LDPs), which focus on the health and social care priorities set out in the 
Priorities and Planning Framework (PPF). The PPF covers a three-year period 
and identifies national priorities and targets that organisations need to 
incorporate into their local plans.41 The PPF for the period 2003 to 2006 
specifically identifies priorities to include: improving access to all services 
(through better emergency care, reduced waiting, and greater patient choice); 
focusing on improving services and outcomes (in the five clinical areas 
mentioned previously); and reducing health inequalities.41 More generally, the 
PPF formally states the need to: "focus on priorities,[ ... ] extract the maximum 
value from every pound, be prepared to change old practices, be creative and 
take uncomfortable and difficult decisions in the drive to improve quality and 
respond to people using services" (Nigel Crisp, Chief Executive of the NHS41). 
At the local level however, PCTs have the freedom to develop local, non-PPF, 
priorities. 
The PCT appears to be fundamental to the process of local health care delivery. 
Its responsibility is reflected in the fact that, as from April 2003, PCTs have been 
entrusted to control up to 75% of the NHS budget,91 32 although it would be 
surprising if this were achievable to the same degree in all localities. The 
purpose of entrusting the PCT with a large proportion of the budget is to ensure 
that staff in contact with patients can influence how resources are used.32 
Indeed, although PeTs are required to 'break-even', they can retain any surplus 
in their budget, which can be spent on services or facilities for their local 
community.9 However, it has been suggested that PeTs do not have sufficient 
resources to manage the organisational change that they have been subject to.4O 
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At the local level, two new providers of care are NHS direct and NHS walk-in 
centres. NHS Direct is a twenty-four hour telephone service for nurse advice 
and health information.29 Nurses use a computerised decision-support 
software in order to triage callers: to self-care; to contact their GP immediately 
or later; or to attend Accident and Emergency (A&E).42 However, whether NHS 
Direct provides an alternative to traditional GP-based services is questionable. 
Analysis of routinely collected data during a recent influenza-like illness 
epidemic suggested that there was no impact on the number of GP 
consultations, in relation to the illness.43 The appropriateness of triaged 
decisions in NHS Direct has also been queried.42 
Walk-in centres provide physical access to medical advice without an 
appointment29 during convenient hours (usually 7am to 10pm every day) and 
in a convenient 10cation.44 The dual purposes of the centres are to address 
unmet need in primary care and to address issues of access.45 The centres 
provide information and treatment for minor conditions, and are led by 
nurses.44 However, there appears to be limited evidence that service delivery in 
walk-in centres is planned in response to needs.44 Although Le Grand views the 
creation of walk-in centres as a form of competition to GP based services9, they 
do not appear to attract a different population from those visiting GPS44 and 
there has not been any evidence of impact on out-of-hours services.46 In this 
sense, walk-in centres may be no more economical than GP based services, 
particularly because consultations in the former tend to be lengthy.44 Despite 
these concerns, a recent postal survey has shown that the majority of local 
providers are in favour of walk-in centres, although GPs in particular tend to be 
concerned with the continuity of care provided there.45 
The micro level 
At the micro level, health care profeSSionals, such as GPs and hospital doctors, 
make decisions about the treatment of individual patients,3D inevitably 
involving decisions about who to treat and what treatment or services they 
should receive.34, 47 GPs and hospital doctors are typically direct providers of 
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services who determine, in conjunction with the patient, the direction of 
treatment.32,48 Furthermore, groups of GPs have clinical and financial 
responsibility, since they must make prescribing and referral decisions within 
their budget. 34 
b) Market, hierarchy, or network? 
All three models of organisation appear to be used in the NHS. The command 
and control model" dominated both network and market" during the early 
years of the Labour Government (Le Grand, p.1489) and the hierarchical nature 
of the health care system is also reflected in the levels of decision-making in 
Figure 1.1. Indeed, five clinical priorities (defined previously) have been set at 
the national level and are a major focus in formal PCT decision-making (in the 
LOP). In addition, there is a strong emphasis on meeting national targets, 
which are used as a basis to rate the quality of Trusts and PCTs. A comparison 
has been made between the feudal system, of knights being delegated property 
in return for fighting for the king, and the need to meet targets by senior 
managers in the NHS.10 
However, the command and control system alone does not fully explain the 
organisational structure of the NHS. A market based system was in place 
during the internal (or quasi-) market, set up by the Conservative Government 
in 1991, which categorised HAs and GP fundholders (who were essentially 
budget holders) as the purchasers of health care and independent Trusts as 
providers of health care (hence the 'purchaser-provider split').9, 49, so The role of 
purchasers was to assess health requirements and purchase services to meet 
these requirements, whereas the role of providers was to deliver services 
against contracts or service agreements.50 Although the internal market was 
largely abolished, or, at least, pushed somewhat backstage by the current 
Government,9 the purchaser-provider split has been retained (PCTs became 
'commissioners' and contracts became long-term agreements9). This might 
explain why PCTs have been specifically compared to Managed Care 
Organisations (MCOs) in the market health care system in the US,51,52 since, in 
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essence, both are free-standing bodies with responsibility for providing 
community health services. 
Currently, there is a drive towards devolving power and responsibility to 
patients,53 further suggesting a more market based system of health care 
delivery. PCTs are coming under increasing pressure to cope with greater 
market incentives. 54, 55 Patient choice has empowered patients to demand the 
type of treatment they want, as well as when and where they receive it.54 In 
theory, patients are able to choose a Trust with a lower waiting time or better 
accommodation.2S There is a problem however in that those who require the 
most care may well get the least, because the sickest and worst-off tend to lack 
substantial knowledge of the organisation of health care in order to make 
informed decisions.2S The Government has also advocated consumer groups 
(consisting of patients, users, and carers) to be involved in making decisions,56 
again implying greater power among consumers. 
Market pressures have also arisen through financial incentives created by these 
initiatives. Payment by results mean that Trusts are being funded on the basis 
of the work they undertake,32 which implies greater pressure for them to 
'compete' by 'producing more'. This, however, only takes into account the 
work, which is being undertaken and does not reflect other aspects such as the 
quality of the services being offered by the Trust. In addition, the scheme of 
Private Finance Initiative (PFI) involves the private sector raising money on the 
Government's behalf, in return for a contract to design and build a hospital and 
operate the facilities for thirty years or more.57 This scheme has been criticised 
for reducing the comparative advantage of public sector procurement57, creating 
increased costs and therefore being potentially detrimental to patient's quality 
of care, which could be reduced as a result of trying to save money. 
Perhaps the greatest pressure on PeTs is the Government's idea for Foundation 
Trusts.58,59,60 Foundation Trust status allows NHS hospitals and PCTs to be 
locally, rather than nationally, accountable and thereby have increased freedom 
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to control their level of spending and make specific decisions for their 
community. They will be, essentially, driven by the demands of PCTs, as well as 
patients and regulators,28 although they are still obliged to follow national 
policies. Potential disadvantages of Foundation Trusts include greater 
bureaucracy because of new accountability arrangements61 and creating the risk 
of a "two-tier" health system, where Foundation Trusts improve in contrast to 
non-Foundation Trusts.62 This questions whether Foundation Trusts can really 
generate greater quality of patient care and points to potential discrepancies in 
care of patients in different Trusts. 
Although together the command and control and market models describe some 
elements of the current system quite well, there also appear to be elements of 
the network model. Local health strategies, as defined in the LDP, provide a 
means of translating national targets into practice, through the integration of 
various institutions and actors.32 As suggested in Figure 1.1, PCTs and Trusts 
decide the delivery of care most appropriate to their local population. 
Networks also exist between Trusts themselves and between various groups 
operating under the PCT.9 In addition, clinical networks provide a framework 
for organising and developing local clinical services. 53 These networks can be 
service focused, in relation to specific diseases (such as cancer), specific 
specialties (such as cardiology),63 or client grouped (such as older people). The 
Calman-Hine report on Cancer Services signified the beginning of a network in 
cancer care.64 Cancer networks are intended to provide expertise in cancer care, 
ranging from primary care through to cancer units in hospital. So far, thirty-
four cancer networks have been established in England. There are also 
networks in CHD and vascular surgery. Clinical networks have the potential to 
alleviate traditional boundaries between primary, secondary, and tertiary care, 
as well as providing configurations that are likely to be more closely aligned to 
the patient's pathway (their experience of care), rather than to the institutions.53 
Clinical networks have the benefits of being clinically focused, collaborative, 
and flexible, responding well to environmental change.65 
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c) Agency relationships 
Although there are different organisational structures in any health care system, 
agency relationships between decision makers can be applicable to any model.66 
The principal-agency relationship exists because the principal is ill-informed 
about some area and therefore employs an agent with specialist skills or 
knowledge to make decisions on their behalf.67 The formal principal-agency 
theory applies to the following situation: 
One individual, called the agent and denoted A, must choose some action a from a given 
set of actions fa}. The particular outcome x which results from this choice depends also 
on which element from some given set of states of the world, fB}, actually prevails at the 
relevant time, so that uncertainty is intrinsic to the situation. The outcome x generates 
utility to a second individual, the principal, denoted P. A contract is to be defined 
under which P makes a payment y to A. A's utility depends both on this payment y and 
the value of the action, a. 
(Rees, p.368) 
The challenge for the principal is to devise incentives to ensure that the agent 
makes decisions in the principal's best interests (since the principal cannot 
observe the agents actions, resulting in information asymmetry).68 Both 
principal and agent are assumed to maximise their own utility or satisfaction. 
The utility functions, which characterise the important factors of principal and 
agent, are assumed to be independent of one another and represented as68,69: 
P utility function: 
A utility function: 
u = f(x,y) 
v = f(y,a) 
If the principal and agent's utility functions coincide, the agent will choose an 
action which maximises their utility as well as the principal's, although this 
might not necessarily be the case. Both principal and agent are assumed to be 
risk neutral or risk averse (so that they do not want to take risks).70 
Furthermore, it is assumed that both agent and principal have the same beliefs 
about the probability of the state of the world, although, in practice, the agent 
may have better information than the principa1.68 An additional assumption of 
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the model is that the agent's outcomes (dependent on e and a) are observable, 
although in practice this will be difficult to achieve.7O 
In health care, there are three clearly discernable principal-agency relationships 
between: 1) doctors and patients; 2) decision makers and society; and 3) decision 
makers as agents for other decision makers in an organisation, as in 
commissioning relationships. Firstly, patients act as the principal and employ 
the doctor to act as an expert on their behalf in making decisions about the 
consumption of health care.71 There is information asymmetry between doctors 
and their patients in that doctors have more expert knowledge. In a perfect 
agency relationship the doctor would act entirely as if hel she was the patient. 
In practice, however, there is likely to be interdependence between the patient's 
and the doctor's utility function72 implying that the doctor includes some part of 
the patient's interests in his or her own objectives, but also has his or her own 
interests to pursue (such as financial interests), which may conflict with the 
interests of the patient.69 However, whether this is the case remains a contested 
issue among some economists.69 Secondly, there might also be a case where 
decision makers act as an agent for the wider society given scarcity of 
resources.71 In such cases, decision makers take a societal perspective and make 
decisions for groups of patients. Thirdly, there are likely to be agency 
relationships between decision makers themselves, as in commissioning 
relationships, for instance between PeTs and Trusts, or managers and clinicians. 
Few studies, however, have used principal-agent theory to explore 
commissioning relationships in the NHS, with the most extensive research to 
date being conducted by Baxter.66 This study found that there was a weak link 
in the principal-agency chain of commissioning and this necessarily led to non-
compliance with decisions. 
2. Theories of decision-making 
So far, the discussion has shed light on the complexity of the organisation of 
health care at the local level, in terms of the actors involved, their formal 
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relationships, and the possible organisational structures which decision makers 
might operate in. However, it is also important to explore the behaviour or 
decision-making of individuals within organisations in order to find out how 
decisions might be made. There are two broad models of decision-making that 
can be used to study NHS decision-making: rational and non-rational models. 
Rational models include classic rationality (as assumed in neo-classical 
economics), alternative rationalities, such as game rationality, and other 
I rational' models which focus on the organisation rather than the individual, as 
in the incremental model of decision-making73 and pluralism (or political model 
of decision-making),74 In contrast, the anarchy or garbage can modeF5 assumes 
the alternative case of non-rational decision-making. Apart from the classic 
model of rationality, the models here do not prescribe how decisions ought to 
be made, but are largely descriptive. The discussion here is also mainly 
theoretical and section 3 will focus on how decisions are actually made in the 
NHS. 
2.1 Rational models of decision-making 
a) Classic rationality (in neo-classical economics) 
Economists, on the whole, assume rationality .76 Although rationality might 
mean something different in an everyday senseili, it has a specific meaning in 
the theory of choice, which is the basis of most neo-classical economic theory. 
Smith13 suggested that rational self-interest drives man to want to uphold the 
Government because he is then free to pursue his own activities and leave the 
running of the country to the Government. In this sense, self-interest is not seen 
as negative, because it facilitates an optimal working of the economy. However, 
this definition does not explain the specific meaning of rationality in neo-
classical economics, and economists later conjured the term rationality rather 
than self-interest. Rational models of decision-making regard the household 
as a unitary decision-making body that makes decisions for all its members 
iii The standard dictionary defInition of ''rational'' refers to individuals as being endowed with reason or 
having a sound judgement. 
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about what they do and what they will each consume.77 Thus, the household 
is assumed to be a single decision maker with shared interests. 
It is assumed that an individual has a specific set of objectives which they will 
pursue.76,78 For example, an individual would like to buy a bundle of 
commodities which he or she can afford and which makes him or her feel most 
satisfied (in terms of utility).76 The objective is to maximize this utility (U) or 
bundle of goods yielding utility (X) subject to the constraints, which, in this 
case, could be income (Y): 
Maximise U (Xl, X2, ... ), subject to Y 
Economists typically assume the specification of the objective function from 
other disciplines. For example, on the basis of some human psychology, 
individuals are assumed to maximise satisfaction.79 The accuracy of such 
descriptions is rarely tested however. For this model to hold, there are three 
axioms of behaviour (reflexivity, completeness, and transitivity) that must be 





Table 1.3: rational choice axioms o[behaviour 
Explanation 
Assumes any bundle of good or service is always as good as itseli. So, for 
bundle X, Xi ,.., Xi (where"" means indifferent between the bundles, and i 
=l, .. n) 
Completeness means that any two bundles can be compared and ranked. 
Thus, for Xi and Y i, either Xi ~ Y i, or Yi ~ Xi or the consumer is indifferent 
between the two bundles, in which case Xi ,.., Yi 
Transitivity means that when one bundle of good or service, X, is preferred to 
another, Y, and Y to Z, then X should be preferred to Z. Hence, if Xi ~ Y i, and 
Yi~ Zi, then Xi ~ Zi 
(Adapted from Varian, p. 3578 and Hargreaves Heap, p.680) 
These axioms suggest individuals act rationally: they always choose what they 
most prefer, preferences are complete (so that they are never unable to chose 
between two options) and preferences are transitive. Thus, one test of 
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rationality used in economics is whether individuals are willing to pay more for 
commodity A than commodity B, if A is preferred to B.81 These axioms of 
behaviour however have received criticism from both within and outside 
economics for failing to reflect how individuals make decisions in practice.82 In 
particular, economists have recognised that the axiom of completeness might 
not hold in individual health care decision-making, with research suggesting 
that respondents to choice-related questionnaires have tended to I construct 
values' in response to questioning, rather than reporting previously formed 
preferences.83,84,85 For instance, using a Discrete Choice Experiment (DCE),iv 
Ryan and Miguel84 carried out a test to compare preferences for three different 
goods (a supermarket, dentist consultation, and bowel cancer screening) and 
found that for health goods in particular, preferences were constructed as 
respondents completed the exercise. This, they concluded, occurs because 
people are not familiar with making choices for health care. Similarly, Shiell et 
al83 found that during re-interviews, one-third of respondents (comprising staff 
and students from a University) deliberately changed their answers relating to 
preferences for full health and two chronic health states. It appeared that they 
were encouraged to reflect on the values they had given previously and adjust 
their preferences. Although the construction of preferences might be 
inconsistent with economic theory, it has been said that this does not "threaten 
economic theory", since "no reasonable person would suppose any definition of 
rationality to be universally and exactly defined" (San Miguel et al, In Press85). 
The transitivity condition has also been subject to criticism through alternative 
theories about how individuals behave, including regret theory and prospect 
theory. Regret theory offers an explanation for intransitive preferences. Both 
Be1l87 and Loomes and Sudgen88 offered definitions of regret associated with the 
dissatisfaction when comparing the outcome for an action with the outcome for 
a different action. For example, an individual might regret not taking an 
umbrella when it rains and hence getting wet. The utility function would be 
iv This. technique attempts to measure the extent to which an individual values a good or service, 
dependmg on 'levels' associated with its characteristics (or attributes).86 
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modified to take account of the effects of regret, using the value of the outcome 
reached (by not taking an umbrella) and the value of the outcome that would 
have been reached (had an umbrella been taken).89 The authors suggest that 
individuals do not maximise their expected utility, but attempt to minimise 
their anticipated regret. Prospect theory,90 which attempts to describe decisions 
under uncertainty, shows that people's attitudes toward risks concerning gains 
may be quite different from their attitudes toward risks concerning losses. 
Prospect theory differs from expected utility theory because probabilities are 
attached to particular outcomes, treating preferences as a function of decision 
weights. 
There do appear to be limitations of classic rationality, which economists are 
reluctant to consider. Typically classic rationality focuses on the relationship 
between information and choice (Figure 1.2). Peoples preferences are largely 
assumed to conform to the axioms of behaviour (as in Table 1.3).91 Similarly, 
the stages leading to a decision or choice (i.e. the process) are largely ignored, 
although, in practice, the decision-making process might affect preferences. 
However, since rational models are generally concerned with individual 
decision-making, it is unsurprising that process is not seen as important. 
Figure 1.2: limitations of the rational model 
Information Perceptions/ 
Preferences / beliefs 
, 
• 
Process Choi ce 
(Adapted from McFadden, p.7491) 
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Indeed, classic rationality is unlikely to reflect 'real' decision situations, because 
of its reliance on the unrealistic assumptions of there being a single decision 
maker, with a defined set of objectives, and whose preferences correspond to 
the axioms described previously. Furthermore, classic rationality fails to take 
into account lack of consensus over goals, constraints on time and financial 
resources, organisational problems which limit rationality, and lack of 
information to make informed choices. 
Although experiments have shown that a substantial number of people exhibit 
systematic patterns of choice that violate predictions of utility theory, this has 
not impeded the adoption of utility maximisation as the main model of 
behaviour of individuals by economists.92 Instead, it has been suggested that 
the experimental evidence showing violations of utility theory simply reveal 
where the approximations falter and is useful for this purpose.92 
Oassic rationality models are likely to be a good starting point for analysing 
decision-making and are relatively intuitive to understand, since some factors 
(such as behaviour) can be kept constant. With such a view of the world, 
economic evaluation would naturally be used by decision makers because it 
provides information for rational decision-making. Although this might not be 
the case, economists have been unwilling to abandon the model, as this would 
involve a new way of thinking - suggesting a possible reason why it appears 
that although some economists have adapted rationality, they have still 
assumed it exists. Favouring rationality for these reasons, however, may not 
provide sufficient justification since economists are ignoring 'real' life situations. 
In order to invoke economists to replace classic rationality, it would be 
necessary to show that it is not useful for the purposes it is being used.92 
Although this may have been shown, economists have been reluctant to 
abandon the model. 
b) Alternative rationalities 
Rather than assuming the strict version of rationality, there have been various 
departures from the definition, particularly over the past fifty or so years.931 94 
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Perhaps the most prominent of these departures is the notion of bounded 
rationality, developed by Simon,93 which suggests that individuals adopt short-
cut devices to decision-making and hence rationality is "bounded" because of 
informational and computational limits. Bounded rationality has been defined 
as "intendedly rational, but only limitedly so" (Simon, p. XXiV95). Although 
bounded rationality still assumes that decisions begin with specific goals and 
objectives and that there is clarity over goals, it takes into account physical 
limits on the ability of individuals to receive and store information, and also 
language limits because of the inherent inability of all individuals to articulate 
their knowledge or feelings in a way which is understood by others.95 Decisions 
are therefore characterised by "satisficing", or selecting a solution that meets a 
minimum standard of acceptance, rather than by maximising.96 Satisficing is not 
necessarily undesirable - it actually resolves problems by producing solutions 
that are satisfactory, as opposed to optimal but unobtainable. 
Although there is no complete theory of bounded rationality, three processes 
that models of bounded rationality can take are simple search rules, simple 
stopping rules, and simple decision rules.97 The first refers to a process of 
search whereby a piece of information is acquired and the process is continued 
up to some (undefined) point. The second refers to terminating search by 
simple stopping rules, such as to choose the first solution that satisfies an 
aspiration level. Searching for a radio station is a good example of this process. 
An individual will find it hard to optimise his or her choice, because it is not 
possible to search for all stations at the same time and most individuals will 
therefore stop searching upon hearing a song they like, or, at least, do not mind 
listening to.96 Finally, simple decision rules refer to choosing the most 
important solution from many. 
Since Simon's original work, further definitions of rationality, including game 
rationality and process rationality, have emerged. These are, again, believed to 
conform more closely to actual human behaviour than rationality.98 Firstly, 
game rationality refers to the tendency of individuals within organizations to 
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act in relation to each other and co-operate to fulfil individual objectives.98 A 
game is a situation where the actions of one person affect the welfare of another 
and vice versa.so This can lead to cooperation or rivalry. The essence of game 
theory is that individuals will try to predict what others will do in response to 
their actions, and then optimise on the basis that others are thinking the same. 
An example of game theory is "Prisoner's Dilemma" .80 Here, two suspects are 
taken into custody and separated. The police are certain that they are guilty of a 
crime, but there is inadequate evidence. They point out to the prisoners that 
there are two alternatives: to confess or not to confess. If they both do not 
confess, they will both receive minor punishment, whereas if they both confess 
they will be prosecuted. But, if one of them confesses and the other does not, 
the confessor will receive a lenient treatment, whereas the other will receive a 
harsh treatment. The 'payoffs' are as in Table 1.4. 
Not confess 
Confess 
Table 1.4: example ofprisoners dilemma 
Prisonerl 
Not confess Confess 
1 year each 
3 months for 2 
and 10 years for 1 
10 years for 2 and 
3 months for 1 
8 years each 
(Source: Hargreaves and Heap, p.9999) 
Here, there is a two-player one-shot game (the game is only played once). It is 
also a non-co-operative game since the prisoners cannot collaborate to make an 
agreement. Confessing is the strictly dominant strategy, since whatever 
prisoner 1 or 2 does, each does better by confessing. Game theoretic approaches 
go well beyond individual decision-making, towards the pluralistic models, 
discussed in a later section. However, game theory does not completely agree 
with pluralism, since the basis of game theory is the individual rather than the 
organisation. 
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Further, individuals might be less interested in the final outcome of the decision 
than the way in which the decision is reached. Process rationality refers to the 
act of decision-making conveying utility or disutility (displeasure), rather than 
the decision itself.98 The existence of process rationality has been empirically 
tested by Wailoo and Anand.1°O Here, six dimensions of procedure in relation to 
health care rationing were evaluated using a postal survey of the general public 
(at three different levels: the clinical level, local level, and Government). These 
dimensions were: ilvoice", or involvement in decision-making process, 
iI consistency" of deciSion-making (in terms of procedural consistency), iI absence 
of vested interests" or disproportionate balance of power, iltransparency" of 
decisions made in terms of given rationale, "reverSibility" of wrong decisions, 
and 1/ accuracy of information". The authors found that the majority of 
respondents believed procedures, or the way decisions are made regarding 
health care rationing, are important, although the degree of importance varied 
according to the type of procedure and decision-making context. For instance, 
respondents felt that it was more important for national, rather than local, 
rationing decisions to be made in consultation with the public. 
However, these more sophisticated approaches to rational decision-making, 
such as bounded rationality, game rationality, and process rationality still 
assume the general approach taken in neo-classical economics and therefore do 
not represent a highly significant departure. They presume that individuals are 
rational and that they have an objective to pursue. Economic evaluation would 
still be perceived as useful to these rational, albeit not neoclassical, decision 
makers, in helping them achieve these objectives. Other models that have been 
developed, such as incrementalism and pluralism, go more towards 
understanding the process of decision-making, although a notion of rationality, 
once again, is assumed to some degree. 
c) Incremental model (muddling through) 
Incrementalism (also referred to as 'muddling through'73 or the method of 
'successive limited comparisons'73) is based on the . on that policy should be 
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founded on a rational decision. Rationality is linked to political and 
organisational concerns101, which can be referred to as "collective rationality" 
(Gregory, p.229102). This suggests that although an organisation might be 
rational, individuals within it may deviate from this, although the nature of this 
is not specified. In this model, decisions are made through an iterative process 
and decision makers perform marginal or incremental comparisons, so that 
decisions differ only slightly from previous decisions. The reasons for making 
only marginal changes in decisions might be because of the difficulty in terms of 
time and money to gather information. "Disjointed incrementalism"l03 is a 
latter variant of this model, suggesting that decision-making is incremental 
because it is undertaken by different agencies within an organisation. It is more 
difficult to see how economic evaluation would influence decision-making 
where that decision-making is incrementalist in nature. 
d) Pluralism 
Pluralism suggests that the level of rationality is at the micro or individual level, 
rather than at the organisational level. Pluralism essentially means that there is 
more than one decision maker; in fact usually there is a range of different 
decision makers each competing so that power over decision-making becomes a 
crucial concept. The appropriate definition of power, however, has caused some 
debate. Dahl104 views power as: 
A has the power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not 
otherwise do. 
(Dahl, p.203-204104) 
This focuses on conflicts of interest. However, from this, it is not possible to 
know how B would have behaved had it not been for A's actions.tos Instead, 
Lukes106 proposed a 'two-dimensional' view of power, noting that: 
A also exercises power ... by influencing, shaping or determining his very wants. 
(Lukes, p.21106) 
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This associates the notion of power with authority. It is likely that, as Bachrach 
and Baratzl07 suggest, understanding power involves examining actual 
behaviour and the process of decision-making. Bachrach and BaratzlO7 suggest 
that power struggles might be reflected in the extent to which a non-decision 
occurs: 
Demands for change in the existing allocation of benefits and privileges in the 
community can be suffocated before they are even voiced; or kept covert; or killed before 
they gain access to the relevant decision-making arena; or, failing all these things, 
maimed or destroyed in the decision-implementing stage of the policy process. 
(Bachrach and Baratz, p.44l07) 
Pluralism and "political decision-making" has been comprehensively explained 
by Allison, writing about the missile crisis in Cuba.lOB The discovery of Soviet 
nuclear missiles in Cuba posed a challenge to Kennedy (the US president). The 
task was to persuade Krushchev (Soviet president) to withdraw the missiles, 
which he eventually succeeded in doing, by imposing a naval blockade. 
However, there was a considerable amount of bluff on the US side should the 
Soviets have decided to breech the blockade. Thus the relative power and 
bargaining abilities determined outcomes,lOB and although Kennedy might have 
been seen as rational, the way that the process of decision-making occurred was 
not straight forward. 
The concept of power presents a problem for rational choice theory. The latter 
usually abstracts from the institutional context, and the phenomenon of power, 
for instance in theory of the markets, is absent.8o Although new institutional 
economists have taken more of an interest in the institution, this focus tends to 
be on the institutional environment (such as the nature of bureaucracy) and the 
governance (as in transactions costs) rather than on notions of power.109 
Pluralistic decision-making may potentially be influenced by economic 
evaluation but in such a process it would need a champion whose aim is to 
ensure rational deciSion-making. Even with such a champion the different 
actors with their different incentives may take little notice of the rational 
solution. 
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2.2 Non-rationality: anarchy or garbage can model 
The anarchy or garbage can model illustrates that decision-making does not 
occur in an ordered manner, but as a complex interaction of four factors or 
streams of events: problems, solutions, participants, and choice opportunities.75 
They describe this as follows: 
An organisation is a collection of choices looking for problems, issues and feelings 
looking for decision situations in which they might be aired, solutions looking for issues 
to which they might be the answer, and decision makers looking for work. 
(Cohen, March and Olsen, p.275) 
Problems represent the divergence between an actual and a desired situation. 
Solutions help to formulate problems, which is contrary to classic rationality, 
where solutions are only developed in response to problems. Participants are 
defined as the flow of people involved in decision-making, whose involvement 
in the decision-making process is restricted by time pressures. Choice 
opportunities are the occasions when the organisation is expected to make a 
decision. The garbage can analogy is quite appropriate: people randomly 
discard rubbish and it is thrown together based on random interactions. In a 
garbage can, at anyone point in time, there might be teabags stuck to crisp 
wrappers, only because they happened to be thrown together at the same time 
(i.e. by coincidence). Similarly, decision-making might not follow an orderly 
series of steps. Thus, individuals can be assigned projects because of a low 
workload, and not necessarily because they are solving a problem and are really 
needed.96 The model further suggests that examining consequences in terms of 
objectives does not necessarily help to understand the decision-making 
process.75 Instead deciSion-making occurs when the four streams of events 
meet. 75 Hence problem identification and the solution might be unrelated and 
decisions can be made without solving problems. 
The garbage can model can be seen as a challenge to individual and 
organisational rationality. For instance, it suggests that there can be radical and 
unexpected changes in policy, unlike the incremental model where current 
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policy is a version of previous policy. However, a possible weakness of the 
garbage can model is that it does not take into account attempts to be rational, 
suggesting little or no role for economic evaluation. 
3. Allocative decision-making in the NHS 
Based on the detailed and comprehensive review of decision-making so far, 
attention is now turned to one of the main themes running through this thesis: 
how are allocative decisions made in the NHS? This section is devoted to 
exploring allocative decision-making (commonly referred to as rationing48,110 or 
priority setting32, 111,112) in the NHS. Such decisions concern which treatments 
or services to provide to patients in view of scarcity of resources. There is 
growing interest in the organisation and delivery of health care, as well as how 
decisions are made in the NHS, as a result of a perceived increase in the 
shortfall between expectations and what is available, commonly believed to be 
caused by an increasingly older population113 and improvements in medical 
technology.114 Types of rationing can be differentiated according to the degree 
of explicitness, where there is 'implicit' and' explicit' rationing, although these 
are a continuum and in practice most health care rationing is a mixture of 
both.111 In this section, relevant empirical evidence is drawn upon in relation to 
the models of deciSion-making. It appears that whilst implicit rationing has 
elements of pluralistic bargaining, incrementalism, and non-rationality, explicit 
rationing is based on classic rationality. 
3.1 Implicit rationing: pluralistic bargaining, 
incrementalism, and non-rationality 
Implicit rationing has elements of pluralistic bargaining, incrementalism, and 
non-rationality. Implicit rationing is lithe unacknowledged limitation of care, 
inevitably occurring where there is no explicit rationing" (Coast et aI, p.8111) 
particularly when clinicians (hospital doctors or GPs) make decisions for 
individual patients and are working within fixed budgets.11s These decisions 
and the reasonings behind these decisions (such as, for instance, equity, cost, or 
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health gain) are not clearly expressed however.lll In the NHS, GPs act as 
gatekeepers to secondary care, to control patients' access to specialist services. 
GPs decide which patients are in need of referring, based on some externally 
undefined criteria (although now the targets dictate a substantial amount of GP 
referral decisions, and this is also an explicit form of rationing).ll1 
Custom and practice and historical allocations (or basing decisions on what has 
been funded previously)116, 117 are two major ways in which implicit rationing is 
undertaken. The former case is the most common form of implicit rationing, 
where decisions are dependent on clinicians' judgements about the appropriate 
course of action, based on what the clinician was taught, their interpretation of 
the evidence, or prevailing practice, although there is no set procedure for 
rationing.47 Basing decisions on custom and practice is often value based and 
can disregard the resource impact of implementing priorities.l12, 118 This, in 
tum, may lead to inefficient provision of services. Similarly, basing decisions 
on historical allocations might be inefficient because it is presumed, similar to 
the incremental model of decision-making, that what has been done previously 
is optimal and can be revised slightly. 
With the existence of implicit rationing in the NHS and as a result of clinicians' 
autonomy and power in individual patient decision-making, decisions could 
also be seen as being made within a pluralistic framework, involving bargaining 
between clinicians and meso decision makers (who are also powerful because of 
their management role, but do not necessarily have patient contact).32, 119, 120 
However, clinician autonomy, as under GP fundholding for instancel21, has 
been curtailed in the movement towards' clinical governance' policy since the 
1980'Sl22, away from professional self-regulation and in favour of tighter 
monitoring and control of clinicians (particularly hospital doctors).123, 124 Little 
is known about how this has affected micro level decision-making. 
On the other hand, there is also evidence to suggest 'irrationality' in decision-
making by clinicians. 54, 125, 126 Jones et al119 showed how GPs often expressed 
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irrationality in much of their decision-making. They were frustrated by 
attempts by them, or by the Government, to encourage them to be more rational 
when other decisions were clearly not based on rational criteria. Some GPs felt 
that much of Government policy was irrational and were therefore dissociated 
to ration in their own clinical practice. In some cases, they were resorting to a 
solution without solving the problem of how to deliver the national directives 
and provide the best local care for their patients. 
3.2 Explicit rationing: classic rationality 
Explicit rationing occurs when decisions about resource allocation are made 
according to specific criteria, which have been made clear or explicit.Ill Explicit 
priority setting processes have arisen in the UK, US, New Zealand, the 
Netherlands, and Sweden, as a result of resource constraints and rising patient 
expectations.94 
Explicit rationing can involve technical methods, such as cost-effectiveness 
analysis and/ or political methodslll, which are usually less explicit. Political 
methods include: 
o Long waiting lists, to cope with the disparity between demand and SUPplYi127 
o A ranking system, whereby a scoring index is developed in order to prioritise 
services; 128 
o Limiting treatment, with regard to specific disease areas, populations, localities, 
or groups,129 such as white-collar workers or those within a specific age range 
(commonly referred to as age based rationingl30). 
Most explicit approaches attempt to determine relative 'need', by measuring the 
amount of ill health categorised by disease, and allocating priorities according 
to the size of the need.131 Need is, however, likely to be only one aspect of 
decision-making. For instance, apart from the need for the intervention, criteria 
among clinicians performing cardiothoracic surgery in Sweden included 
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evidence, risk assessment, benefit to patients, quality of life or satisfaction of 
patients, and severity of illness.132 
Some researchers have claimed that decision-making based on need assessment 
is a "systematic approach to ensuring that the health service uses its resources 
to improve the health of the population in the most efficient way" (Wright et aI, 
p.1310133). However, the approach can only inform decision makers as to 
whether one problem is more serious than another - it does not inform resource 
allocation decisions by maximising the health gain of the community,134 and 
therefore has little appeal among health economists. Donaldson131 firmly states 
that the need approach ignores the fact that a) "it is not the size of the disease or 
illness that counts but what should be done about it in terms of the effectiveness 
of interventions" (Donaldson, p.81,131 emphasis added) and b) the importance of 
assessing costs resulting from health care interventions. In recent years, priority 
setting forums for (such as those in Oxfordshire and Berkshire health regions) 
have tried to make decision-making more explicit using criteria, some of which 
might be related to costs and effectiveness, so that decisions are not made 
exclusively on the basis of need.135 
In practice, however, explicit rationing is not a wholly comfortable notion 
among health care decision makers136 and it might be easier to use implicit 
rationing rather than to explicitly make difficult choices.129 There have been 
examples where implicit decisions have been made explicit and these have led 
to negative public attention towards health care commissioners. For instance, 
one locally contested decision involved a four-year-old child with a malignant 
brain tumour.3D Despite specialist opinion advising that there was no curative 
treatment, the parents of the child referred themselves to a specialist in the US 
who claimed that he could operate with a 20% chance of success. The local 
Member of Parliament (MP) helped the family to visit the US and requested 
NHS funding but the local commissioners refused to pay. The local public 
support paid for the treatment and the local commissioners were severely 
criticised by the media for not helping the child, who died four months after 
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returning to the UK. The case shows how decision-making is complex because 
of the emotive nature of the decisions and the media's portrayal of ('unjust') 
decisions made on the basis of money. 
There is a tendency among health authorities to want to "avoid blame"114 by not 
making rationing decisions. Using semi-structured interviews with members of 
health care professionals, Coast found there was a desire to avoid disutility 
associated with denying care.l20 Local decision makers are likely to face 
obstacles in making rationing decisions for the community because of vested 
interests from politicians, clinicians, Trusts, and pressure groups. Coast found 
that there is likely to be a 'dilution' and 'reinterpretation' of decisions as choices 
made locally are translated into practice at lower levels within the health care 
system. In particular, clinicians found it difficult to try and do the best for the 
patient and avoid denying care. This might explain why local decision makers 
often look to the Government to make allocative decisions.132, 137 
There is also some evidence to suggest that managers themselves might not 
think they are well placed to perform explicit rationing. The small amount of 
literature which exists on this topic is drawn mainly from the UK, Canada, and 
Australia. The literature from Canada suggests that, in practice, health 
authorities find it difficult to balance competing pressures from the provincial 
government, their providers, and their citizens, meaning that accountability 
might be fragmented.138 Further evidence from Canada suggests that decision 
makers are likely to find the priority setting process lacking in transparency, 
some referring to it as a "black box", with a lack of clarity about how priority 
setting decisions are made.116 Further light is shed by work conducted by Miller 
and Vale139 in the UK, showing how priority setting is conducted within a 
reactive environment (somewhat similar to the Canadian experience of reacting 
to providers, the Government, and to the media), leaving little freedom for 
proactively developing strategy. The economics literature has, on the whole, 
not considered where decisions are influenced by people's behaviour or 
emotion, although there are some exceptions.120 The literature has also not fully 
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explored the incentives of decision makers in priority setting. Whilst decision 
makers have claimed, for instance, to have an interest in health care and a desire 
to be part of decision-making,l40 it is not clear how personal motivations (for 
instance financial incentives) might have a role to play. Neglect of these 
important issues has largely arisen because the methods used (such as postal 
surveys140, structured interviews116 or semi-structured interviews139) have not 
been sufficiently sensitive to capture 'real life' decision-making. It is likely that, 
as Miller and Vale139 point out, future work on priority setting should be in 
areas of behavioural sciences. 
There are also practical barriers to explicit, evidence-based priority setting in 
practice, including difficulty in accessing information, lack of interpretation 
skills, and lack of timely or 'good' information.112 It is likely that facilitators to 
using economics will include the creation of incentive systems to assist decision 
makers in moving towards informed, explicit priority setting, and involving 
clinicians in the process in order to create accountability and acceptability of the 
policy decisions.112 
Whether health care systems should operate on an implicit or explicit basis has 
caused contention among academics. There are those who have argued that 
implicit rationing is associated with unfairness and inequity,62, 141 and, on the 
other hand, those who maintain the potential disutility from explicit 
rationing,136, 142, 143 
4. Research utilisation 
The penultimate section of this chapter explores use of research evidence in 
decision-making. This is an important issue because it can reflect the degree of 
explicitness of decision-making and the way in which decisions are assumed to 
be made. Use of research evidence is also a particularly important topic in 
health care since decisions are essentially made about other people's lives, and 
decisions therefore, one might assume, should be supported by such evidence. 
This section draws upon leading review papers on the use of research evidence, 
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particularly in relation to health care. The section discusses the theory 
surrounding research, the ways in which research is used in health care in 
practice, and the general mechanisms, which have been proposed to facilitate 
greater use. 
4.1 Theory of research use 
The UK Government Cabinet Office describes evidence as: 
Expert knowledge; published research; existing statistics; stakeholder consultations; 
previous policy evaluations; the Internet; outcomes from consultations; costing of policy 
options; outputs from economic and statistical modelling. 
(The UK Government Cabinet Office, in Nutley, p.3144) 
Evidence in health care relates to published research, clinical experience, patient 
experience, and information about the local context.l45 Evidence therefore 
includes informal knowledge gained, as well as knowledge gained from 
published research or reports. However, there are likely to be different levels of 
importance attached to diverse forms of evidence in health care. Among 
academics, there appears to be a hierarchy of evidence, which places RCTs at 
the apex, observational studies below, and professional opinions much lower 
down.l44 Explicit ranking of types of evidence in health care is likely to have 
arisen because it is generally accepted that biased conclusions can be drawn 
from less methodologically rigorous studies. However, among doctors, it is 
likely that informed knowledge, including professional opinion, will be very 
important.l46 
There is a spectrum of research use, generally ranging from direct or 
instrumental use (which results in changes in practice or policy making) to non-
instrumental, conceptual, or indirect use (which brings about changes in levels 
of understanding, knowledge and attitude).147 Various examples are shown in 
Table 1.5. 
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Table 1.5: examples of 'use' of research 
Spectrum of use 
o Changes in access to research 
o Changes in the extent to which research is considered, referred or read 
o Citation in documents 
o Changes in knowledge and understanding 
o Changes in attitudes and beliefs 
o Changes in behaviour 
(Walter et aI, p.11147) 
Weiss,148, 149 whose work has informed much of the current thinking on research 
use in policy-making,150 proposes that the term "research utilisation" has 
evoked different meanings. Each differs in terms of how research is used and 
how it enters into the decision-making process. Weiss148 defined two broad 
models of research utilisation: linear and non-linear. Linear models assume 
research is used in a very ordered and sequential way. Such models of research 
utilisation in decision-making suppose a rational decision-making model. The 
two linear models of research utilisation are the "Knowledge-Driven Model"148 
and the "Problem-Solving Model" .148 These models are discussed in tum, 
followed by a discussion of the (four) non-linear models, which can be seen as 
being related to a more incrementalist view of decision-making, where decision-
making involves a series of steps over a long period. 
The "Knowledge-Driven Model"148 assumes that the following sequence of 
events occurs: basic research, applied research, development, and application. 
Basic research is thought to create an opportunity for use in public policy; 
applied research is then conducted; appropriate technologies are developed to 
implement the findings of the research; leading to application of the research. In 
this sense, research has created the opportunity for application. Examples of the 
knowledge-driven model of research utilisation generally come from the 
physical sciences, whereas social science provides few examples. There are 
several reasons why this would be the case: social science research is often not 
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so compelling as to be automatically used; such research does not usually 
support specific technologies, as in the physical sciences; and research is less 
likely to be used unless it has received consensus since decision-making tends to 
occur in a political arena.149 
The "Problem-Solving Model"148 proposes that a problem exists and a decision 
has to be made. Hence, unlike the previous model, there is a specific quest for 
information to resolve a problem or reach a decision. Generally, research can 
enter the policy-making arena in two ways: either existing before the policy 
problem or commissioned subsequently to fill a knowledge gap. The Expected 
Value of Perfect Information (EVPI) model used by economists is an example of 
how decision-making is assumed to be rational. Here the objective is to decide 
on the basis of existing evidence, about costs and benefits, whether more 
research should be conducted.1Sl It is assumed that obtaining further 
information will enable decisions to be made with greater certainty than is 
currently possible and from these models it is possible to determine when 
collecting further data is worthwhile and when it is not. The problem-solving 
model assumes decision makers have a clear idea of their goals and that they 
have already identified informational needs. It is also assumed that: research 
will have a direct and immediate applicability and will be used for decision-
making; there is a well defined decision; decision makers are responsible and 
able to make the decision; there is a decision whose resolution depends on 
information; information needs have been identified; research matches the 
circumstances in which the decision will be made; and research findings are 
unambiguous and comprehensive. These assumptions point to research use 
within classic rationality. 
Weiss believed that although linear models were an important reference point, 
they could not accurately reflect the use of social science research in public 
policy making and non-linear models were more applicable.149 Weiss suggests 
that the conceptual (indirect or non-instrumental) use of research findings 
would be more common in social sciences: 
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Officials apparently use social science as a general guide to reinforce their sense of the 
world and make sense of that part of it that is still unmapped or confusing. A bit of 
legitimating here, some ammunition for the political wars there, but a hearty dose of 
conceptual use to clarify the complexities of life. 
(Weiss, p.17149) 
There are four different models within the broader non-linear models. Firstly, 
research can be used as part of a wider influence, so that it is one of many 
competing factors. The "Interactive Model"148 describes a situation where 
research enters the decision-making arena as a search for knowledge by 
decision makers. Social scientists are one group among many, competing for 
influence on decision-making. They will rarely have research that bears directly 
on the policy issue however, and other factors, such as political issues, will be 
important. 
Secondly, research evidence can also be used to legitimise a particular action. 
The "Political Model"148 suggests decision makers are unlikely to be receptive to 
research, because of other conflicting interests. To support a particular case, 
however, decision makers will use research as "ammunition". Indeed, political 
economy adherents would view Evidence Based Medicine (EBM)v as a resource 
that medics use to buttress their authority.l53 Alternatively, EBM might enter 
into the political process (for example through clinical guidelines) as a way in 
which the national level restricts clinical authority.153 Thirdly, the "Tactical 
Model"148 suggests decision makers use research as a tactic, for example in 
delaying action or decisions they are not particularly keen to make. Finally, the 
"Enlightenment Model"148 suggests that through illumination, research can 
generally penetrate into decision makers' way of thinking. Weiss, however, felt 
it was important to recognise there are obvious deficiencies in the level of 
'enlightenment' achieved, in that much of the research that gains its way into 
people's minds has been oversimplified or is wrong. 
v EBM is an attempt to introduce more objective, quantifiable estimates of clinical variables to medical 
practice. 152 It therefore aims to ensure that scientific research, as opposed to individual patient decision-
making, is the fundamental ground of clinical decision-making.153 
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Although research might be used in various ways, as the models by Weiss 
suggest, it is likely that those based on classic rationality offer limited insight 
into how social science research is actually used, particularly at local rather than 
national levels. In health care, it seems that research use is influenced by many 
factors that the rational model assumes to be exogenous, including the content, 
actors, process, and context of decision-making.154,155 Consequently, it is far 
more likely that alternative models, which pay attention to how decisions are 
made, are of greater relevance in understanding how research is used. For 
instance, it would be difficult to understand how rational use of research could 
apply to allocative health care decision-making concerning unexpected 
decisions needing to be made for the treatment of individuals. Here, it might 
not be possible for local health authorities to predict their use of research 
evidence. Instead, it might be thought that local health authorities would be 
more likely to use clinical research evidence as "ammunition" (as in the political 
model) to support their case for not funding treatment for instance. 
4.2 Practice of research use 
Findings from systematic reviews suggest that the direct application of research 
is a relatively uncommon phenomenon in policy making.144,147 Examples from 
health care reiterate this, suggesting a lack of direct utilisation.156,157 The 
barriers identified to using research directly are shown in Table 1.6: 
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Table 1.6: barriers to research utilisation 
Barriers to research use 
o Lack of time of policy makers 
o Low priority of research in relation to internal and external pressures 
o Poor communication of research within organisations 
o Perceptions of research - for example, internally conducted research is more likely 
to be seen as relevant and hence considered 
o Research is not timely or relevant to users needs 
o Research is less likely to be used where findings are controversial 
o Other sources of information may be valued more highly 
o Individual resistance to research, especially when a threat to 1/ craft" skills and 
experience 
o Failure to value research at the organisational level or a hostile organisational 
culture 
o Conflicting research outcomes 
(Adapted from Walter et aI, p.27-28147) 
In the field of health care, research is likely to be only one of several sources of 
information decision makers use when making decisions.150, 154,158,159 For 
instance, clinicians have a substantial degree of autonomy in their individual 
decision-making and it is thought that they might be more likely to base 
decisions on personal experience rather than research evidence.160 A recent 
study found this to be the case,161 where factors in decision-making for Drugs 
and Therapeutics Committees (DTCs) of two general hospitals in the UK 
included clinical trial data, cost, pre-existing prescribing patterns of drugs, 
pharmaceutical company activities, decisions of other DTCs, and" clinician 
excitement" (or the level of interest in the intervention expressed by the 
clinician). The authors advocate recognition of the difference between the 
1/ formal rationality of science and the local rationality of health care provision" 
Oenkings and Barber, p.l0161), highlighting limitations of the assumptions of the 
classic rationality. 
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Other studies of research use in health care have similarly found the direct use 
of research to be limited in practice. In a study of the use of federal health 
evaluation research, Patton et al perceived that research was used, but not in the 
unambiguous way social scientists often assume.162 They conclude that 
definition of /I use" has often been too narrow and has failed to give attention to 
the nature of the decision-making process. Research was found to be used to 
support opinions or intentions of decision makers, as would seem to be similar 
to the political model of research use, but also fed slowly into the process over 
time (perhaps akin to the enlightenment model of research utilisation). The 
main barriers to research use were not related to any the authors had assumed 
(such as methodological quality and timeliness of studies), but were associated 
with political factors (in that decision-making is a political process depending 
on whose priorities are being reviewed) and a "personal factor" including the 
leadership, interest, and enthusiasm of decision makers. 
In relation to factors that facilitate or impede use of EBM in the NHS, Elliott and 
PopaylS0 suggest that the contribution of research to policy making is more 
similar to the interactive model than the problem-solving model. Through in 
depth interviews with twenty-eight decision makers, it was found that the 
direct influence of research evidence on decision-making was hindered by 
constraints in the amount of money available, as well as decision makers' own 
experience. In addition, in health care it has been claimed that there is not 
enough time to read researchl63, perhaps because of a heavy workload 
(particularly among GPSl64) and that research is not conducive to 
understanding, because of the complex methods and jargon used.l65 It is 
therefore unsurprising to discover that doctors tend to read editorials or 
commentaries, which are easier to follow, than original papers.l66 
Barriers from the researcher's side (or those producing the research) might also 
be relevant. Researchers are likely to be concerned with other factors aside from 
the usefulness of their research, including enhancing their status and obtaining 
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financial or non-financial rewards.149,162 As O'Donnell (a medic) succinctly put 
it: 
Scientific papers are not written to disseminate information ... but to be published. 
Authors are eager to get their names in print not because they are bursting to tell us 
something but for more solemn reasons. Another paper means another line on a 
curriculum vitae, another step towards a job or a research grant. 
(O'Donnell167) 
This factor does not appear to have been extensively researched, or found, in the 
literature however. 
4.3 Increasing the impact of research 
Various measures have been proposed to ensure that research enters into the 
decision-making process (Table 1.7). Here, it is generally assumed that passive 
dissemination of research is of limited value. 
Table 1.7: practices to enhance impact of research 
Practices to enhance impact of research 
o Active dissemination of research 
o Educational strategies and those which allow interaction with colleagues and 
experts 
o Supportive opinion leaders 
o Developing closer links between researchers and practitioners, for example through 
partnerships 
o Support for practitioners to "try out" research findings and conduct their own 
research 
o Reminders 
o Adequately resourced facilitative strategies 
o Multifaceted interventions (i.e. using more than one type of intervention) 
(Walter et aI, p.29141) 
The suggestion for interfaces between researchers and policy makers,lSS, 156, 168 
point to an interactive model of research utilisation. Examples of interfaces 
include the creation of committees of decision makers and researchers.l56 
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However, it is also recognised that there need to be incentives for researchers to 
produce utilisable research156 and research that is of good quality.l44, 169,251 In 
this respect, there have been various initiatives over the past few years to 
increase the quality of research in health care. For instance, the Cochrane 
Collaboration17o produces and disseminates systematic reviews for selected 
health care interventions. Such initiatives assume that research is also more 
likely to be more influential if it is topical and/ or timely.157, 169 Finally, there is 
some concern about conducting research that answers the questions that 
decision makers are interested in.l71 Here, an understanding of the decision-
making context (including the doctor-patient relationship) is vital in improving 
the targeting of research.l72 
5. Conclusion 
Health care decision-making is complex because of the organisation of health 
care and the behaviour of decision makers within the organisation. There 
appear to be three models of organisation in health care (the market, command 
and control, and network), although it is difficult to establish from the literature 
which model is most pertinent to the NHS currently. The simultaneous use of 
different organisational forms may well have created perverse incentives, where 
local decision makers are torn between self-interest (as assumed in the 
command and control model) and societal concerns (assumed in the network 
model).9,173 Understanding the behaviour of decision makers within the NHS is 
also complex and there is little clarity about the process of making allocative 
decisions at the meso level, either in the academic literature, or, it appears, 
among those involved in the process. Academics have applied a variety of 
theoretical models, such as the political model and garbage can model, but the 
small amount of empirical work suggests that there is confusion as to how 
rationing is achieved in practice, or whether it is possible to comprehend this 
complex topic at all. In particular, there appear to be fundamental questions left 
unanswered. For instance, although there might be political decision-making in 
the NHS, based on power struggles, how does this relate to the disparate and 
powerful groups in the NHS alongside the control from the Government? In 
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addition, does any form of extended classic rationality apply to health care 
decision-making, such as game playing or process utility? Furthermore, links 
between organisational change and the decision-making that takes place in the 
NHS have seldom been made. 
It might be reasonable to suspect that economists have a particular view of 
health care decision-making. They tend to assume: explicit rationing is feasible; 
there is a classic rationality among decision makers; as well as a rational model 
of research utilisation. In practice, the empirical evidence for the NHS suggests 
that implicit rationing, based on other forms of rationality and non-rationality, 
rather than classic rationality, is more likely. It appears to be also rarely the 
case that research evidence will be used directly in health care, because of the 
variety of actors involved and the politics associated with health care decision-
making. Thus, health economists are unlikely to be aware of how decisions 
might be made in the NHS, the priority setting process that takes place, and the 
usefulness of the work typically produced. It may well be assumed that 
economic evaluation is directly relevant and applicable to decision makers. 
Further research is clearly needed to find out whether these assumptions hold 
in practice and the implications this has for the discipline of health economics. 
It appears, therefore, that there may be some diversity between the context in 
which decision-making takes place and the context assumed by economists. 
The context in which decision-making takes place appears ambiguous in both 
organisational form and the nature of decision-making. Despite this, 
economists have developed decision-making tools based on an assumed 
rationality. The nature of these models and the evidence about their value is 
explored in chapter 2. 
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Chapter 2: Use of economic evaluation in health 
care decision-making 
Economic evaluation is not being used to its full potential. In short, economic 
evaluation is sometimes used, is often not used, probably should more often be used, and 
ways can be found to increase its use. However, I might be kidding myself! 
(Drummond, p.9174) 
This point of view, from a UK health economist, highlights the concern about 
the extent to which economic evaluation is used in practice. The purpose of this 
chapter is to evaluate the literature on the contribution of economic evaluation 
to local decision-making. This chapter first provides a brief outline of economic 
evaluation, so as to put the use of economic evaluation into an appropriate 
context. The chapter then evaluates the topic of this chapter, using data drawn 
from a systematic review conducted as part of the thesis. Included sections are: 
the use of economic evaluation; barriers to use; and ways in which greater use 
might be facilitated. The penultimate section explores the methods that have 
been employed in the empirical studies of use of economic evaluation. The 
chapter concludes by highlighting the need for further work using more in-
depth methods that avoid the potential for respondents to exaggerate their use 
of economic evaluation. 
1. Economic evaluation 
Economic evaluation has been defined as lithe comparative analysis of 
alternative courses of action in terms of their costs and consequences" 
(Drummond et aI, p.9175), hence involving two parameters -costs and outcomes. 
Economic evaluations are not only concerned with costs, since an intervention 
or programme might be cheap but represent poor value for money.176 The 
concept of opportunity cost is fundamental to health economics and therefore to 
economic evaluation.l77 Opportunity cost is based upon the idea of scarcity of 
resources, so that the opportunity cost of undertaking an activity is the benefits 
that are forgone by not allocating resources to the next best activity.177 
Opportunity cost will depend on the viewpoint employed (such as patient or 
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societal).178 So, for instance, the opportunity cost of expanding a breast clinic 
might be the forgone benefits of developing the next best alternative, such as 
expanding an oncology clinic or buying a new piece of equipment. However, if 
a wider perspective is taken than the hospital, such as the entire local health 
care system, the opportunity costs might be different, such as a reduction in 
community care as a result of investing in the hospital. 
Economics, and economic evaluation, are primarily concerned with efficiency, 
which involves obtaining the maximum benefits from a given amount of 
resources.178 There are two types of efficiency - technical and allocative 
efficiency.179 Technical efficiency involves achieving a given objective with the 
least possible expenditure. For example, the most technically efficient way of 
achieving the objective to reduce waiting times in hospital will be the lowest 
cost option, other things being equal.176 Allocative efficiency involves producing 
exactly the quantity and type of health care that society wants. It differs from 
technical efficiency because a value judgement must be made as to which 
objective is worth pursuing, rather than deciding which programme will meet 
the objective.176 For example, it might be necessary to assess whether it is 
worthwhile expanding a clinic for oncology patients or employing additional 
clinical staff to reduce A&E waiting times, where both of these programmes 
have differing objectives. 
There are generally three specific methods of economic evaluation: eost Benefit 
Analysis (eBA), Cost Effectiveness Analysis (CEA), and Cost Utility Analysis 
(eUA). It could be argued that eBA deals with allocative efficiency, since 
comparison of costs and benefits are made across programmes serving different 
patient groups (for example a eBA can be conducted for orthopaedic care 
versus cancer care).180 A monetary value can be placed on an intervention by 
asking people what is the maximum amount they would be willing to pay for it 
(or, alternatively, how much they would be willing to pay to avoid the effects 
of, for example, illness),181 The Net Social Benefit (NSB) of a treatment can be 
calculated using the following formula:181 
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Where W is society's willingness to pay for the benefits offered by the 
intervention, Ci is the cost to the health service of the treatment, and Cs are the 
societal costs (outside the health care system).181 It is suggested that CBA using 
monetary valuation of outcomes facilitates the comparison of disparate 
programmes181 (for instance comparing health programmes and educational 
programmes for schools) and it is also clear what amount of money must be 
given up in order to fund any new intervention. In addition, willingness to pay 
has been suggested as one method for detecting process utility in health care, so 
that utility is not only derived from health gain but also from the value in using 
health care,182 although evidence on the existence of process utility is mixed. 
However, although there are three types of classic economic evaluation, 
contention exists among health economists as to the different perspectives 
undertaken and specifically whether economic evaluation should be conducted 
from a welfarist or non-welfarist perspective 183 (the latter is also termed' extra 
welfarist'l83 or 'decision maker approach'l84). Welfare economics suggests that 
individuals maximise utility and that the overall welfare of society is a function 
of individual utilities.175, 179 Paretian welfare economics suggests that an optimal 
state is reached when no-one can be made better off without making someone 
else worse off.183 It is difficult to imagine situations where this would occur, so 
the compensation principle was developed, whereby potential losers can be 
offered compensation by potential gainers (although this does not require that 
compensation is actually paid, but that it could be, hypothetically, paid).l85 The 
compensation principle allows the number of programmes that can be ranked to 
increase considerably in comparison to what is achievable using the Pareto test. 
However, there is concern among some economists that it is not possible to use 
CBA in health care decision-making because of the reliance on valuing 
outcomes in monetary terms,175 For this reason, the non-welfarist approach 
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allows for measuring consequences of alternative policies in a way that is not 
necessarily in line with the way individuals would value them. Non-welfarist 
approaches typically measure health gains,183 with the aim of maximising health 
in a community from a given budget.l84 Because consequences of alternative 
polices are not necessarily valued in the way individuals would chose to value 
them, some have argued that CEA and CUA are conducted from a non-wel£arist 
perspective.186 In fact, the welfarist and non-wel£arist positions have been much 
debated in the literature, with some health economists feeling that non-wel£arist 
approaches, where health (as opposed to utility) is the final outcome of concern 
(taking into account other non-good characteristics such as freedom from pain 
and mobility) is a more accurate representation of well-being.187 Welfarist 
economists are likely to be reluctant to adopt this perspective, feeling that it is 
not possible to apply valuations uniformly across people, regardless of their 
individual valuations, without violating the Pareto principle.1SO 
In CEA, the focus is on a single outcome measure,175 such as reduction in blood 
pressure181 or life-years saved,l75 hence only interventions which have the same 
outcome measures can be compared. The main measure used in CEA is the 
Incremental Cost Effectiveness Ratio (leER) which gives lithe incremental price 
of obtaining a unit health effect" (Gold et aI, p.27179). For two treatments, 
current treatment A and new treatment B, the lCER is defined as181: 
lCER= (CS-CA) / (Es-EA) 
Where C represents costs and E represents outcomes for the interventions.181 
Clearly, there is no need to calculate this ratio when an intervention is both 
more effective and less costly (and here the alternative is said to "dominate" 
current practice).179 It is assumed that programmes are divisible with constant 
returns to scale.l88 Divisible means that they can be partially implemented and 
constant returns to scale means costs and effects are proportional to the scale of 
implementation. However there are specific problems introduced by 
indivisibilities, since the optimal combination of A or B cannot be facilitated 
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without integer programming. In addition, increasing returns to scale might 
mean that a mixture of A and B is better than full implementation of either. 
CU A is a variant of CEA. As with CEA, comparisons cannot be made between 
programmes in different sectors of the economy (for instance, CUA cannot 
advise whether to open a new hospital or build a new road, since outcomes will 
be different). Outcomes are combined into a single index combining length of 
life and quality of life.181 Preferences of society are taken into account to some 
extent (since valuations are population based and applied across all affected 
people regardless of their individual valuations - hence individual valuations 
might be different from societal valuations).175 The most commonly used 
measure is the Quality Adjusted Life Year (QALY). QALYs are a measure of 
quality of life and are anchored on a scale of 0 to +1 where 0 is equivalent to 
death and +1 is the best or optimal health state imaginable (although negative 
states are permitted). QAL Y weights typically measure various aspects of 
morbidity assessed by the patient or their carer. For instance, the EQ5D or 
EuroQol assesses Quality of Life (QOL) according to five criteria: mobility; self-
care; usual activities; painj discomfort; and anxiety / depression.189 Each of these 
dimensions has three levels, ranging from no problems to extreme difficulty for 
each dimension. Composite health states are generated to have a five-digit code 
number relating to the relevant level of each dimension.vi These weights are 
multiplied by the expected duration of treatment (often life expectancy) in a 
particular health state to obtain life years that incorporate an element of 
morbidity.175 A cost per QALY gained estimate can then be used in an 
assessment of efficiency. The principle advantage of QALYs over health effects 
is that for the latter comparison cannot be made between ICERs from different 
programmes, but with QALYs comparison can be made between cost per 
QALYs of different programmes. Disability Adjusted Life Years (DALYS) are 
an alternative measure where, apart from combining information about 
vi For instance, 11223 would mean no problems with walking about, no problems with self care, some 
problems with performing usual activities, moderate pain or distress, and extremely anxious and 
depressed. 
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mortality and morbidity, age-weighting and or disability weighting can be 
used.19o 
QALYs, however, have not been without criticism. Four main criticisms are as 
follows. Firstly, the assumption of constant proportional trade-off between 
length of life and health status (meaning that the individual is prepared to 
sacrifice some constant proportion of their remaining years of life in order to 
achieve a given improvement in health status) might not hold.191 Hence, an 
individual who regards 12 years in excellent health as equivalent to 15 in their 
current state of health, might not regard 4 years of excellent health as equivalent 
to 5 in their current health state.191 Secondly, it is assumed that the individual 
has a constant proportional risk attitude, with respect to treatment length for 
example, which might not be the case, since an individual might exhibit both 
risk aversion and risk seeking behaviour in different time periods.191 Thirdly, it 
is assumed that the value assigned to each state is independent of the time spent 
in the health state and experience of other proceeding health states, which 
might not hold, particularly for chronic illnesses. Finally, there are issues of 
equity, which QALYs have not taken into account. QALY maximisation might 
discriminate against the elderly and the infirm, or those with a lower than 
average capacity to benefit.192 Empirical evidence has also shown that people 
have revealed a tendency to want to sacrifice quality of life gains in order to 
prioritise the severely ill (the rule of rescue principle).193 Rawlesl94 has claimed 
that assessing outcome on the basis of QALYs is inequitable. Although Mooney 
accepts that maximising QALYs will not necessarily embrace equity, he feels, 
however, that this is not the objective they seek and that other methods of 
prioritising, as suggested by Rawles, such as I shroud waving' (or publicly 
announcing that unless resources are increased patients will die) are unlikely to 
be equitable anyway.195 
It is likely that further research is needed to understand people's preferences for 
rationing on the basis of QALYs, particularly to find out the significance of key 
factors (such as age and severity of illness).193 Empirical studies assessing 
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whether maximisation of QAL Y s hold have also involved decisions 
surrounding organ transplantation196, 197 (where it is likely that people are more 
readily accepting of rationing), although empirical studies are also needed 
regarding rationing for other more commonly delivered treatments or services 
that are not life threatening. 
There are two approaches, the (QALY) league table approach and the threshold 
approach, which can be used to determine whether an intervention is relatively 
worthwhile compared to alternative allocations of resources.198 A league table 
is a ranked list of all non-dominated programmes in order of increasing ICER.199 
The objective is to implement all programmes, starting from the top, until the 
budget is exhausted.199 However, there are various problems with using league 
tables in practice. Generally studies that have computed the ratios have used 
different methods and assumptions (such as choice of comparator, discount 
rate, and time horizon), rendering comparison difficult.200 In addition, the 
league table approach assumes perfect divisibility and constant returns to scale, 
which may not, in practice, hold. At the margin, it may be beneficial, in terms 
of QALYs gained, to provide a linear combination of programmes, rather than 
one programme.201 The use of league tables has therefore been cautioned.202, 203 
One of the earliest and only examples of explicit priority setting using QALY 
league tables was in the state of Oregon (US), which drew up a list of priorities 
for Medicaid and excluded certain categories of treatments from funding.204 
However, as Oregon discovered, using economic techniques to compare costs 
and benefits was not sufficiently reliable due to the incompatibility of efficiency 
and equity and Oregon did not use them in practice (although there were other 
problems such as poor data).204 Indeed, QALY league tables, as with QALYs, 
take no account of equity (except that a 'QALY is a QALY is a QALY', no matter 
who receives it).177 There is no concern about who receives the gains from 
society by distributing health care according to a league table, so that the 
benefits from health care can be obtained by a few, or the very wealthy, as long 
as this is efficient. 
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As an alternative to league tables, thresholds (or benchmarks) can be used to 
appraise individual programmes against a pre-determined cost-effectiveness 
value.198,l99 Thresholds are essentially the same as league tables, except that 
there is a cut off point, where programmes with values less than the threshold 
are implemented and programmes with values exceeding the threshold are not 
implemented. One way to look at the threshold rule is to calculate a net benefit 
by using the estimate of the cost-effectiveness threshold as an I exchange rate' to 
convert costs (or benefits) to effectiveness (or cost) unitS.205 This net benefit of a 
programme (Ni) is defined as:l99 
Where A is an externally set threshold, C represents costs, and E represents 
outcomes for the interventions. The incremental net benefit of the programme 
compared to the alternative (N1) is:199 
The threshold rule is the same as selecting the intervention with the greatest 
(non-negative) incremental net benefit.199 In the UK, NICE uses an implicit 
threshold of £20,000 to £30,000 per QAL y206 (although the existence of a 
threshold has been firmly refuted by the chair and previous vice chairman of 
NICE35) and in the US it has been claimed to rest at $50,000.207 
Only if the threshold is well calibrated and the programmes are divisible with 
constant returns to scale will the threshold rule improve efficiency.l99 When 
anyone of these conditions is not met, the rule could reduce efficiency, by 
sacrificing more efficient and expandable programmes.199,201 Indeed, the 
threshold approach fails to take into account where the additional resources are 
taken from to fund the new intervention, and thus the opportunity costs of 
removing resources from other uses.201 
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A modification of the threshold rule is Cost-Effectiveness Acceptability Curves 
(CEACs). These do not rely on whether the results of a study fall below a 
threshold, but, instead, examine the probability that a particular study falls 
below or above a threshold, given the inherent uncertainty surrounding 
treatment outcomes or costS.208 The objective is to provide a graphical 
representation of the probability that, over a range of A' 8, an intervention is 
optimal. Fenwick et a1209 propose using a cost-effectiveness frontier which can 
provide information concerning the uncertainty associated with the a decision. 
However, neither the league table approach, the threshold approach or CEACs 
escape the problems mentioned previously with QALYs. 
To summarise, although all fit within a broad notion of classic rationality 
economic evaluation can take a number of forms and have different theoretical 
bases. Perhaps the greatest contention among health economists is whether 
economic evaluation should be conducted from a welfarist or non-welfarist 
perspective. For instance, under the non-welfarist approach, if a programme is 
accepted, its ICER is the minimum value placed on a QAL Y by decision makers, 
given a fixed budget. The question arises as to whether this valuation differs 
from society's willingness to pay to gain a QAL Y? In addition, it is not apparent 
how the ICER relates to different types of efficiency since it only deals with how 
efficient it is to pursue the programme of interest, and not whether any 
resources will need to be taken from elsewhere to fund the programme (which 
essentially deals with issues of allocative, rather than technical, efficiency). 
Apart from challenges associated with the perspective pursued in economic 
evaluation, there are also practical and methodological difficulties associated 
with all forms of economic evaluation. Despite such problems, the numbers of 
economic evaluations has increased rapidly in recent years. 
2. Use of economic evaluation 
Given the quantity of resources devoted to the conduct of economic evaluation 
it is important to assess what the evidence is for its use in decision-making. To 
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this end, this thesis presents a systematic review of current evidence for use of 
economic evaluation. The methods of the systematic review are presented, 
before moving to examine the findings in terms of use of economic evaluation at 
national and local levels. 
2.1 Methods of review 
A systematic literature review was conducted to locate studies about the use of 
economic evaluation in health care decision-making. A range of databases was 
searched and specific criteria were used to select the most relevant studies. The 
search strategy used for the review is presented in Table 2.1. Three steps were 
undertaken: 
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Table 2.1,' search strategy for systematic review 
Firstly, MEDLINE and EMBASE databases were search (commencing either in the year 1993 or 19S0, to 
present). The following search terms were used: 
1. Health adjl research.mp 
2. (Economic adjl (evaluation$ or efficiency or appraisal$ or evidence».tw 
3. Cost effectiveness/ 
4. Cost utility / 
5. Cost benefit/ 
6. Cost minimisation/ 
7. Health economics 
S. Pharmacoeconomics 
9. Health policy.tw 
10. Health policy (MeSH) 
11. Decision$.tw 
12. Policy making.tw 
13. *Decision making/ 
14. *Policy making/ 
15. (Use or utilization or utilisation or implementation).tw 
16. Or/l-S 
17. Or/9-15 
IS. 16 and 17 
In addition, Web of Science (Was) and EconLit were also searched, using terms such as 'use of health 
economics', 'use of economic evaluation', 'priority setting', and' decision-making'. Several journals 
(Social Science and Medicine, Health Economics, and British Medical Journal) were also hand searched 
from the period 1992 to 2005. Aside from this process of collecting published material, grey (non-
published work) literature was obtained from HESG conferences, databases, and personal 
communication. 
Secondly, articles in MEDLINE (n=923) were screened based on their title and abstract and only studies 
whose title indicated a major focus on the topic were retained (n=30). EMBASE, WoS, and EconLit did 
not identify additional empirical work that was used in the review, nor did hand searching of journals 
identify any additional work. Additional papers were identified from HESG conferences (4), references 
cited within already obtained studies (3), and personal communication (1). 
Thirdly, all remaining studies were categorised according to whether they were empirical or review 
studies and whether there were policy or practice implications. 
Data from selected empirical papers were extracted in a systematic way: data were recorded about the 
author, year of the study, sample, methods and size of sample, study focus, and main findings. 
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The process involved in obtaining papers is shown clearly in Figure 2.1. 
Figure 2.1: schematic overview of results of literature search 
1. Literature 
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papers 
920 studies 














The purpose of the review was to amalgamate all the available empirical work 
on this topic and to explore the overall findings. Studies were not excluded on 
the basis of their quality. Examining the quality and methodology of the studies 
was an important element of the literature review (see section 2.3c), hence 
excluding studies at this point would not have been appropriate. Studies were 
only excluded if they were not related to the topic of interest. 
2.2 The macro level 
At the macro level, the strongest evidence of the usefulness of economic 
evaluation is that of revealed preferenceP4 There has been positive evidence of 
the utilisation of economic evaluation in national health care decision-making, 
particularly over the past few years, in countries such as the Australia, Canada, 
and the UK.210 This has emphasised the increasing importance attached to 
economic evaluation over time. Requirements for economic evaluation 
alongside reimbursement applications of technologies have been the main 
facilitator of the use of economic evaluation at the national level in some 
78 
countries.s,211, 212, 213 For instance, pharmaceutical companies in both Australia 
and one state in Canada (Ontario) are formally requested to support 
reimbursement for pharmaceuticals with economic evaluation data.214, 215 
Evidence suggests that the Australian Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory 
Committee (PBAC) uses economic evaluation in making recommendations to 
the Minister for Health about which drugs and medicines should be available 
on the pharmaceuticallisting.214 However, the potential role of economic 
evaluation could be developed for reimbursement decisions in other 
countries.216 
In the UK, the request for data about the cost effectiveness of new 
pharmaceuticals and health technologies by NICE has played a large part in 
advancing the role of economic evaluation. Also in the UK, Health Technology 
Assessment (HT A) agencies, which provide evaluations of technologies (drugs, 
medical devices and clinical procedures) through review of the scientific 
evidence, have opened the way to greater use of economic evaluation. Around 
a third of the reports published by the HT A include cost analyses or economic 
evaluation,217 although the influence of HTA on decision-making is seen as 
being limited.218 However, economic evaluation has been influential in specific 
Government policies,219, 220, 221 in particular screening policies,222 for example in 
mammography223 and heart disease/ transplantation6, 7 in countries including 
the UK. However, it is not obvious at all from these papers as to whether policy 
makers were using the evidence to support decisions that they had already 
made, and may have needed justification for spending money on them, or 
whether they had used the evidence beforehand to inform their decisions. 
Despite some evidence for use of economic evaluation at the macro level, its 
actual use is questionable.174 In particular, there have been several outliers in 
decisions made by both the PBAC and NICE and there is contention around 
whether an explicit cost per QAL Y threshold exists, beyond which NICE are 
unwilling to pay for additional life years gained.206,214,224 This suggests that the 
role of economic evaluation is unclear. However, at least within these systems 
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there is support by the Government for economic evaluation. In contrast, in 
other countries, the national level has limited interest in the use of economic 
evaluation as a criterion in decision-making, as in Austria,225 because of 
difficulties of implementing this in a social insurance system, and Japan,226 
because of a fee-for-service system and strict price regulation which is seen as 
being non-conducive to economic analyses. Apart from Austria and Japan, 
economic evaluation appears to have also been of limited use in national policy 
in less developed countries,227 although there are, even in this context, examples 
where economic evaluation has influenced policy, for example in relation to 
screening policies and preventative therapies for TB control in Africa.! 
2.3 The meso level 
A total of thirty-eight empirical papers (Table 2A at the end of this chapter) 
were found concerning the use of economic evaluation at the local level in a 
range of countries (the UK, US, Australia, the Netherlands, Sweden, Germany, 
Finland, Portugal, France, Norway, Austria, and Spain). The earliest of these 
studies date from almost twenty years ago. Here issues of sampling and the 
main findings of these studies are discussed. 
a) Sampling 
Earlier studies tended to evaluate health economists' and researchers' 
perceptions of the use of economic evaluation7, 82, 222, 228 whereas studies after the 
year 1995 focus on the input of potential users or decision makers. These latter 
studies included a range of local decision makers (Table 2.2). 
Table 2.2: range of local decision makers sampled 
Decision maker Number of studies 
Pharmaceutical advisors or pharmacists 11 
Physicians, including internists and GPs/ family doctors 8 
Insurers of medical care (US only) 6 
Medical directors/ hospital managers 6 
(Senior) managers responsible for purchasing items of expenditure 4 
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Public health managers 3 
As can be seen from Table 2.2, pharmaceutical advisors or pharmacists, 
generally in the UK or the US, have been the most frequently sampled group of 
decision makers.6, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238 Pharmacists are an important 
group to study, since they often have to take account of the costs and efficacy of 
drugs included in their budget. The second most frequently sampled group 
were physicians, including internists and GPs/family doctors, 221,231,233,235,239, 
240,241, 242 although six of these studies included physicians in the sample as part 
of a wider sample of decision makers,231, 233, 235, 237,239, 242 and two studies 
surveyed only physicians.240,241 Studies have also involved insurers of medical 
care,221,243, 244, 245, 246, 247 medical directors/hospital managers 231,235,239,243,248,238 
senior managers either at the Governmental level or locallevel,235, 237, 249 and 
public health managers.6,239,242 Some of these studies involved an organisation 
delivering care (for example, a PCT or Trust) and the different decision makers 
within that organisation.48, 117, 250, 251, 252 
Earlier studies were largely conducted in the US and tended to involve senior 
managers responsible for major health service expenditure decisions and 
insurers of health care or pharmacists/pharmaceutical advisers. The study by 
Drummond et a16 was the first in the UK to evaluate the use of economic 
evaluation among a range of decision makers and was followed by the 
European Network on Methodology and Application of Economic Evaluation 
Techniques (EUROMET) study,4 covering a variety of decision makers 
(managers from Government agencies, physicians, hospital pharmacists, 
hospital managers, and manager's sickness funds or the pharmaceutical 
industry) from nine European countries (Finland, France, Germany, Norway, 
Austria, Netherlands, Portugal, UK, and Spain). 
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b) Important findings 
Use 
Health economists are, in general, pessimistic about the role of economic 
evaluation in decision-making.222 Various studies have suggested that only a 
third of decision makers have used economic evaluation in their decision-
making?' 235, 249 Use is not restricted to one particular type of decision-maker, 
but among pharmacists,23o, 232, 234 doctors and managers within hospitals,239 and 
medical directors or GPS.248 Interestingly, there have been no studies assessing 
whether evidence from economic evaluation has actually stopped something 
from happening. 
From the US perspective, economic evaluation is most likely to be used by 
pharmacists to justify adding a drug onto the formulary.247 However, although 
a substantial number (90%) of pharmacists apparently think about using 
economic evaluation, two-thirds (approximately 60%) occasionally act on this 
information and few (20%) rarely or never do SO.233 Further, although it might 
be thought that pharmacists under the pressure of managed care would be more 
likely to use cost-effectiveness information, no supporting evidence for this 
claim has been found.23o In the UK, use of economic evaluation is also found to 
be limited and there is mixed evidence as to the use of option appraisal 
(performed for public services, considering costs as well as benefits, to 
determine value for money253). Whereas Drurnmond174 claims that option 
appraisal is a form of economic evaluation, McDonald48 discovered in her study 
that benefits are not typically quantified in such appraisals. 
It is difficult to establish the level of understanding of economic evaluation 
among local decision makers from the studies reviewed. Those studies which 
have examined the issue, suggest that most decision makers appreciate notions 
of scarcity of resources, opportunity costs, and the need to weigh costs and 
benefits.248,254 Among decision makers at more senior, Governmental levels, 
knowledge appears to be greater249 as it is among public health doctors6 than 
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among other types of decision makers. The explanation for greater knowledge 
among public health consultants may be two-fold: health economics forms part 
of the training in public health; and public health doctors are required to use a 
societal viewpoint which is also more aligned to the basis of economic 
evaluation. 
Barriers to use of economic evaluation at local level 
The majority of the empirical studies explored potential barriers or obstacles to 
using economic evaluation in decision-making and a summary of these barriers 
are shown in Table 2.3. They have been grouped into three categories: barriers 
at the organisational level; decision-making level; and research level. 
Table 2.3: barriers to using economic evaluation at the local level 
Barrier 
Organisational level 
o Inflexibility of health care budgets 
o Political objectives 
o Lack of time in process 
Decision-making level 
o Lack of understanding 
o Other objectives (evidence of effectiveness) 
o Individual patient perspective vs. population perspective 
Research level 
o Bias and quality of economic evaluation 
o Lack of relevant economic evaluation 
Organisational level 
At the organisational level, where the PCT or Trust as a whole is affected, 
because of the context or environment of health care decision-making, there are 
three constraining factors on the use of economic evaluation: inflexibility of 
health care budgets; political objectives being more important than the results of 
economic evaluation; and a lack of time in the decision-making process. 
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Inflexibility of health care budgets 
Inflexibility in health care budgets, associated with the difficulty in releasing 
money from one budget to another, has been associated with a lack of use of 
economic evaluation, since financial resources are not easily accessible. This 
barrier was found particularly, but not only, for hospital pharmacists in the 
UK.4, 6, 229, 231 In the EUROMET study4 inflexibility of health care budgets was 
ranked as the most important barrier from a potential list of five barriers, across 
all countries involved. 
Inflexibility of budgets is likely to be particularly related to the UK for two 
reasons. Firstly, traditionally there is a financial divide between primary and 
secondary care, meaning that (financial) resources do not often flow freely 
between the two.48 Due to this inflexibility, an efficient programme 
development might not be made. Drummond et aI6 and Walley et aI229 reveal 
that decision makers ranked difficulties in reallocating resources from 
secondary care to primary care as the highest barrier to use of economic 
evaluation. Secondly, in the UK, finances have tended to be fixed and allocated 
annually, so it is not possible to borrow against future resources48 (although 
finances now have a three-year rolling basis). This might result in a reluctance 
among decision makers to take a long-term view.229 
Due to budgetary inflexibility, it is likely that immediate costs are important to 
decision makers in the NHS. Drummond et al6 found that among UK 
pharmacists, the acquisition cost of medicine was the most important criterion 
in the formulary listing, although a large proportion of pharmacists (85%) 
claimed that they would contemplate better outcome against higher cost. 
Similar findings have been reported in the US among insurers of medical care 
who have focused on the immediate costs of acquiring technologies rather than 
any future savings that might be made.243,245 
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Political objectives 
Several studies, mainly from the UK suggest that the requirement to follow 
national policies can restrict the use of economic evaluation in decision-
making.4s, 228, 249,254 Specifically, Government directives might be of greater 
importance compared to evidence from economic evaluation. For instance, 
Weatherly et al254 found that for decisions relating to CHD or cancer, the 
majority of respondents ranked NSF guidelines as a very important source of 
external empirical evidence (78%), followed by Government publications (40%), 
and NICE guidance (37%). Only a third of respondents were aware of economic 
evaluation being used in the production of HIMPs and the survey found that 
cost-effectiveness analyses were ranked as very important by only 15%, quite 
important by 35%, and of limited importance by 29%. About a quarter (24%) 
felt that economic evaluation should influence the design of HIMPs "very much 
so", 15% thought it should be of influence "only marginally" and most believed 
that it should be of influence" quite a bit". On the other hand, where economic 
evaluation agrees with national policy it is likely that the research will be 
adopted. Nixon et al250 found that structured abstracts from NHS EED, which 
claimed that assertive community treatment (ACT) for those with mental health 
problems is more effective and also less costly, resulted in the introduction of 
two ACT teams. In this case, there was also a recommendation from the 
Government to provide ACT. 
Lack of time 
Lack of time in the decision-making process, restricting the ability to gain access 
to economic evaluation or conduct economic evaluation, has been highlighted 
as a barrier to use in countries including the UK.228, 243, 249, 254,255 Often health 
care decisions need to be made quickly249 in reaction to immediate problems or 
unexpected requests for additional funding,256 whereas time is needed to 
conduct economic evaluations or for them to become available.228 It is difficult 
to deduce from these findings, however, whether lack of time would be a 




At the individual decision-making level, there are three constraining factors on 
the use of economic evaluation: lack of understanding of economic evaluation; 
evidence of effectiveness rather than cost effectiveness being important; and the 
tendency to take the individual patient perspective rather than the population 
perspective. 
Lack oj understanding 
The EUROMET study defined the extent of training in health economics as 
being "low": around a third of decision makers surveyed had previously 
received training.4 This lack of training in health economics might explain why 
decision makers are found to have a limited understanding of the techniques of 
economic evaluation.4 Further, some decision makers appear to be prone to 
mistakenly associate cost-effectiveness with cost reduction.239 On the other 
hand, often economic evaluations do not readily lend themselves to being used. 
Technical concepts or jargon typically used in economic evaluation might not 
facilitate understanding among local decision makers.231, 249 Duthie et al231 
found that, for statements commonly generated in economic evaluation, those 
related to QALYs in particular were not understood, as has also been reported 
in other studies.4, 232. 238 In addition, it could be that economic evaluation itself 
is too complex for decision makers to comprehend. McDonald presented to the 
local level an economic analysis (for an open access echocardiography service 
for the diagnosis of heart failure), consisting of a crude estimate of costs and 
benefits, but it was not used because it was felt to be too convoluted.48 
Evidence of effectiveness 
Decision makers might attach importance to other objectives, besides allocative 
efficiency,6, 223, '257, '258 so that efficiency becomes only one of several in£l uences on 
decision-making. Evidence of effectiveness has been found to be more 
important to decision makers than evidence about cost-effectiveness, 
86 
particularly among decision makers with clinical responsibility or those in a 
pharmacy role. 221,229,231,246238,259,260 For instance, MeOs apparently evaluate 
drugs on clinical efficacy and daily acquisition costs, with little attention to the 
overall cost-effectiveness.261 
Laupacis argues that most highly effective drugs are cost-effective, and most 
marginally effective drugs are not, suggesting that clinical effectiveness is the 
most important factor.262 Clinical evidence is often used, without costs, perhaps 
because the latter is not a priority for clinical day-to-day decision-making.221 
This might account for why Duthie et al231 found that economic arguments that 
were most commonly understood by GPs related to clinical benefit. Evidence 
about clinical effectiveness also appears to be the most important factor for GPs 
and medical directors when deciding whether to adopt a new treatment.4 On 
the other hand, there is evidence to suggest that GPs are not as cost averse as 
might be assumed. In a postal survey of almost two-hundred GPs, Ryan et a[263 
found that whilst GPs often had inaccurate perceptions of costs, their 
prescribing habits were influenced by these perceived drug costs. 
Individual patient vs. population perspective 
Physicians (hospital doctors and GPs) typically base their decisions on the 
individual patient4, 48, 231, 240, 241 and are therefore prone to be reluctant to take a 
population perspective. Thus, the use of economic evaluation appears to enter 
into a decision-making process constrained by a doctor-patient relationship. In 
a survey of one thousand physicians in the US, Ginsberg241 discovered that the 
vast majority (72%) believed it was the responsibility of the physician and the 
patient to decide what is cost-effective. These findings are replicated in the UK, 
where most GPs appear to have a patient perspective in their decision-making: 
"We don't deal with populations, we deal with individual patents" (Duthie et aI, 
page 153231). In this study, although in theory GPs accepted the notion of the 
greatest good for the greatest number, they did not appear to base their 
decisions on this. Part of the reason for such responses might be because GPs 
tend to underestimate their role in allocating resources.4 In contrast, other 
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decision makers, such as those responsible for allocating funds locally, have 
been found to be more likely to take a wider societal perspective, or the 
"population out there" (Duthie et aI, p.153231) 
Physicians might also have ethical and moral dilemmas associated with 
rationing care on the basis of economic evaluation. For instance, some 
physicians in Austria and Portugal are reluctant to refuse treatment on the basis 
of health economic arguments.4 In the US, the vast majority of physicians object 
to the use of cost-effectiveness in screening decisions on moral grounds.240 
"Shroud waving" (or appealing for funding based on emotional criteria, such as 
'This patient will die if they do not receive treatment') by clinicians, can deter 
the use of economic evaluation because such arguments again might not 
consider a wider population.228 
Research level 
At the research level, constricting factors are related to the studies themselves, 
including the bias and quality of economic evaluation and lack of relevant 
studies. 
Bias and quality of economic evaluation 
Decision makers in several countries have claimed that they are reluctant to use 
economic evaluation funded by the pharmaceutical industry.4, 6, 229, 230 The 
EUROMET study found this to be the second most important discouraging 
factor among a range of decision makers.4 It was also found to be the second 
most important barrier specifically among UK primary care prescribing 
advisors.229 Fears of bias in studies funded by the pharmaceutical industry 
might be well founded, since manufacturers' estimates of leERs have been 
shown to be consistently lower than those from academic centres.264 Economic 
evaluation also might be perceived as being biased because of a large number of 
assumptions (regarding the quality of life, timing of costs and benefits, and the 
discount rate).4, 238, 254 In one US study, of pharmacists and medical directors, 
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one of the most important barriers to using pharmacoeconomic research was the 
reliance on excessive assumptions in studies.238 
In other cases, the quality of economic evaluation may be perceived as being 
questionnable249 or variable.265 A literature review conducted on the use of 
economic information in drug selection by hospital formularies found that lack 
of methodological quality of economic evaluations was the most important 
barrier.266 In one UK study, this was found to be an important obstacle in over 
half of decision makers sampled, from a range of backgrounds, although it was 
the most important obstacle in only 12% of those included in the study.6 
Lack of relevant economic evaluation 
Few studies have examined the relevance of the topics in economic evaluation 
to local health care decision-making. Where this factor has been found, it has 
been suggested that local decisions were rarely made on topics addressed by 
economic evaluation.256 One explanation for this might be because medical 
interventions are more comprehensively evaluated than non-medical 
interventions267 which could mean that for decisions on the latter, no 
appropriate study can be found. Even for medical interventions, however, 
economic evaluations may well be lacking. For instance, in the US, a systematic 
search discovered that only two cost-effectiveness studies, relating to the same 
drug, were available for nine recently introduced drugs of relevance to 
pharmacists.23o There could be economic evaluations that would be useful for 
decision-making by pharmacists, but they are unavailable.247 
There is also evidence that the perspective of the economic evaluation is a 
constraining factor to use. Economic evaluation is usually not from the point of 
view of the local setting, but from a wider societal perspective, which might not 
be seen as being applicable.4, 4, 174, 230, 243 Generalizability of studies might be low 
because of differences in health systems across the settings,268 although there are 
potentially other reasons limiting usefulness such as differences in costs and 
patient populations in local setting compared to society. 
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Increasing the impact of economic evaluation 
Although health economists may not believe that findings from economic 
evaluation should be the only influence on decision-making,269 they are 
concerned to increase its impact and practical use so that economic evaluation 
has more prominence in health care decisions. Several ways in which the use of 
economic evaluation might be enhanced have been proposed, with many of 
these in reaction to the perceived barriers. In this section, four broad factors 
proposed to increase the impact of economic evaluation are reviewed: 
generating appropriate incentives (to ensure economic evaluations are timely 
and relevant and to generate better understanding of economic evaluation); 
maintaining methodological standards in studies (to address possible criticisms 
of bias and quality of economic evaluations); using a 'simpler' process, as in 
cost-consequence analysis; or using economic evaluations as part of a wider 
process, as in Programme Budgeting and Marginal Analysis (PBMA). Cost-
consequence analysis and PBMA can potentially tackle a range of problems 
associated with use of economic evaluation, including political objectives, 
evidence of effectiveness, lack of understanding of economic evaluation, bias 
and relevancy of topics of economic evaluation. 
Incentives 
It has been recognised that incentives are needed for decision makers to use 
economic evaluation. There are three general approaches which have been 
proposed: training decision makers in health economics; active dissemination 
strategies for studies; and the use of financial incentives. Firstly, training in 
health economics has been identified as a way to facilitate greater use of 
economic evaluation.4,252 The EUROMET study found that, overall, decision 
makers wanted more explanation of the results of economic evaluation.4 
Secondly, active dissemination strategies to promote economic evaluation (such 
as interactive websites, including NHS EED and the Cochrane Collaboration) 
might be a specific way to increase use. Finally, it has also been proposed to 
attract decision makers to using economic evaluation by offering financial 
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incentives.169,270 However, it is not clear how this would work in practice given 
that financial incentives are likely to be only one among many incentives. Also, 
this raises the question of the sustainability of financial incentives in the long 
run. 
Incentives for health economists to make their work more relevant have not, on 
the whole, been recognised. A potential problem exists in that researchers, 
including academic health economists, might view publication in peer-reviewed 
journals as their main aim, rather than how their work affects the decision-
making process.8,269 Indeed, recent advancements in cost-effectiveness 
research by health economists have largely focused on methodological 
refinement, such as techniques to handle uncertainty in cost-effectiveness 
measures and the value of information methods,271 rather than any attempts to 
make their work utilisable by decision makers. In this respect, Kernick may be 
correct when he points out that "it is time to move on rather than refine theory 
further" (Kernick, p.314272). By this he means that it is important to encourage 
conversation between decision makers and health economists, rather than to 
focus on improving the methodological rig our of economic evaluations which 
he believes is unlikely to influence 'real' world decision-making. 
Maintaining methodological standards 
The need to maintain methodological standards in economic evaluation has 
been widely recognised, particularly among health economists themselves.2, 3, 8, 
236,251,265,273 Reinhardt believes that economic evaluation may generate 
suspicion due to the assumptions typical in models. He therefore proposes that 
evaluations should be subjected to "rigorous and penetrating audits that are 
customary in financial accounting" (Reinhardt, p.555168). Others focus more on 
the concepts and terminology (and standardisation thereof) employed in studies 
to enable transparency of the findings.3 
Improvements in methodology may, however, be insufficient to increase use of 
economic evaluation.8 Adherence to methodological and reporting practices 
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was found to have improved in published CUAs over the period 1976 to 2001,274 
although findings in the previous sections suggest that there has been no 
corresponding increase in the use of these studies. One solution, proposed by 
Drummond, would be to instigate additional reporting requirements, which, to 
some extent, go beyond methodological standards, including: a description of 
the relevant patient populations(s); information about the budgetary 
perspective and impact on budgets; inclusion of data on costs, consequences, 
and cost-effectiveness by subgroups; information about the practical 
implications of adopting the recommendations of the study; listing the key 
assumptions and data sources; and inclusion of a sensitivity analysis using the 
decision maker's own data and assumptions (rather than the economists).236 
This would enable the data to be broken down into more relevant areas, such as 
cost-effectiveness by subgroups (assisting sufficient sample size). 
Cost-consequence analysis 
It has been argued that CBA in a "disaggregated form" ,275 also referred to as 
cost-consequences analysis,178 can be more useful in decision-making. 275,276 
Here, different options, using costs and consequences, are contrasted in tabular 
form. Apart from allowing decision makers to compute their own values in 
order to take account of the local context (for instance, the impact of a new 
treatment on lifetime resource use, costs and health outcomes for an individual 
or group of patients277), it also permits other information, such as need and 
equity, to be presented as well.276 This enables decision makers to use their 
local data on costs and benefits and different options to be contrasted clearly 
and explicitly276 without prescribing a weighting system.277 In addition, 
implications for equity, need, and other relevant objectives can be presented.276 
Cost-consequence analysis might be useful in overcoming decision makers' 
need for more explanation of the practical relevance of results, as suggested in 
the EUROMET study4 and avoid extensive use of assumptions as typical in 
economic evaluation. It differs from Drummond's suggestions for improving 
methodological rigour in the sense that the data is presented in tabular form 
and can be amended and appended to by decision makers. However, some 
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economists are strongly critical of the approach, regarding it as a 'step back in 
time'.278 
PBMA 
As a systematic and explicit approach to priority setting, PBMA is a way of 
II thinking" 279 about economic concepts, rather than a single approach to priority 
setting.112 It has been described as a II tool kit" 112, 279 by some, but actually 
appears to be more of a "framework": 
It is not in itself a tool of appraisal or evaluation but rather it represents a means 
whereby appraisal and evaluation are facilitated. 
(Mooney, p. 379280) 
The technique has been described as moving from a "purely economic 
technique concerned with measuring marginal costs and benefits, to a 
management process still based on economic concepts but which contributes to 
strategic planning" (Donaldson and Mitton, p.76112). 
The objective of a PBMA exercise is two-fold. The first step, programme 
budgeting, involves establishing how resources are currently being used and 
can be seen as a way of evaluating total resource usage.112 The idea is to link 
cost and activity data to answer such questions as "what proportion of the 
current budget is going to care of the elderly?"(Mooney, p.379280). The purpose 
of asking such questions is to reflect on the process of decision-making, and be 
aware of, what Mooney calls, /I ad hoc decisions on minor changes in resource 
allocation" (Mooney, p.379280), for instance: 
Given the question of whether or not to appoint a new consultant paediatrician, it is 
extremely difficult for an AHBvii to answer other than yes. But if, perhaps with the aid 
of programme budgeting, an AHB has previously decided to give increased proportion to 
care of the elderly and mentally ill and handicapped and a lower priority to child care it 
is better placed to consider the merits of the appointment. 
(Mooney, p. 379280) 
vii Area Health Board (Scottish), which can be compared to a PCT in England, as an organisational body 
responsible for commissioning of local care. 
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The second step is marginal analysis, which addresses how any changes in 
resource use can be made, either through redeployment, reduction, or 
expansion of services. Thus, marginal analysis involves comparing the 
candidates in terms of costs and benefits.131 Marginal analysis is therefore the 
point at which economics enters into the process of priority setting. 
PBMA can be used: at the micro level within programmes of care (such as 
cancer services); across services within the same general area of care (such as 
surgery for a range of conditions or diseases); and across all programme areas 
within a single health organisation (for instance at the level of the entire services 
provided by a PeT). The decision rule is to implement the programme if the 
benefits of allocating £X to a particular programme exceed its opportunity 
costS.281 
Arguably, in the UK, PBMA is becoming a more popular method and Table 2B 
at the end of this chapter provides a summary of research undertaken in PBMA, 
focusing on the UK (the list is by no means exhaustive). Although many 
Governments introduced PBMA during the 1960s and 1970s, the interest in the 
technique then largely faltered282 and re-emerged around the early 1990'S.112 
There has been greater applicability of the framework and the approach has 
been used almost ninety times in over seventy health organisations in seven 
countries, with the vast majority (80%) being undertaken between 1992 and 
2003.112 Use of the PBMA approach has been at a wide (macro level) as in local 
authorities in Australia, which still appear to be using the framework,283 or at a 
smaller level, for instance within a specific departments (e.g. surgery) within 
hospitals.284 In the UK, recently a workshop was held in Wales to determine 
whether its use could be facilitated at the locallevel.285 In other local settings, 
the PBMA approach might already be undertaken, but in no structured way.286 
In the study by Cohen, the findings from the PBMA he was involved in were 
incorporated in a strategic plan, and he comments that "this is probably the first 
time that applied marginal analysis has directly influenced strategic planning in 
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the United Kingdom" (Cohen, p.7287). However, other PBMA studies have not 
examined or reported the outcome of the exercise on the policy process, often 
because the work is still ongoing.28S,289,290,291 
Arguably, the achievement of PBMA might be far greater than that of published 
economic evaluation, since realisable changes can be made.292,293, 294,295 PBMA 
facilitates a close collaboration between researchers and decision makers, which 
might generate use of economic evaluation among decision makers,169, 273 
PBMA has also been shown to aid an explicit priority setting basis and the 
involvement of clinicians, which has been found to be important to the priority 
setting process.292, 293 The technique has most often involved discussion groups 
with decision makers and some PBMA exercises have used Participatory Action 
Research (PAR), which aims to create knowledge through experience and the 
action of 'doing'.279 Where this technique was used in Canada,292 participant 
observation, focus groups and interviews were conducted to develop and 
implement a priority setting approach at the macro level, which released $45 
million (Canadian dollars), available for service growth areas and the deficit. 
However, there are barriers to using PBMA including a lack of trust between 
stakeholders to carry out changes (interestingly, trust is not usually a concept 
recognised by economists), as well as facilitators such as high level champion 
(which involves an influential person pushing forward the use and continuation 
of PBMA).112 These barriers and facilitators can relate to the uptake by an 
organisation of an explicit approach to priority setting. Successful 
implementation of PBMA necessarily hinges on the organizational context of 
decision-making.296 
c) Methodological appraisal of studies 
The empirical studies evaluating the use of economic evaluation in local 
decision-making have employed a wide range of methods, some of which are 
able to provide a greater contribution to understanding than others. This 
section provides a summary of the methods used as well as a discussion of the 
95 
strengths and limitations of methods employed. This will help formulation of 
the methods used in the empirical work in this thesis, as explored in the next 
chapter. 
Methods used 
The range of methods employed is presented in Table 2.4. They include postal 
surveys,6, 7, 82, 222, 228, 229, 233, 234, 235, 240, 241, 244, 245, 254 259,297 structured interviews,249 
semi-structured interviews,221, 231, 235,237,239,243,252 review of documents,48, 117, 237, 
239,250,254,265 telephone surveys,230, 232, 238,246,247,260 focus groups, 235,236, 
251participant observation,48,252 and 'researchers own experiences'.265 Most 
studies have used only one method: only six employed a combination of 
methods, such as interviews, postal surveys, and focus groups. 4,48,237,239,252, 254 
Table 2.4: methods of study 
Method Number of studies 
Postal survey 16 
Interviews (face-to-face: structured or semi-structured) 9 
Review of documentsj documentary analysis 7 
Telephone survey 6 
Focus groups 3 
Participant observation 2 
'Researchers own experiences' 1 
In depth interviews o 
The most popular method has been postal surveys, typically undertaken in the 
US. All interviews have been face-to-face, although some have been structured 
(as in a standard quantitative interview, to gain answers to exact questions, as 
typical of telephone surveys, also used), whereas others have been semi-
structured, permitting greater flexibility in, for instance, the ordering of 
questions and freedom of responses. Reviews of documents have also been 
used, whereby documents of interest (such as case studies of decisions made or 
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local documents) are reviewed to highlight whether some evidence of interest is 
found. Focus groups, a form of group interview that uses communication 
between research participants to generate data, have been popular in the UK 
and Europe over the past few years. Participant observation and documentary 
analysis, whereby researchers participate in an activity and observe individuals 
or a group and examine any documents referred to or used, has only been used 
twice so far. None of the studies used in depth interview techniques, a 
formalisation of ordinary conversation whereby the interview is discursive, 
there are no fixed set of questions, instead allowing the interviewee and 
interviewer to explore an issue. 
Strengths 
The empirical work conducted has three strengths. Firstly, the majority of 
studies attempted to explore use of economic evaluation from decision makers' 
or potential users' perspectives, rather than researchers' perspectives. The work 
performed on researchers7, 82, 222, 228 is unlikely to reflect the decision-making 
that actually takes place. The second strength is that the studies have each used 
several different methods between them and research has been conducted in 
twelve countries. In this respect, the EUROMET study4 appears to be the most 
comprehensive since nine countries were sampled and three different methods 
employed. It might be anticipated that use is, to some extent, context 
dependent, so studies covering a variety of health systems are useful in 
suggesting commonalities or generalizability. Finally, the studies have sampled 
different decision makers including pharmacists, physicians, public health 
managers, insurers, hospital managers, as well as more senior managers. 
Studies sampling one particular decision-making group cannot hope to capture 
the range of decision-making at the local level and the findings will not 
necessarily be applicable to other groups. 
~imitations 
There are four limitations to the research conducted so far, meaning that its 
usefulness in exploring the topic is constrained. 
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Researchers' assumptions 
The methods used have largely sought to answer questions based on specific 
hypotheses, relying on researcher's assumptions related both to decision-
making and the use of economic evaluation. Typically, a well-defined decision-
making situation, a decision that needs to be made, and decision makers who 
are able to implement decisions, are all taken for granted. This points to a 
classical rational model of decision-making. There has also been a general lack 
of description of the decision-making process. The vast majority of studies did 
not describe the local decision-making context, perhaps because the main 
application of economic evaluation is seen at the centrallevel.236 There is one 
exception: McDonald48 described the decision-making environment at the local 
level, including the process of decision-making, the context, and the actors 
involved. 
With regard to use of economic evaluation, it is typically assumed that evidence 
can be used directly, as in a problem solving or knowledge-driven way. 
However, the range of definitions of use referred to in the previous chapter 
suggests that there is likely to be a diverse range of use of economic evaluation: 
it can potentially be used to justify existing policies and practice; lead to, or 
contribute to, a change in policy or practice; inform planning of services; 
influence the amount of funding available to an area; or highlight important 
knowledge gaps.l 
The assumption that research is only directly used can clearly raise unrealistic 
expectations about the direct influences of research while underestimating the 
other benefits, in the form of understanding and changes in behaviour and 
opinions among decision makers. The failure to acknowledge the indirect use 
of economic evaluation is likely to underestimate its usefulness in decision-
making.298 Solely examining direct use ignores cases which prevent an action 
from not happening (" fallacy of activity"); findings that are changed or altered 
in the political process of decision-making (" fallacy of specificity"); studies 
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being used over time rather than immediately ("myopic fallacy"); and the 
behind the scenes input of economists where there is no visible link between the 
production of a study and its use ("fallacy of the invisible input").298 
Few studies have concerned the contribution of employing health economists to 
help decision makers in their commissioning decisions,48, 265 or how well health 
economic information (such as QALYs) is understood.231,232, 236, 250 Further, few 
studies 234,239,243,244,246,254,255 have addressed use of non-research evidence as 
well as economic evaluation. This definition of use focuses attention on health 
economists' views, in the way they would like economic evaluation to be used: 
Research in various countries suggests that economic evaluation is not being used by 
health care decisions makers to the extent that health economists think that it should 
be. 
(Ross, p.l03,249 emphasis added) 
Limitations of surveys 
The second general1imitation of the studies concerns the use of survey 
methods. Surveys can only capture what decision makers claim they do. 
However, often what people say and do is likely to be different, because the 
way individuals think they act is not necessarily the way they behave. For 
example, a study by Drummond et al6 found that a number of respondents 
claimed to have seen two fictitious studies. In another US study involving 
telephone interviews with medical and pharmacy directors, there appeared to 
be inconsistencies in what was being claimed by respondents,238 In this study, 
almost all respondents claimed to have an adequate understanding of 
pharmacoeconomics on the one hand, and yet most terms, such as QALY s, were 
not understood. The use of survey techniques explains why the most common 
methods to elicit barriers to use of economic evaluation involve either decision 
makers ranking choices from a list4, 6, 229, 235, 260 or selecting choices on a list. 234, 254 
Furthermore, quantitative use of survey methods tends to ignore negative or 
deviant cases (where some findings do not conform to the overall pattern of 
responses). For instance, one study analysed the responses for the 86% of 
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participants who felt that pharmacoeconomic data were always or very often 
used, whereas the 6% who felt otherwise were seemingly dropped from the 
analysis. The authors did not attempt to explore why these respondents felt 
differently. 
Awareness of respondents of focus of research 
In all studies decision makers were aware of the focus of the study and/ or that 
health economists were conducting the study. Policy makers might be inclined 
to state that they do use research evidence, because they think this is what they 
should be saying.299/157 Informants may well, therefore, have had an incentive to 
be overly positive about the use of economic evaluation and report what they 
think they should say, rather than express their actual beliefs. For example, since 
the decision makers involved in the research conducted by McDonald48 were 
aware of her background as a health economist, it is possible that they acted 
differently and made a deliberate attempt to use economic evaluation during 
the CHD meetings she observed. 
Health economists incentives ignored 
None of the studies have investigated incentives among health economists to 
produce utilisable work at the local level. This, however, is likely to be 
important: 
An equally valid explanation of the growth of published studies is that there has been an 
increase in the supply of health economists, who need to fill their time somehow. 
(Drummond, p.3174) 
Are health economists interested in the use of economic evaluation because they 
feel that their work is valuable and should be used, or are they mainly 
interested in enhancing their career? Perhaps health economists and decision 
makers have entirely different preferences, as well as different perspectives on 
the world of health care provision. 
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3. Conclusion 
In the UK, economic evaluation tends to be constrained largely to use at 
national, rather than local, level decision-making. Use of economic evaluation 
might often support the Government's screening policies (although, in practice, 
studies have not examined how evidence has been used and whether it might 
be a justification for something that policy makers had wanted to pursue in the 
first place). At the local level, there appear to be barriers relating to the 
organisation, the actors involved, including decision makers and health 
economists producing research. It is not clear how such barriers might be 
overcome, and there appears to be a divided camp amongst health economists 
in terms of those who believe that there needs to be greater training of decision 
makers in health economics, or involvement of health economists in decision-
making and those, on the other hand, who would argue that health economists 
can stand back and only by improving their work can it be used. This latter 
group appear to have the most influence on the discipline currently since most 
health economics work is focused on developing increasingly technical work. 
However, in the studies evaluated in this chapter, use of economic evaluation at 
the local level is generally taken to mean direct use, which would explain why a 
quantitative figure of 30% use has been found in some studies. In addition, the 
decision-making process has generally not been explored, although as 
suggested in the previous chapter, the organisation and decision-making 
surrounding the NHS is likely to affect the use of evidence. The complexity of 
decision-making might explain why health economists have deterred from 
involving this in their analysis, but the methods used have also been unsuitable 
for exploring the process. 
The studies reviewed in this chapter have major limitations. Further research is 
required on this topic because it is not entirely possible to understand the use of 
economic evaluation fully here. In particular, it would be important to be able 
to assess how/whether evidence from economic evaluation, as well as economic 
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concepts and ideas, are influencing the process of decision-making and in what 
way they are being used (directly or indirectly). It is likely that more qualitative 
techniques, including in-depth interviews, which have not been used so far to 
address this topic, would be extremely helpful. This idea is further developed 










Table 2A: empirical studies about the use of economic evaluation in decision-making 
Sample Methods and Study focus Main findings 
Researchers involved in 
economic evaluation 
(Scandinavia and UK) 
Researchers involved in 
economic evaluation 
(Scandinavia and UK) 














Postal survey (11) To explore the impact of 
researchers' studies on 
decision-making 
Postal survey (28) 
Postal survey (46) 






To revisit/retest ideas from 
previous pilot study (above) 
To assess the use, and lack of 
use, of economic appraisal in 
decision-making 
To locate economic 
evaluations, examine the 
methodology used, and 
identify use in decision and 
policy making in health care 
To evaluate the contribution 
of two health economists 
providing cost effectiveness 
information about health care 
interventions to the local level 
To explore use of economic 
evaluation from the point of 
view of potential users 
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Only screening studies had an impact on 
decision-making. Economists were 
pessimistic about the role of economic 
evaluation in decision-making 
The interest in economic appraisal as 
apparent in the UK in 1982, had spread to 
Scandinavia. Five studies were found to 
have a major impact (3 were from the UK) 
Use of economic appraisal is limited. It is 
used to support a particular course of 
action or decision already made 
Around a third (27%) of studies were 
thought to have influenced decision-
making or policy 
Cost effectiveness information is of 
variable quality and difficult to interpret. 
Usually clear answers are required to 
answer quite specific questions, for which 
economic evaluation is not helpful 
There is a high level of awareness of 
economic evaluation among decision 
makers and some had used it in their 
decision-making. However, there were 
various barriers to use (including lack of 
availability of data and expertise) 
Author(s) 
Luce and Brown 
(1995)243 
Steiner et al (1996)244 
Steiner et al (1996)245 
Walley et al (1997)229 
Sloan et al (1997)230 
Sample 
Decision makers from 
hospitals, HMOs, third-




















To evaluate the role of 
economic evaluation in 
technology assessment in 
health care 
To examine the information 
used by medical directors of 
private health plans to make 
medical coverage decisions 
for new medical technologies 
To investigate the influence 
of organisational structure 
and physician's method of 
payment on managed care 
plans' decisions to cover new 
medical technologies 
To assess the attitudes of 
advisers to economic 
evaluation and perceptions of 
barriers to cost effective 
prescribing 
Directors of hospital Telephone To determine whether 
pharmacies and survey (103) hospital pharmacies under 
pharmacists the pressure of managed care 
(US) wer~likely to ensure less 
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Main findings 
Role of economics is 1/ ambiguous" in the 
process. Hospitals are particularly 
focused on traditional financial analyses. 
Pharmacy committees tend to conduct 
more economic analyses. HMOs and 
insurers exclude economics. 
Barriers were related to the paucity of 
timely, relevant, and credible information, 
and the societal perspective of studies 
There was limited role for economic 
evaluation because of lack of timely data 
Four of the top five important 
considerations in deciding coverage of 
medical technologies related to clinical 
issues rather than to economic evaluation 
Economic issues were less important than 
clinical issues, but were considered at 
most meetings between advisers and 
primary care medical practitioners. 
Barriers included the lack of credibility of 
evaluations and structural inflexibility in 
theNHS 
Hospitals under the pressure of managed 
care were not more likely to use cost-
effective practices. Barriers included a 
lack of timeliness of studies, lack of 
Author(s) 
Lyles et al (1997)246 
Drummond et al 
(1997)6 
Duthie et al (1999)231 






hospital directors of 
pharmacy, directors of 
public health 
(UK) 
GPs, hospital doctors, 
Trust business managers, 
hospital pharmacists, HA 
personnel 
(UK) 
Medical and pharmacy 














costly and more effective 
provision of care 
Mainly to understand the role 
of socio-economic 
assessments (which includes 
cost-effectiveness) on drug 
adoption decisions 
To explore the reasons for the 
lack of impact of economic 
evaluation 
To determine the application 
of economic outcome 
measures 
To find out the use of 
pharmacoeconomic and 




relevant information, lack of independent 
sponsorship, and inadequate expertise in 
economic evaluation 
A high percentage of plans used some 
type of assessment, with clinical 
effectiveness most common, and cost-
effectiveness second. Studies need to be 
comprehensive and timely if they are to 
be used 
One of main barriers was budgetary 
inflexibly. There is a need to increase 
decision makers' awareness of economic 
evaluation and help them understand 
study results 
The use and value of health economics as 
a discipline is generally recognized. 
However, there are structural and 
operational barriers. The latter includes 
the tendency to focus on the individual 
level, rather than the population level 
Efficacy and safety information were 
ranked the most important data sources 
for medical and pharmacy directors. Both 
groups ranked cost-effectiveness data 
third. Almost all felt that they had an 
adequate understanding of 
pharmacoeconomics, but less than 30% 
said that they understood QAL Ys. The 
main weaknesses of pharmacoeconomic 
research were perceived to be the reliance 
Author(s) Sample Methods and Study focus Main findings 
sam£lesize 
on assumptions and the lack of 
generalizability of the findings 
Cox et al (2000)232 Pharmacists Telephone To evaluate the relevance of Statements reported in terms ofQALYs 
(US) survey (16) health economic information were difficult to understand 
to decision makers 
Grizzle et al (2000)247 Managed care decision Telephone To understand how The majority (>70%) of decision makers 
makers survey (31) pharmacoeconomic felt there was pharamcoeconomic 
(US) information is used in information that they desired but was 
managed care unavailable to them 
Motheral et al Pharmacists or physicians Postal survey To understand how decision While 90% consider using this 
(2000)233 (US) (409) makers view and use information, 20% rarely or never act on 
pharmacoeconomic this information and two-thirds 
information occasionally do 
Anell and Svarvar Members of formulary Postal survey To identify information used There was an interest shown in economic 
(2000)234 committees (210) and decision-making criteria evaluation. However, barriers included: 
(Sweden) important in establishing lack of competence among committee 
clinical practice guidelines members; inadequate supply of relevant 
studies; difficulty in translating results 
into clinical practice guidelines 
Ginsberg et al Hospital physicians (and Postal survey To identify physicians' views Most physicians regard cost-effectiveness 
(2000)241 family doctors) (1,000) and experience of using cost- as an appropriate component of clinical 
(US) effectiveness in clinical decisions. However, 72% felt that only 
decision-making the physician and patient should decide 
what is cost-worthy 
Rosen (2000)239 Hospital clinicians, Semi-structured To explore the way in which Primarily clinicians and public health 
hospital managers, interviews (51) doctors and managers view doctors use cost-effectiveness 
purchaser managers, and documentary effectiveness of health care information, since it rarely relates to 
public health consultants, analysis interventions and how this decisions made by managers, although 
others (nurse managers, affects the evidence they use the way in which they used published 
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Author(s) Sample Methods and Study focus Main findings 
sam~lesjze 
audit officer, regional in decision-making research varied considerably. The 
scientific officer) evidence used to inform decisions reflects 
(UK) the professional role and objectives of 
decision makers, such as clinical, 
financial, personal, and organisational 
Hoffmann (2000)4 Government agencies, Postal survey To assess the extent of Economic evaluation studies are not 
physicians (includes (968), semi- knowledge, use, and barriers widely used in decision-making. Barriers 
GPs/ family doctors), structured to use, of economic included budgetary inflexibility and lack 
hospital pharmacists, interviews (53), evaluation of credibility of studies. An explanation 
hospital managers, and and focus group of the practical relevance of studies, as 
sickness (20) well as training of end users in health 





Portugal, UK, Spain) 
Burns (2000)242 Purchasers of health care Semi-structured To determine the role of HT A Purchasers use HT A information 
(in UK included non- interviews (55) and clinical effectiveness sporadically. This appears to be mainly 
medical Health Authority information in decisions due to inability to access information (in 
purchasers, public health about health care contracting terms of obtaining information and 
physicians, and GPs) and purchasing understanding information). Although 
[UK and US] many UK purchasers were familiar with 
HT A information, most US purchasers 
were unsure about what it was and 
tended to confuse it with other types of 
information, such as performance 
indicators 
Kulsomboom et al Pharmacy directors of Postal survey To determine the criteria for The two most important criteria for the 
(2001)259 teaching hospitals (166) using pharmacoeconomic use of pharmacoeconomic data were the 
(US) data for formulary decisions, impact a new medication might have on 
to describe the data sources institutional costs and anticipated annual 
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Author(s) Sample Methods and Study focus Main findings 
sam~lesize 
that were used, and the pharmacy budget for a new medication 
quality of data 
McDonald and Nine HAs Semi-structured To explore the role of health The environment of decision-making, 
Baughan (2001)256 (UK) interviews (9) economists at the local level which involved reacting to immediate 
problems or requests for additional 
funding, is very important. Much of the 
work conducted by health economists 
comprises work not related to economics. 
Rarely were decisions made on topics 
addressed by published economic 
evaluations. Economics was sometimes 
treated as a fur coat to support decisions 
already made 
Folakemi et al Hospital pharmacists Telephone To explore the use of The majority (86%) of pharmacists 
(2002)260 (US) survey pharmacoeconomic data in indicated that pharmacoeconomic data 
(204) hospital formulary decisions were used either all the time or at least 
very often when formulary decisions 
were made. Only 6% said that 
pharmacoeconomic data were rarely or 
never used. Drug efficacy was ranked 
among one of the most important factors 
in formulary decisions 
West et al (2002)297 Senior bureaucrats in Postal survey To examine the procedures Information required for decision-making 
provincial governments (Not specified) for the scientific evaluation of about cost-effectiveness of drugs is often 
(5 Canadian provinces) drugs in listing for not available. There are also minimal 
reimbursement mechanisms to examine cost-effectiveness 
of a drug once it is listed: hence, there is 
no way to re-visit a decision once it has 
been made 
Weatherly et al Health Improvement Postal survey To explore the use of Government reports and reports from 
(2002)254 Programme (HIMP) (102), telephone evidence (economic evidence NICE were the main sources of published 
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Author(s) 
Nixon et al (2002)250 
McDonald (2002)48 
Johnstone and Lacey 
(2002)117 



























(2 in total) 
Study focus 
in particular) 
To explore how summaries of 
clinical and economic 
evidence can be accessed and 
used in local decision-making 
An exploration of the nature 
of local decision-making and 
the role of economic 
evaluation in Coronary Heart 
Disease (CHD) strategy 
To investigate decisions 
based on evidence of 
effectiveness from 
Randomised Controlled 
Trials (RCfs) and systematic 
reviews of RCTs 
To examine the usefulness of 




evidence, rather than economic 
evaluation. Barriers include lack of time 
and availability of studies. Accessible 
summaries of studies may facilitate 
greater use 
Findings from structured abstracts from 
NHS EED suggested that assertive 
community treatment (AC1) tends to be 
more effective and also less costly. Two 
ACf teams were subsequently introduced 
Rational health economic approaches are 
unlikely to be adopted widely due to the 
political environment, existence of 
competing objectives, and lack of 
explicitness in decision-making process 
Evidence existed for less than half the 
decisions identified (124 in total). For 42 
decisions, favourable evidence to support 
the decision was identified; in 18 
decisions the evidence either showed 
equivocal benefit or no support; 64 
decisions had no clear evidence from 
economic evaluation 
Decision makers generally recognized the 
usefulness and necessity of published 
economic evaluation in informing the 
decision-making processes. However, 
there was a poor generalizability of the 
results and lack of methodological rigour 
Author(s) Sample Methods and Study focus Main findings 
samrle size 
in studies. There was a general consensus 
among decision makers in favour of 
developing a quality scoring system for 
studies 
Drummond et al Managed care Focus group (10) To discover how health Seven additional reporting requirements 
(2003)236 pharmacists economics information can be were specified for economic studies 
(US) used 
Ubel et al (2003)240 Hospital physicians (and Postal survey To determine the influence of Providing cost effectiveness information 
family doctors) (560) cost effectiveness information had only a moderate influence on 
(US) about physicians' screening physicians screening recommendations. 
decisions 36 physicians' indicated cost was not 
relevant to medical decisions 
Ijzerman et al Local decision makers, Semi-structured To discover whether pre- Use of economic evaluation is not JJself-
(2003)221 including GPs, interviews assessment of decision evident." Cost effectiveness criterion is of 
representatives of health (not specified) makers' needs can increase limited importance; results from clinical 
insurance companies, the impact of economic effectiveness studies and budget impact 
members of the Health evaluation studies are of greater importance 




Sheldon et al Primary care Semi-structured To assess the extent of Implementation of NICE guidance has 
(2004)237 prescribers jhospital interviews implementation of NICE been variable. It is more likely to be 
pharmacists, senior (68) guidance (12 cases) adopted where there is strong 
clinicians and managers [Also time series professional support, a clear evidence 
(UK) analysis and base, and no increased costs 
audit of patients 
notes] 





(local level, including 
representatives of Trusts 

















ways in, which health 
economic information is used 
in health policy decision-
making, as well as the factors 
associated with utilisation 
III 
Main findings 
rarely informs technology coverage 
decisions (although at the national level, 
the opposite was true, and economic 
analyses were found to inform technology 
coverage decisions). The main sources of 
information on cost-effectiveness were 
found to be the manufacturers of product 
information and NICE guidance. Barriers 
related to: limited resources and capacity 
to generate or locate evaluations in time 
to inform decisions; inability to realise 
savings identified in analyses; concerns 
about bias due to the source of the 
analysis, the robustness of the analysis or 
the appropriateness of the comparators. 
These problems arose within an overall 
context of a lack of incentives to use 
economic analysis and a lack of skills and 
understanding. To facilitate greater use, 
there is a need for a clear, standardised 
format for the presentation of economic 
analysis including greater clarification of 
the assumptions that went into models. 
Health economic analysis could be 
improved by making it more sensitive to 
the questions that health provider's need 
answers to. Training in health economics 




Bellamy and KIuvers 
(1995)283 
Craig et al (1995) 290 
Brambleby (1995)289 
Twaddle and Walker 
(1995)294 
Ratcliffe et al (1996)288 























Selected services considered 
Range, focusing on maternal 






Child health services 
Range 





There was an agreement to incorporate the findings into the 
strategy plan 
A majority of councils said that they would use the 
traditional budgetary approach, irrespective of whether 
they were using programme budgeting 
Work was ongoing 
Useful in terms of communication and education, but work 
still undergoing 
There was an agreement to incorporate findings into 
contracts 
Effects of implementation were not reported 
Recommendations were incorporated into policy, resolving 
difficulties and apparent conflicts facing purchasers 
Research achieved realisable changes in services based on 
the principles of CEA. Also achieved a change in decision-
making culture and acceptance of range of matters in 
planning services 
Study built upon the PBMA framework and released $45 
million (Canadian dollars), available for service growth 
areas and the deficit 




One of two of the recommendations from the PBMA was 
implemented. The other failed to be implemented because 
a lack of financial resources to fund the proposal 
Chapter 3: Research methodology and design 
Chapter 2 suggests that further exploration of the use of economic evaluation in 
health care decision-making is required. There is currently little knowledge 
about the extent to which economic evaluation is used, particularly in terms of 
indirect use, and existing studies have tended to employ relatively insensitive 
quantitative techniques. Choice of methods is therefore crucial to enhancing 
knowledge in this area rather than merely repeating existing work. This 
chapter discusses the rationale for using qualitative research methodology in 
exploring the research topic. The chapter begins by examining the basis of 
qualitative research (in terms of ontology, epistemology, and methodology) 
before investigating the research design and specific methods used here to 
explore views of decision makers and health economists. The final section of 
this chapter presents a brief conclusion. 
1. Ontology, epistemology, and methodology 
Different perspectives can be taken in any research, and hence different 
paradigms and points of view employed, as suggested here. These are typically 
in relation to positivist and interpretative research paradigms. 
1.1 Paradigms in research 
A paradigm characterizes changes in the 1/ standards governing permissible 
problems, concepts and explanations" (Kuhn, p.l063OO). A paradigm forms the 
implicit beliefs, values, and commonsense assumptions of a scientific 
community, and in this respect a paradigm is more than a set of theories. For 
instance, the development of Newton's physics marked the emergence of a new 
paradigm in physics. Although paradigms cannot be proved or disproved, 
they represent fundamental positions that are taken on the part of the 
researcher.3Dl Denzin and Lincoln302 relate paradigms to particular ontologies, 
epistemologies, and methodologies. These terms along with others are 
summarised in Table 3.1, with each concept informing the next. 
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Table 3.1,' concepts associated with research paradigms 
Concept Description 







The theory of knowledge (which addresses the relationship 
between the researcher and the known) 
The philosophical stance informing the methodology and hence 
providing a context for the process 
The plan of action or design lying behind the choice and use of 
particular methods 
The techniques used to gather and analyse data related to a 
research question or hypothesis 
Two distinct research paradigms (positivist and constructivist/ interpretativist) 
will be explored in detail. 
a) Positivism 
The ontological stance of positivism is a belief in realism, or some single 
knowable reality, which is based on the natural sciences.302 An example in 
economics, is the belief in general equilibrium theory. This means that 
behaviour, institutions and society can be studied in the same way as, for 
instance, a chemical process,105 For positivists, research is based on empirical 
observation and hypothesis testing, leading to a rejection or acceptance of the 
hypothesis, where researchers aim to be objective, seeking to uncover 'facts'.304 
For instance, positive economics is used to describe the branch of economics 
that deals with description, based on facts confirmed through empirical 
evidence.los Popper, an advocate of realism, whose work forms much of social 
science thinking, suggests a II falsification" method, in which a statement is 
scientific if it is testable, rather than whether it is true or false.305,306 These 
views have been adopted by Blaug, an economist who suggests that a theory 
cannot be proved to be true and it is only possible to disprove it.3D7 However, it 
is disputable whether the social world can be studied as the natural world can 
be, due to the complex interaction of people, with differing views, thoughts, 
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and opinions. Lawson, a contemporary (critical) realist economist, believes that 
complex social structures, as studied by economists, require more flexible 
approaches.308 Lawson argues that the main problem with economics is that the 
method used does not reflect the nature of the phenomenon: 
Rather than starting with a question about an aspect of social reality and determining 
an appropriate method, modern economists usually start with a particular type of 
method and presume, mistakenly, that it must be appropriate to all social contexts. The 
result is that modern economists end up distorting social phenomena just to render 
them open to treatment by their chosen approach. 
(Lawson, p.22260) 
Lawson argues that economic modelling, with its reliance on functional 
relationships, is largely inappropriate to studying most social phenomena. 
b) Constructivism/Interpretivism 
As a result of the inadequacies of positivism to define social situations, 
qualitative research has arisen as a separate methodology in its own right. 
Qualitative research has been defined as: 
A multimethod in focus, involving an interpretive, naturalistic approach to its subject 
matter. This means that qualitative researchers study things in their natural settings, 
attempting to make sense of, or interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings people 
give to them. 
(Denzin and Lincoln, p.3302) 
Although the types of qualitative research studies are diverse, employing a 
multitude of methods, qualitative research has particular characteristics (Table 
3.2). 
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The study of natural or real-life situations as they unfold and 
openness to findings that emerge 
Willingness to adapt inquiry as understanding deepens and/ or 
situations change 
Thick, rich descriptions based on direct quotes of people's 
individual perspectives, detailed observations, careful document 
review, or case studies 
Assumes change is constant and ongoing 
The researcher has a close relationship with the people and the 
situation, and hence the researcher's personal experiences and 
insights are an important part of the understanding of the 
phenomenon 
Exploration of patterns and themes in data, followed by 
confirmation, guided by analytical principles as opposed to rules 
Focus on the whole phenomenon under study, where meaning 
cannot be reduced to a few discrete variables 
The majority of qualitative research is conducted within a constructivist 
framework,302 also referred to as interpretative inquiry, naturalistic inquiry or 
hermeneutics, because it deals with the interpretation and understanding of 
text.310 Constructivist inquiry has also been associated with theoretical 
perspectives such as symbolic interactionism (interpretation of other's actions 
are based on the meaning which they attach to such actions311) and 
phenomenology (which describes people's experience, without recourse to 
theory or assumptions from other disciplines105). Constructivists believe that 
people' construct' knowledge based on their experience, history, and culture, 
which recognises subjective meaning and not objective reality. They oppose the 
notion that it is possible to directly grasp the 'real world' through empirics and 
they believe that no one 'truth' exists.310 Hence, behaviour is not self-evident, 
from what people say and do, and requires interpretation.312 Consequently, 
qualitative research, conducted within a constructivist framework, aims to gain 
an 'interpretative' understanding of subjects' meanings.312 
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The constructivist paradigm is based on a relativist ontology (as opposed to 
realism) and knowledge is created through the researcher and the research 
subjects, so that there are multiple realities.3l3 This paradigm has a I subjectivist' 
epistemology, which suggests that the interaction between subject and I object' 
creates the form of inquiry.30l However, not all qualitative researchers are fully 
supportive of the notion of relativist inquiry and Hammersley proposes a 
weaker version of realism, termed subtle realism, which is: 
... the idea that research investigates independent, knowable phenomena. But it breaks 
with [realism] in denying that we have direct access to those phenomena, in accepting 
that we must always rely on cultural assumptions, and in denying that our aim is to 
reproduce social phenomena in some way that is uniquely appropriate to them. 
(Hammersley, p.523l4) 
The constructivist paradigm typically uses methodologies such as ethnography 
and grounded theory.303 All attempt to understand people's worlds, although 
there are marginal differences in foci. Ethnography is a method of studying 
and learning about a person or group of people in their own environment, 
paying particular attention to culture. Grounded theory, as described by Glaser 
and Strauss, has a slightly different perspective in that it refers to how to build 
theory which is developed inductively from a body of qualitative data,3l5 
Hence, grounded theory aims to understand phenomena by being I grounded' 
in the data and developing thick, rich descriptions of people's behaviour or 
views.3l5 The approach involves reading (and re-reading) a body of data (such 
as field notes) and exploring emerging concepts or categories, as well as any 
interrelationships, with the purpose of developing new theories,3l5 Grounded 
theory also stresses the importance of simultaneous data collection and data 
analysis, so that the process is iterative.3l5 Grounded theory was subsequently 
expanded on by Strauss and Corbin336 who provide four central criteria for 
I good' grounded theory: 1) it should fit the phenomenon, which has been 
carefully derived from diverse data; 2) it should provide understanding, and be 
comprehensible to those within and outside the study; 3) it should provide 
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generality, being applicable to a wide variety of contexts in the area; 4) and it 
should state the conditions under which the theory applies and provide a basis 
for action in the area. Inevitably, different interpretations of grounded theory 
arise from thse two works, neither of which provides empirical application. For 
instance, where Stauss and Corbin suggest that theory should be applicable to a 
variety of contexts, it is not clear from Glaser and Strauss's work that this is the 
case and there appears to be more focus there on developing a theory that 
accounts for much of the relevant behaviour. 
Blaxter316 suggests that methodologies such as grounded theory, which 
typically involve inductive theory developmentviii, can be diagrammatically 
represented as an entire research process (Figure 3.1). 
Figure 3.1: inductive theory development 
(Adapted from Blaxter, p.8316) 
Inductive theory development enables exploration of, and reflection on, the 
phenomenon, where the design influences data collection, data analysis, and 
theory generation. This occurs in a cyclical fashion, so that following theory 
generation, for instance, the design of the project is altered or modified, leading 
to further data collection. 
viii No~e that the s?ndard approach in positivism is deduction, which refers to a series oflogical steps in 
deducmg conclUSIons from, for instance, generalization or universal law. 105 
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Health economists tend to be largely unfamiliar with qualitative methods. 
Where health economists have used qualitative research it has tended to inform 
quantitative analysis,85 using questionable qualitative methods. For instance, in 
the study by San Miguel et al,85 the authors claim that qualitative analysis was 
where" an open space was provided for ... responses within the questionnaire" 
(In press). Coast has argued that qualitative research is a challenge for the 
discipline of health economics, based on two premises: the acceptability of 
methods and the acceptability of presentation.317 In relation to the former, 
health economists are accustomed to assessing the quality of research in terms 
of generalisability, whereas this is not a requirement of qualitative research. 
Indeed, a recent article suggested that most economists view fieldwork (or 
qualitative research) as a "doubtful activity, one reserved for the lowest orders, 
such as reporters and sociologists" (The Economist, p.64318). However, the 
article goes onto profess the "fruits of fieldwork" and that "data is just the 
plural of anecdote - as long as the anecdotes are scrupulously and 
systematically chosen" (The Economist, p.64318). This suggests that economists 
have most trouble with the small number of participants in qualitative research, 
whereas typically quantitative research uses large numbers. In addition, 
reflexivity (whereby the researcher attempts to assess their 
influence/perceptions on the research process/findings), highlighted as an 
important attribute of qualitative research,302 is likely to conflict with the idea of 
objectivity. In the latter case, typical in economic studies, it is assumed that 
there is a single version of reality that cannot be influenced by the perceptions 
of the researcher. Hence researchers' influence on the data/subjects is not 
examined (this might explain why the studies on the use of economic 
evaluation did not consider the potential influence of participants knowing that 
health economists were performing the research). 
Despite the challenges that qualitative research presents to health economists, 
qualitative techniques are likely to become more important in areas such as 
attribute development for discrete choice experiments in health economics319 
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(although the exact way of proceeding with this remains unclear), as well as in 
more exploratory studies such as reported in this thesis. 
1.2 Methods in qualitative research 
Many methods of data collection are available for use in qualitative research, 
including interviews, participant (or non-participant) observation, focus 
groups, documentary analysis, and content analysis of questionnaire materials 
(whereby usually pre-determined categories or themes are fed back into 
quantitative models317). The remainder of this section focuses on interviews, 
participant observation, and documentary analysis, which are the methods that 
were chosen for this research. Focus groups were not used because it was felt 
that they rely on a hypothetical scenario and would be difficult to convene 
without appearing contrived. Questionnaires were also not used because they 
are relatively insensitive to exploring views and options about a complex topic 
such as health care decision-making. 
Whatever method of data collection is chosen, the method of sampling is 
important, and it is to this area that this section turns first. 
a) Sampling 
Sampling (or choosing a smaller group or entity) is necessary because it is 
rarely possible to study an entire population.320 There is a distinction between 
qualitative and quantitative sampling strategies. Quantitative studies typically 
use samples selected randomly, and of sufficient size to achieve a pre-
determined level of statistical power, and are most appropriate when the 
purpose is description and explanation.321 Quantitative sampling is also 
concerned with representativeness, so that the results of studying the sample 
can be generalized back to the population.320 In contrast, qualitative studies 
typically focus on relatively smaller samples, selected purposefully, using non-
random selection, and are most suited for exploration and theory 
development,321 including questions of 'why?' and 'how?'320 Statistical 
representativeness is usually not a feature of qualitative research.322 
121 
Furthermore, qualitative sampling tends to be (although not always) iterative, 
so that more data can be collected after theory refinement. Hence, the sample 
size is usually not pre-determined, becoming clearer only as the study 
progresses and the new categories or themes cease emerging from the data 
(saturation).315,320 Since the focus is on information richness and quality, sample 
size in qualitative research is not crucial for the study. 
As the sample size is usually not pre-determined, the choice of sampling 
strategy needs to take account of the context of the study as it evolves.32o There 
are various sampling strategies available to the researcher, depending on the 
objectives of the research, including theoretical sampling, maximum variation 
sampling, and snowball sampling. 
Firstly, theoretical (or purposeful) sampling, associated with grounded 
theory,315 involves collecting data as theory emerges - hence, new samples are 
sought to elaborate on the data already collected. The analyst selects 
informants, collects and analyses data, with the aim of producing a theoretical 
explanation before deciding which data to collect further and from whom.323 
The purpose of sampling is to refine ideas or explanations and researchers 
might revisit the same settings or individuals to gain further information.313 
Some qualitative researchers suggest theoretical sampling later in the research 
process in particular enables insights to be developed.313 
Secondly, maximum variation sampling is a special kind of purposeful 
sampling, which involves obtaining a broad range of perspectives on a 
subject.324 The objective is to select cases that exhibit maximal differences 
between each other in the cases of interest. Finally, snowball sampling entails 
identifying informants from other informants already sampled.304 Snowball 
sampling is commonly used when potential informants are not known to the 
researcher and are difficult to find, but are known to informants in the area.304 
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In practice, a mixture of sampling strategies are likely to be used, since, for 
instance, purposeful sampling may mean going outside of a group sampled 
based on what has been suggested by informants (resulting in snowball 
sampling). All of these sampling strategies, however, are likely to differ from 
obtaining a simple convenience sample (or selecting whoever is closest or 
easiest to sample), since this is unlikely to obtain a full range of views or 
opinions on the topic. 
b) Data collection 
Interviews 
Interviews are usually conducted to uncover the subjective meanings of 
informants' experiences and views and to allow exploration of complex 
issues,325 Interviews are a useful technique for collecting data which would be 
unlikely to be accessible using other methods.316 Interviews can be in-depth 
(referred to also as exploratory or unstructured) seemingly equivalent to a 
guided everyday conversation,310 or structured, which are similar to 
questionnaires, in that informants receive the same set of questions, using a 
structured interview schedule (or a list of points/ questions to be raised), and 
questions are asked in the same order.326 Semi-structured interviews are a 
mixture of both types, in the sense that interviews are generally unstructured 
but researchers have a pre-determined list of pOints that they aim to cover 
during the interview, although these points can be raised in any order.327 
It is important to note that the choice of interview type undertaken will largely 
depend on the research and the information being sought.310 For instance, 
structured interviews are used in public opinion polls and market research,328 
where the objective is to obtain a wide response. In contrast, in-depth 
interviews are most appropriate when developing ideas and research 
hypotheses.328 In-depth interviews offer the possibility for researchers to be 
deeply engaged in the development of the project328 (hence, it appears, relating 
closely to the iterative model in Figure 3.1). 
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During in-depth interviews the onus of conducting a I good' interview is 
essentially on the interviewer. The interviewer must be able to pick up what is 
being said, what is being omitted, and the hesitations expressed, together with 
the reasons behind them.328 At the same time, the interviewer must also create a 
neutral or relaxed atmosphere, to enable the informant to express ideas in their 
own words.328 The researcher must therefore be involved in collecting ideas 
rather than only data, and ideally there is a constant monologue by the 
informants on the topic of the research, and limited role for the interviewer -
using nuances (such as "Uhuh") or prompts (such as "Yes", "I see", or "Please 
go on").328 
The method of conducting interviews (face-to-face or telephone) is also 
important because this can affect the type of data collected. Although face-to-
face interviews are the usual, telephone interviews are becoming a more 
important tool for data collection. They tend to be cheaper to organise and 
easier than face-to-face interviews and some have claimed that informants tend 
to stay more focused on the topic.327 The disadvantages of telephone interviews 
are that potentially important nuances may be lost and it is not possible to 
provide visual prompts (for example, eye contact, to signal awaiting a reply or 
interest in what is being said).327 
Rapport and trust are essential for all interviews, irrespective of the type and 
method by which they are conducted.326 In particular though, in-depth 
interviews require a high level of interpersonal skills, such as the ability to put 
informants at ease, asking questions in an interesting manner, and jotting down 
informants' responses without interrupting the conversational flow.328 In-depth 
interviews are usually recorded on tape,310 to capture accurate details of what is 
said328 and to also allow the interviewer to concentrate on the process of the 
interview.316 It is important that the interviewee trusts that the interviewer will 
keep the information imparted on the audiotapes confidential. 
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Reflexivity is also a key feature of interviews. It is necessary for the interviewer 
to reflect on their experience and role within the research325 so that potential 
improvements can be made to the interview technique, the quality of the 
interview can be assessed, and insights developed (again relating to the 
iterative process as shown in Figure 3.1). 
Participant observation 
Participant observation enables exploration of how the context of a social 
situation gives meaning to behaviours or beliefs,329 It contrasts with the 
interview technique because it does not rely on the perceptions of informants, 
but offers the researcher an opportunity to directly access people's 
assumptions,329 Importantly, it can allow differences between actual behaviour 
(in a certain situation or setting) and verbal behaviour (during interview) to be 
examined.329 Further, participant observation offers the opportunity to 
examine sequences of events, rather than attempting to piece together 
understanding from interviews.329 The technique is particularly suited to 
studying the working of organisations and how people perform their roles,33o 
Prior to conducting participant observation, it is necessary to gain access to the 
setting. This might be particularly difficult, since formal settings are not easily 
penetrated and can be policed by 'gatekeepers', who themselves might not be 
readily known.331 Gaining access can therefore be an important part of the 
process and can take time. Once access has been obtained, the degree of 
participation depends on the purpose of the study and the nature of the 
setting329 and can vary (during the course of the fieldwork), from complete 
participation to non-participation (or complete observer), although most 
fieldwork lies between these two extremes,329 
During observations, researchers usually take 'fieldwork observations'. These 
typically concern the following categories, although they might not be recorded 
in a single observation: noting who is present and the 'activity' that is 
happening, including when, where, and why it is happening.329 Spradley 
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differentiates between three types of observation depending on the stage of the 
research.332 These three levels can be thought of as a funnel, where each level 
has a narrower focus: descriptive observations tend to occur early in the study; 
focused observations, which are more selective than descriptive observations, 
tend to occur in the 'intermediate stages'; and selective or highly focused 
observations occur towards the end of the research when more insight has been 
gained. Following observations, it is important for the observer to be reflexive 
and to constantly ask questions about the way their presence is influencing 
what is being observed and the findings from the study.331 This is relevant for 
the ideas generated as the study progresses. 
Documentary analysis 
Documents are essentially any written text, and for the purposes of research, 
they are a social product in the sense that they are produced on the basis of 
certain ideas, theories, and principles.126 Scott333 suggests that quality control 
criteria should be used to assess authenticity (how genuine the document is), 
credibility (how distorted the document is, in relation to truthfulness), 
representativeness (in relation to the body of documents), and meaning of 
documents. The latter is of importance since although positivistic researchers 
tend to look for facts and figures, it is necessary to go beyond this and examine 
the actual meaning of the document, which might be bound up with the 
subjectivity of the author or researcher.304 Apart from the actual data provided 
in documents, documentary analysis can also be important for triangulation (i.e. 
checking whether a similar picture emerges as from other methods of data 
collection).l26 This can confirm what is already known or provide insights not 
generated previously. 
c) Analysis of qualitative research data 
Different methods of data analysis are typically used in qualitative research, 
including framework, content analysis, discourse analysis, and conversation 
analysis. Those methods that do not use an iterative approach are not further 
considered here. The iterative approach involves: affixing codes to field notes or 
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interview transcripts; noting reflections; identifying relationships, patterns, 
themes, and differences between groups; taking these patterns or differences to 
the next wave of data collection; and theory generation.334 Miles and Huberman 
propose that analysis consists of three continuous and iterative activities: data 
reduction; data display; and conclusion drawing/ verification.334 These are 
discussed in turn. 
Data reduction refers to the process of "selecting, focusing, simplifying, 
abstracting, and transforming the data" that appear in field notes or transcripts 
(Miles and Huberman, p.l0334). An important part of data reduction is the 
creation of codes, which refers to making meaning of blocks of text.335 
Grounded theorists suggest a carefulline-by-line reading of text to enable codes 
to be 'grounded' in the text.336 There are essentially three recognised types of 
codes336 (usually but not always in this order): 'open coding' or categorizing of 
the data; 'in vivo' or identifying categories and terms used by informants; 'axial 
coding' or putting the data back together by establishing connections between 
categories. For example, in assessing the attributes for older people's 
preferences for dying, open coding of the data might reveal factors such as 
'relationships', 'family', 'burden', 'place of death', etc. Some of these categories 
might be terms used by informants. Axial coding establishes links between the 
codes, so that for instance, following on from the example of people's 
preferences for dying, relationships could be a general theme, encompassing 
family and friends. Under family could come the desire of older people to 
ensure their family are well provided for when they die, on the one hand, and 
also their wish not to be a burden on their family should they develop cognitive 
or physical impairment. 
As coding categories emerge, the researcher compares and contrasts concepts, 
using 'constant comparison', whereby accounts are compared with one another 
to facilitate richness in data analysis, between different types of respondents or 
settings.315 Following on from the example above, views of different types of 
older people might be compared and contrasted, depending on: their income; 
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whether they have any disability (cognitive or physical); whether they are in a 
care home or in their own home, etc. The objective is to find out whether a 
particular view or opinion is likely to be dependent on the type of individual-
for example, between those informants at home and those cared for 
professionally in care homes. Constant comparison involves familiarity with the 
data through repeated reading, comparison of data to other data and to 
developing themes, testing of hypotheses whilst generating new data, 
development, modification and extension of categories, and detailed descriptive 
accounts. (In contrast, quantitative research has preference for numerical data 
subjected to statistical analysis,304 comparing all data at the end stage, with little 
or no descriptions). To assist the process of comparison and analysis, the 
researcher may also use memos, of which three types have been described:336 
code notes describe the concepts that are being discovered; theory notes are 
summaries made by the researcher on his or her ideas; and operational notes 
concern practical matters, such as the timing of observations and listing who 
was present. 
Once this process is underway, data display is undertaken, involving 
organisation of information so that conclusions can be drawn.334 For instance, 
following on from coding of data, it is useful to use displays (such as matrices, 
graphs, and charts) to enable the researcher to see what is happening and either 
draw conclusions or move onto the next stage of analysis.334 At this point, it can 
also be useful to generate ideas for testing in subsequent fieldwork. This 
process can also help to identify negative or deviant cases that disconfirm parts 
of the analysis or suggest new connections (note that in quantitative research 
disconfirming evidence is generally ignored335). Finally, conclusion drawing 
and verification of the data, as new data are collected or reviewed, occurs 
throughout the data analysis,334 
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2. Quality of qualitative research 
It is important to be able to assess the quality of qualitative research, although 
how to do this in practice is a contested issue and there are opposing views 
between researchers.331, 337 There are those who believe that the same criteria 
should be applied to qualitative and quantitative research (i.e. reliability, 
validity, and replicabilityix).338 This group believe that qualitative research 
should be judged using the same criteria as quantitative research and assumes 
the existence of an underlying reality that can be studied.337 There are also 
those, the majority, 'antirealists', who feel that qualitative research represents 
an alternative paradigm to quantitative research and should therefore be 
judged by alternative criteria. The criteria Hammersley regards as important to 
both qualitative and quantitative research are 'truth' (or validity) and 
'relevance'.331 Regarding truth, although Hammersley acknowledges that it is 
never possible to have access to reality or knowledge of whether an account is 
true (he is a proponent of 'subtle realism', as discussed previously), he believes 
that the validity of claims should be judged on the basis of the adequacy of the 
evidence offered in support of them. It is necessary to provide more evidence 
in support of central claims, and what is involved in assessing the validity of a 
claim varies according to whether it is a definition, description, explanation, or 
theory.331 Hence, the requirement for validity is likely to vary between cases. 
Relevance, concerns the importance of the topic and contribution of the findings 
as relevant criteria (although a mere confirmation of what is already known is 
of limited value).331 Although Hammersley is not a proponent of assessing 
qualitative research on the basis of generalis ability , he does suggest the 
importance of reflecting on the' typicality' of cases to the general population.331 
According to Hammersley, assessing the quality of qualitative research should 
include331: the degree of development of theory; the novelty of the claims 
made; the consistency of the claims with empirical observations; the credibility 
ill The defInitions are as follows: reliability assesses whether the results are repeatable; validity concerns 
whether ~e research measures what it says it does, in terms of 'internal' (to the study) or 'external' (to 
other settings or other populations); fInally, replicability concerns whether the results are reproducible. 
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(or truthfulness) of the account; the extent of transferability of the findings to 
other settings; and the reflexivity of the account, including the degree of 
assessment of the effects of the researcher and the amount of information about 
the research process. These criteria are similar to, and agree with, the medical 
sociology group criteria (in Boaz and Ashby338) for assessing qualitative studies 
and the criteria suggested by Mays and Pope.337 It is generally recognised that 
the methods and data need to be explained so that other trained researchers 
would be able to conduct the study and come to the same conclusions.330 
However, criteria for assessing qualitative research are likely to be open to 
challenge, since, for instance, it is arguable whether all research should be 
concerned with the development of theory.331 Furthermore, assessing 
qualitative research is likely to be dependent on emerging criteria as "the entire 
field of interpretative or qualitative inquiry is itself emerging and being 
defined" (Lincoln, p.275339). 
3. Methods of study 
The theoretical perspective and methods discussed so far are of paramount 
importance to the study design employed in this research. The choice of 
whether to use qualitative methods, and the associated tools, depends on the 
aims of the research, rather than solely the preferences of the researcher320 
(although it is, of course, likely to involve making a particular judgement).317 
This study used a modification of grounded theory, located within a 
constructivist; interpretative paradigm, using qualitative methods. The design 
of the study, the fieldwork area and actual methods used, as explored here, 
reveal the iterative, flexible, and in-depth nature of the work conducted. Local 
Research Ethics Committee (LREC) approval was obtained in January 2003. 
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3.1 Design of study of local decision-making 
















The initial stage of the project, which took place over a period of approximately 
one year, involved observation of a meeting group for cancer care (the CG), 
documentary analysis, and in-depth interviews. This allowed the researcher to 
establish rapport with decision makers and to gain substantial knowledge of 
the decision-making environment and process. Following this, a workshop on 
economics was held upon the request of the chair of the CG (and was delivered 
by an outside speaker). The local study therefore differs from what appears, in 
a quantitative paradigm, to be a 'before and after' study, where an intervention 
is deliberately constructed. Here, the aim was not to try to determine whether 
changes resulted from this workshop. Instead, the workshop allowed the 
researcher to observe decision makers trying to prioritise and subsequently 
provided the opportunity to explore their feelings about the role of economics 
in further interviews. Following the workshop, the objective was not to 
examine whether decision makers had changed their opinion about economics 
or whether the process of decision-making during the CG had been affected, 
but to open the way for explicit discussion of economics which had not been 
previously possible. In addition, the second round of interviews provided the 
opportunity to re-explore topics which had been generated since the first round 
of interviews and hence confirm or refute hypotheses. Decision makers who 
were interviewed in this second round were selected to include those who had 
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attended the workshop, but also those important to the process of decision-
making as perceived by those already interviewed. 
The work conducted with health economists comprised a parallel project, 
involving interviews with senior UK health economists, purposefully selected 
according to their different roles. The purpose of these interviews was to 
explore their views of use of economic evaluation in local decision-making in 
the NHS. This is important since it is necessary to find out how far their views 
and opinions differ from local decision makers and to be able to reflect on the 
work being undertaken by this group, since they are the main producer of 
economic evaluations in the UK. 
The fieldwork took place over sixteen months Oanuary 2003 to April 2004). The 
study design was iterative, so that design, data collection (consisting of 
interviews, a workshop and observation of priority setting meetings, and 
documentary analysis), data analysis, and theory development, were informed 
by one another (Figure 3.2). Although observation of priority setting/ CG 
meetings occurred continuously over the sixteen months, the first wave of 
interviews (of which 17 were conducted) took place between February and 
November 2003, and the second wave (consisting of 12 interviews) between 
March and April 2004. These second wave interviews followed the economics 
workshop held in January 2004. Prior to the workshop, eleven meetings were 
observed including eight CG meetings and three hospital meetings (a meeting 
group attended by hospital representatives of the CG, which fed into the CG).x 
Following the workshop, four CG meetings were observed. 
The study used a 'modified' grounded theory approach. Although the main 
goal was to develop new theories through purposeful and systematic 
generation of the data, there was a strong interest to try and gain knowledge of 
the whole field. This idea is similar to ethnography but it is not the focus of 
x Note that only three hospital meetings were observed because, according to informants and following 
observation of these three meetings, it became clear that the main decision-making occurred within the 
CG. . 
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grounded theory (since accurate evidence is not particularly crucial for 
generating theory and the objective is to develop a theory which accounts for 
much of the behaviour of interest, rather than providing a perfect description of 
an area). Decision-making at the local level was studied in depth, over a period 
of time, through observation of CG meetings. This was particularly important 
since it was necessary for the researcher to grasp a new area! field and put aside 
her training as an economist! health economist. 
3.2 Selection and entry into fieldwork area 
The research was based in one Pcf. The location of the fieldwork has not been 
specified in this thesis to retain informants' confidentiality. There were two 
fundamental criteria for the selection of the fieldwork area: first, the ability to 
gain access at the local level to informants; and second, the willingness of local 
informants to engage in the research once access had been gained. Meetings 
were observed after initial contact with the chair of the CG. The CG meetings 
were a formal part of the local service organisation and brought together 
providers and commissioners to make decisions about the funding and delivery 
of cancer services for their local population. Although several other groups also 
existed, such as for mental health and CHD, the CG was seen as a point of entry 
into the decision-making process for the research. 
The provision of cancer services involves primary health care, secondary health 
care, and palliative therapy. Consequently, those attending the CG meeting 
included GPs, hospital managers, clinicians, nurses, palliative care managers, 
cancer network managers, and PCf managers. The meetings were held bi-
monthly, for approximately one hour, and usually the same people attended, 
although over the period of fieldwork new members arrived and some left the 
group. The remit of the group included decision-making for services related to 
breast cancer, lung cancer, upper and lower gastrointestinal tract cancer, 
genitourinary tract cancer, haematopoietic system cancers, head and neck 
cancers, and other rare cancers. These services are located within secondary 
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care, in surgical oncology and non-surgical oncology, due to the nature of 
cancer treatment and speciality provision. 
4. Data collection 
4.1 Observation 
At the start of the first CG meeting attended (in January 2003), participants 
were informed about the project, to be undertaken by a PhD student, and that 
any information extracted from the CG meetings would be used only for PhD 
research. The participants of the CG were asked whether they objected to 
observation of the CG meetings and were also given the opportunity to ask any 
questions, although in the event no objections or questions were raised. All 
members were provided with written information outlining the study (Extract 1 
in the Appendix). Participants were also asked for written consent (Extract 2 in 
the Appendix) to being observed on the understanding that observation would 
cease the moment that anyone felt uncomfortable (this did not occur in 
practice). Over time, any new participants to the CG were also provided with 
the same information, and similarly asked to provide written consent. 
Apart from the chair of the CG, informants were not aware of any focus on the 
use of economic evaluation. The importance of being vague during initial 
contact with informants in the field has been acknowledged329, particularly in 
view of the iterative nature of the research and thus possible changes to the 
design. In this study, participants were provided with a broad description and 
overview of the study, stating that the interest was on local decision-making in 
the NHS. While this statement was true, it was deemed to be less threatening 
than introducing the interest in use of research evidence or economic 
evaluation, which could have also influenced informants' actions or decisions in 
a way that would have both altered the research findings and also have ethical 
implications (in that, to appear to be doing the right thing, informants might 
overweigh economic research evidence) compared to their usual practice and 
thus influence decision-making. However, the importance of being honest is 
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also well known329 and any questions on the research were dealt with in an 
open manner (although, in practice, it was never relevant to discuss the 
economics component of the study). 
Hand-written notes were made during all meetings observed. The CG 
meetings were not audio recorded because it was felt that this might influence 
what participants were saying and create an unnatural environment. As much 
information as possible was jotted into a notepad, but often it was not possible 
to capture everything that was being said and on some occasions it seemed 
inappropriate to take notes (for instance, where something clearly confidential 
or personal was being discussed). Over time, certain themes or topics started to 
emerge from the data, and the researcher became aware of these whilst taking 
notes during the meeting, making note-taking a slightly easier process. 
However, during the first couple of meetings, the researcher needed to adapt to 
the medical terminology being used, as well as the role of different types of 
medical drugs and equipment. All information was written down and 
spellings/understandings were checked later. 
Apart from what informants were saying, body language and temperament of 
the informants was recorded where relevant and often provided important 
contextual information. Different roles and behaviour were similarly noted. 
Hand-written notes were typed up as soon as possible after the meeting, 
usually the same day. The cut off point for observation of CG meetings was 
determined by the timescale associated with the decision-making framework 
(in that the formal decision-making framework ran from April of one year to 
the following April), saturation of the findings, and timescale constraints 
associated with the study. 
4.2 Workshop 
The chair of the CG was keen to engage the group in explicit priority setting 
and proposed the idea for a workshop on economics to participants of the CG. 
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He appeared to be interested in receiving help in making some of the decisions 
the CG were responsible for (and, unlike other participants in the study, was 
aware of the researcher's background as a health economist) and following 
discussion between the chair, the researcher, and one of the researcher's 
supervisors OC), a workshop seemed to be the most appropriate means of 
meeting the chair's needs. An experienced health economist, being the 
researcher's supervisor at the time OB), was responsible for running the 
workshop. The workshop was held over a two-hour period. All (fifteen) 
participants of the CG were invited to attend the workshop. In the event, ten 
attended, including the chair of the CG. The workshop involved a presentation 
of basic economic concepts, economic evaluation, and PBMA. Prior to the 
workshop, two health economists (from outside the University of Bristol and 
with experience of the health service) assessed the appropriateness of the 
presentation slides, offering some constructive comments. The chair of the CG 
meeting also examined the presentation slides during a meeting arranged with 
him specifically for this purpose, although no changes were made as a result. 
The presentation slides are provided in the Appendix (Extract 3), although 
some parts, pertaining to the geographical region and details of the priorities, 
have been anonymised or deleted to retain confidentiality. 
During the workshop, the list for funding, which was discussed during the 
previous months by the CG, was presented and participants were advised to 
incorporate costs and benefits of the listed programmes into the decision-
making process. The presentation was followed by a group discussion during 
which members of the group were asked to decide which of the programmes 
were related to the targets or guidance set nationally and which of the 
programmes had evidence about their effectiveness or their cost effectiveness. 
They were then supposed to be presented with a smaller list of fourteen non-
funded programmes and asked to prioritise them, taking into account their 
budget constraint, an estimate of the incremental costs and benefits, and what 
the opportunity cost of each programme might be. However, the chair of the 
CG also came to the workshop with a revised list of priorities from the CG and 
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finally these were the ones discussed. The workshop exercise, which was not 
actually used (because there was a debate on what should be the priorities, 
hence consuming most of the time), is provided in the Appendix (Extract 4). 
Again details of the priorities have been deleted to retain confidentiality. An 
evaluation form (Extract 5 in the Appendix), to assess the quality of the 
presentation slides and information, was also provided to informants. 
4.3 Interviews 
a) Sampling 
In total, twenty-nine interviews were conducted with twenty different people; 
thirteen of these were participants in the CG (Table 3.3). 
Table 3.3: backgrounds and number of informants interviewed 
Role No. Interviewed Number who were members of CG 
PCf role 8 2 
Hospital managers 3 3 
Palliative care 2 2 
Cancer Network 2 2 
GPs 2 2 
Nurse 1 1 
Clinician 1 1 
SHA 1 0 
TOTAL 20 13 
Prior to the workshop, seventeen single interviews were undertaken with 
participants of the CG (nine), non-participants/PCT managers (six), and local 
representatives from the cancer network (two). Initially, informants were 
purposefully selected from those who had expressed a particular viewpoint in 
the CG meetings or had failed to contribute to discussions during the CG 
meetings, to account for any particular views (in line with maximum variation 
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sampling and to account for negative cases). Table 3A and 3B indicates the 
reasons for selection of participants. However, eventually the majority of CG 
participants were interviewed, since important themes emerged and were 
developed in further interviews. New participants to the CG meeting group 
were not necessarily interviewed because saturation was reached. Six PCT 
managers were interviewed, based on snowball sampling and because of the 
seniority of their role and their importance in decision-making at the whole 
PCT level. Cancer network members were also interviewed because of 
recommendations made by those already interviewed. 
Following the workshop, twelve interviews were conducted. Informants were 
purposefully selected on the basis of attendance at the CG (seven) and those 
who had been invited but were unable to attend (four). Two of these interviews 
were with informants who had not been interviewed previously because they 
had recently joined the CG. In addition to these interviews, one interview was 
conducted with the SHA manager responsible for this locality since it emerged 
that it would be important to obtain a viewpoint of someone more senior than 
the PCT. Nine of the interviews were re-interviews with the informants 
sampled prior to the workshop. 
Table 3A and 3B (prior and post workshop, respectively) at the end of this 
chapter present the role of the informant interviewed, the reason for 
interviewing them, duration of interview, and comments on the interview. '5' 
denotes the subject interviewed and the number represents the order in which 
the interview was conducted. An extra '5', as in Table 3B, denotes that 
interviews were conducted after the workshop (since this aids interpretation in 
the analysis). 
Invitation to interview 
In interviews prior to the workshop, members of the sample were contacted by 
e-mail to ask whether they would agree to be interviewed (Extract 6 in the 
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Appendix). They were provided with an outline of the study, which 
emphasised that it was PhD research, and reminded/ informed about the nature 
of the study. They were told that the purpose of the interview was to study 
decision-making at the local level. They were also asked about the possibility of 
audio recording the interview. Two of the CG participants contacted declined 
to take part in interview. One CG participant felt that she was too busy and 
taking part in an interview would jeopardise personal time. Another informant 
was commencing maternity leave so could not take part. All PCT managers 
who were invited to interview agreed to take part. 
In interviews following the workshop, informants were again contacted by e-
mail but on this occasion they were informed that the focus of the interview 
was to discuss their use of economic evaluation in priority setting following 
from the workshop (Extract 7 in the Appendix). The workshop provided an 
entry into discussions about the use of economic evaluation, without appearing 
to force the issue suddenly upon informants. Two informants declined to take 
part in an interview, because of lack of time. 
All interviews followed the same general guiding principles. Specifically, the 
term 'meeting' was used in preference to the word 'interview', to prevent any 
formal connotations with the event and to help create a relaxed atmosphere. 
Invitees were given approximately one week to respond to e-mails, after which 
time they were sent follow-up e-mails or telephoned to find out whether they 
were available for interview. 
Conducting interviews 
All interviews with decision makers were in-depth and face-to-face. At the 
beginning of the interview, interviewees were provided with an information 
sheet outlining the study and emphasising, again, that it was for PhD research 
(Extract 8 in the Appendix). Informants were then asked to complete and sign a 
consent form for interview (Extract 9 in the Appendix). Informants were 
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reassured that their views would be extremely valuable and would remain 
confidential. Upon being asked to confirm that the interview could be audio 
recorded, informants were assured that all data would be anonymised and 
audiotapes would be kept in a locked, secure unit. The vast majority of 
interviews (twenty-seven) were audio recorded; one informant refused to be 
audio recorded and one interview was not audio recorded because of technical 
problems with the machine. In the latter instance, the interview was not 
repeated because it was difficult to arrange another interview and hand written 
notes were therefore deemed to be sufficient. 
Informants led interviews, enabling them to discuss the topics that they felt 
were important. However, interview schedules were used to ensure that some 
important areas were covered, where appropriate, and to provide stimulus if 
the conversation faltered. At the beginning of interviews prior to the 
workshop, informants were asked about their professional role and how they 
felt priority setting worked in their area. These were general questions, which 
were found to put the informants at ease and allow more difficult topics to be 
covered as the interview progressed. The schedule contained prompts on: 
interviewees' perceptions of the factors they believed to be important in the 
decision-making process; how and who made decisions; how decisions were 
communicated to CG participants; whether there was an appeal process for 
decisions believed to be unfavourable; how decisions were made in other PCT 
areas or decision-making bodies; and whether they used any evidence in 
making decisions. As more interviews and observations took place, the 
interview schedule was adapted to allow for emerging themes. The final 
interview schedule is provided in the Appendix (Extract 10). 
Whereas interviews prior to the workshop took place over a relatively long 
period (February 2003 to November 2003), interviews after the workshop 
occurred over just two months (March 2004 and April 2004). Post workshop 
interviews were timed to allow recollection of the workshop but also a chance 
to have thought about the ideas and concepts. An interview schedule was used, 
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again to provide guidance should conversation dry up. Prompts included: the 
use of economic evaluation by the informant personally or by the CG; the 
factors that were important to priority-setting decisions; and the barriers or 
obstacles to the use of economic evaluation, experienced by them personally or 
the group. The final interview schedule is provided in the Appendix (Extract 
11). It should be noted that use of terminology associated with economics (such 
as cost-effectiveness, QALYs, efficiency, etc) was avoided during interview, in 
order to allow informants to express themselves in any way that they wished. 
During all interviews, informants' meanings were continually checked instead 
of relying on assumptions. Towards the end of each interview, informants were 
asked whether they wanted to add any comments before the interview ended. 
Often asking this question tended to lead informants to summarise what they 
had said during the interview or, more interestingly, encouraged them to raise 
other topics they felt to be important in greater detail. In addition, following 
the interview, after the audio recorder had been switched off, some informants 
continued to discuss the topic, expressing opinions that they did not feel were 
relevant during interview. These were noted immediately after the interview 
ended. All audiotapes were listened to the same day and transcription 
occurred over the next few days. In addition, field notes, which were taken to 
provide summary information about the setting of the interview and general 
perceptions of the interview in terms of rapport and ease of responses, were 
also included as a separate section in the transcript. Again, these notes were 
used to direct future research and to identify emerging themes, but were also 
part of the reflexive process. 
All interviews were scheduled for one hour, although in practice interviews 
lasted between thirty minutes and one hour thirty minutes, with the mean 
interview duration being about fifty-five minutes for interviews prior to the 
workshop and fifty minutes following the workshop. Most interviews ended 
naturally, although sometimes informants had other appointments scheduled 
after the interview so they were unable to spend more time than the allocated 
141 
hour even when they wanted to. Interviews were only continued past the 
allocated hour on the interviewees' insistence. The vast majority of interviews 
were held at the office of the interviewee; one was held at the informant's home 
and another was held in the meeting room of the CG, after the meeting had 
taken place. 
4.4 Documentary analysis 
Formal documents from the PCT, the CG, option appraisal, and other written 
material were analysed alongside the interviews and workshop observations. 
These documents often served to increase the level of understanding of the 
decision or issue. Most of the time documents did not provide additional 
information, but supported the decision or issue. The main focus was on 
assessing the meaning of the documents, paying particular attention to the 
ideas being expressed, the language used, and the way in which the authors 
intended the documents to be interpreted. 
5. Interviews with health economists 
Alongside the fieldwork with decision makers, a separate project took place 
with a sample of health economists. The purpose of undertaking interviews 
with health economists was to find out how far their views differed from 
decision makers since health economists are generally instrumental in 
producing economic evaluation and also have a role in national and local 
decision-making (such as through NICE, priority setting forums, and working 
at the local PCT level as health economists). Their views and opinions shape the 
conduct and reporting of economic evaluation, and so are important. 
5.1 Sampling 
Health economists were identified through a specific annual publication on 
Health Economists' Activities, Research and Teaching (HEART) and through 
Internet searches. Interviewees were purposefully selected to include: senior 
academic health economists; those involved in national decision-making (such 
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as through NICE or the Scottish or Welsh equivalent) or local priority setting 
forums; and those with local decision-making experience, in PCTs or the 
equivalent. This attempted to obtain the full range of health economists in a 
variety of roles. The sampling strategy was based on maximum variation and 
snowball sampling. 
The total sample size (fifteen) was determined by the exhaustion of new themes 
arising from the research (saturation). Table 3C at the end of this chapter 
provides the background to the health economists interviewed. Interviewees 
are labelled E (where E denotes I economist') and the numbering represents the 
order of the interview. 
5.2 Invitation to interview 
Health economists were sent, bye-mail, a letter, to ask whether they would 
participate in a telephone interview for approximately half an hour (Extract 12 
in the Appendix). In this letter, they were also provided with a description of 
the overall study of both decision makers and health economists. If they agreed 
to be interviewed, they were asked to complete and post a consent form for 
interview (Extract 13 in the Appendix), which was attached to their e-mail 
message, together with possible dates they were available for interview. Upon 
receipt of the consent form, the health economist was contacted by telephone or 
e-mail to confirm a specific date and time. Where health economists did not 
respond to the invitation to interview, they were contacted again to ask whether 
they could take part. Of the health economists approached for interview, five 
never responded to the original e-mail and subsequent e-mails, and two 
declined saying that they were too busy or were not the best person to be 
involved in the study. 
5.3 Conducting interviews 
Interviews were all arranged between March and November 2003. Interviews 
were conducted by telephone, due to budgetary and time limitations. 
Informants were reassured that all data would be anonymised and kept in a 
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securely locked unit. All informants were willing to be audio recorded but in 
the event two recordings were lost because of a technical fault with the 
machine, meaning that transcripts are not available for these interviews (El0, 
Ell). 
Interviews were semi-structured, because it was necessary to cover some 
essential points in the limited time. A schedule (Extract 14 in Appendix) was 
used, although informants were free to guide the interview and points were not 
covered in any particular order. The schedule included: who they thought the 
decision makers were; their perceived use of economic evaluation among 
decision makers at national and local decisions; how economic evaluation is 
used; and the barriers to using economic evaluation by decision-makers. 
Questions were angled differently for those not performing many economic 
evaluations but who have a major influence on the methodology used. In these 
cases, the topics were more in relation to methodological developments. Again, 
notes were made following the interviews on rapport and ease of responses. 
Other aspects that could only be recorded through face-to-face interviews were 
not noted. Interviews were scheduled with economists for half-an-hour and the 
mean interview time was forty minutes. 
6. Data analysis 
6.1 Analysis of observations and documents 
Hand written notes from the CG meetings were coded in the same way as 
interview transcripts. The observations of the CG meetings helped to form an 
overall picture, whereas the interviews provided specific reflections at a point 
in time. The observations of the CG meetings therefore helped to provide 
important information about the decision-making process and context. They 
also supplemented information offered during interviews. It was interesting to 
note that the majority of informants behaved very differently publicly during 
meetings compared to privately in interview. This highlighted the differences 
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between what people say and do, and hence supported the use of methods 
triangulation. 
Formal documents circulated at the CG meetings (usually funding proposals, 
product information, or financial data) were analysed and coded at the same 
time as the observations of the CG meeting, to aid interpretation. Often these 
documents helped to elaborate on some of the issues further. Moreover, PCT 
documents referred to in interview by some informants were helpful in 
showing how the formal decision-making process was supposed to operate in 
contrast to the process that was actually observed. 
The process of data analysis was resource intensive but provided rich and 
meaningful data. After a few CG meetings were observed, the researcher 
gathered a list of emerging themes/topics (in some cases these were simply 
perceptions/ notions such as "power" or" funding", and in other cases they 
were words which members of the CG had used themselves whilst talking, 
such as "hypothecated sum", which appeared to adequately reflect the ideas 
being presented). Together with the documents which the researcher had 
examined during this process, a descriptive account was prepared which 
detailed the type of issues that were being raised in the meetings, who 
attended, as well as initial impressions gained. Negative cases helped to form a 
part of the analysis - hence, for instance, where one informant appeared to have 
different motivations, feelings or behaviour, this was documented and reasons 
for these differences were explored, either by re-examining the evidence or 
through further interviews. Analysis was only considered complete once all 
negative cases or disconfirming evidence had been accounted for. Other 
descriptive accounts were prepared for further small numbers of observation 
transcripts and combined/ supported with evidence from interview transcripts, 
providing a rich source of data which included all the researchers' data 
collection to date. At later stages, several descriptive accounts were merged 
into a single document, reducing duplication of themes, and allowing for an 
overall summary and reflection. This constant and reiterative data collection 
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and analysis enabled the generation and testing of hypotheses/theory. It should 
be noted that early in the process joint coding was conducted between 
researchers (OA and JC). All descriptive accounts were also read by JC, who 
relayed any comments or ideas back to the researcher. This enabled the 
researcher and her supervisor to discuss the emerging themes from the data, to 
share ideas, and resolve any apparent conflicts in the data. Triangulation of 
coding, whereby two or more researchers separately identify and attach 
codes/ themes to the data, has been suggested as a way of achieving greater 
reliability in the analysis.323 Case studies were developed for particular 
decisions. 
Notes from observation of the workshop were analysed slightly differently 
from the observations of the CG meetings. Observation from the workshop was 
analysed as a single event that was somewhat disjointed from the CG meetings. 
Hence there was no prior background to the workshop, apart from the priority 
list for funding, which was discussed and developed through the CG. Again it 
was important for detailed notes from observation of the workshop to be made, 
since the workshop represented an area that future interviews would be 
developed from. Three completed evaluation forms were also analysed. The 
observation transcripts from the workshop were combined into the descriptive 
account, described previously, which was built up over time. 
In the findings presented in the following results chapters, observational data 
and data from analysis of documents are combined with interview data. It is 
important to note that, as will become apparent, observations from the CG 
meetings provided important information on the process of decision-making, 
those who were involved, and the context. Analysis of the observation 
transcripts provides an overall picture of decision-making and was helpful in 
addressing important issues in interviews conducted later with informants. For 
this reason, it may seem that the majority of justifications for the arguments 
provided in this thesis are from interviews with informants, although various 
case studies are taken from decisions made during the CG. 
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6.2 Analysis of interviews 
Audio recordings were fully transcribed as soon as possible after each 
interview, to be able to recall any unrecorded data (such as nuances, sarcasm, 
intonation) and to ensure consistency and permit familiarity with the data. Full 
transcription refers to an accurate recording of the words spoken, including 
interruptions, pauses and laughter. Detailed information about the length of 
pauses, 'umm', 'err', and repeats of words were only noted if they could be 
meaningful (for example, in the case of hesitation or uncertain reactions). The 
recorded notes were consistent, so that verbatim was placed in double quotes 
(" ... "), paraphrases in single quotes (' ... '), and researcher comments in square 
brackets ([ ... ]).329 Transcription usually took between six and eight hours per 
tape, which is normal.322 The accuracy of the transcription of the data was 
crosschecked by re-listening to all audiotapes whilst reading the transcripts. 
Analysis drew on the constant comparison method of grounded theory. As 
discussed previously, data collection and data analysis took place concurrently. 
This process enabled the development of hypotheses and pursuit of emerging 
themes. Transcripts were read several times, line-by-line, and sections of the 
text relating to a specific theme or area of interest were copied and pasted from 
the transcripts into separate Word documents under relevant headings. Codes, 
developed from a coding schedule (see Extract 15 and 16 in the Appendix) were 
then attached to specific sections of text within a theme. Early in the process 
triangulation of coding was conducted (by OA and JC).As more interviews 
were conducted, data were examined for similarities and differences. Codes 
were modified, refined and new codes were added. During the coding process, 
accounts were generated for small samples of interviewees and all quotes were 
used relating to a particular theme. As more descriptive accounts were 
generated, they were combined into one analytical report, which allowed 
greater comparison and contrast. In conjunction with this process, matrices, 
involving sub-groups of respondents, facilitated organisation of the data. Here, 
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columns were used to represent the topics, with rows representing individual 
respondents. The use of matrices also helped to overcome the problem of 
finding simplifying patterns that may not exist. 
Although the process of data analysis was the same for both studies, transcripts 
from health economists were initially analysed separately from those of local 
decision makers, and different themes and codes were developed. However, 
towards the end of the analysis, a combined analytical report was produced 
that summarised the differences and similarities between decision makers' and 
health economists' perceptions and beliefs. 
In the thesis, quotations presented are those that best illustrate and support the 
suggested themes developed, although there were generally several quotes that 
could have been used. Some quotations were deliberately not used, although 
they might have been the best illustration of what was being said, in order to 
retain the confidentiality of informants (particularly for health economists, who 
are easily identifiable through the area of study they are involved in 
researching). Quotations were I cleaned' in the sense that ellipses were used to 
denote missing speech removed because it was not relevant to the specific topic 
being addressed. Nuances such as "umm", "err", "you know", "I mean" and 
repeats of words that do not add to meaning have been removed without the 
use of ellipses. Underlined words are those that were emphasised by the 
interviewee. Square bracketed text was used in some cases to retain the 
confidentiality of a particular person, area, or institution name. Furthermore, in 
this thesis, quotations are sometimes provided which relate to e-mail 
correspondences. In these cases, consent has been obtained to use these 
comments and acknowledgement has been made to their source. 
7. Conclusion 
Although the methodology in this thesis is likely to be substantially different 
from that commonly employed by health economists, it followed a protocol for 
148 
careful and rigorous data collection and analysis. This study used a modified 
grounded theory approach, located within a constructivist/ interpretative 
paradigm. This allowed the exploration of a complex setting, enabling the data 
to I speak for itself' without the imposition of pre-determined ideas, as has 
happened with some of the previous research conducted on this topic. For the 
study of local decision-making, a range of qualitative methods was employed, 
including observations, documentary analysis, and interviews, allowing 
information about different aspects of decision-making to be gathered, as well 
as providing differences between what people say and do. For the study of 
health economists, telephone interviews with a range of informants were 
chosen as the best method, within time and money constraints. Throughout the 
analysis, the researchers' influence on the research was documented. For 
instance, records were made in cases where it was felt that decision makers 
were uneasy during CG meetings because of the presence of the researcher 
(although, in practice, this was not perceived to be a problem), as well as the 
researcher's role in the workshop (which was important since the chair knew of 
the researcher's background as a health economist). Reflexivity was also an 
important feature during interviews with health economists, since the 
researcher often felt uneasy during interviews with senior colleagues and 
therefore free-flowing conversation was sometimes restricted. Such recordings 
of the researcher's influence on the research enabled understanding of the how 
the context affects the data generated. 
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Table 3A: pre-workshop: inf!!rmants' backgrounds and interview descriptions 
Code Sex Role Purpose of interview Time Comments 
PCT Hosp Clinic 
51 M .,/ .,/ Attended CG meeting. Was vocal in 1 hr Good setting, ease of responses and rapport 
group and represented one of the two 
GPs attending 
52 M .,/ Chair of cancer group Ihr Excellent rapport. He invited me to CG meetings 
53 F .,/ .,/ Occasionally 1 hr Good rapport although difficult to obtain responses at 
attended CG meeting and was beginning because she was worried about confidentiality 
recommended by 52 of what she was saying 
54 M .,/ .,/ Attended CG meeting and had quite 45 Difficult rapport and difficult to conduct. Interviewee was 
strong ideas about receiving funding mins late and was keen to finish in less than the hour slot. The 
for treatments for his patients interview was interrupted twice 
55 M .,/ Attended CG meeting and expressed 1 hr Very good rapport and ease of responses. Difficult to 
some interesting ideas about maintain conversational flow however because was not 
organisational culture during meetings audio taped (on 55's insistence) and therefore tried to take 
notes during interview 
56 M .,/ Recommended by 55 and 52. Attended 1 hr 15 Very good rapport and ease of responses 
CG meeting and did not participate mins 
much 
57 F .,/ Chaired a similar group to the CG 1 hr Very good rapport and ease of responses. Difficult for me 
meeting. Was recommended by 52 to be at ease because had spent time trying to fix audio 
recorder 
58 F ./ .,/ Attended CG meeting and was very 30 5he seemed nervous and sometimes not willing to expand 
vocal in meetings mins on things, but rapport was very good 
59 F ./ .,/ Recommended by 52. Attended CG 1 hr Very good rapport and ease of responses 
meeting and was very vocal in 
meetings 
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Code Sex Role Purpose of interview Time Comments 
PCT Hosp Clinic 
510 M ,/ ,/ Recommended by 55 and 52. Attended 45 Very keen to talk a lot, sometimes was difficult to control 
CG meeting was one of two GPs mins and keep focused 
attending 
511 F ,/ Chief executive of the PCf and 45 Very good rapport and ease of responses and seemed very 
recommended by 510 (and indirectly mins interested in project 
by some others) 
512 M ,/ Chair of the PCf and indirectly 1 hrl0 Very good rapport and ease of responses 
recommended by some mins 
513 F ,/ Recommended by 511 50 Very good rapport and ease of responses 
mins 
514 M ,/ ,/ Recommended by 513 50 Very good rapport and ease of responses 
mins 
515 M ,/ ,/ Recommended by 512 45 He was very nervous about being interviewed. Interview 
mins was difficult to conduct and responses were not freely 
flowing as in some other interviews 
519 F ,/ (eN) Recommended by 52 1 hr15 Very good rapport and ease of responses 
mins 
520 M ,/ (eN) Recommended by 519 35 Very good rapport and ease of responses 
mins 
Note: eN = cancer network 
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Table 3B: post workshop: informants' backgrounds and interview descriptions 
Study Sex Location Reason for interviewing Time Comments on interview 
code 
peT Hosp Clinic 
SSI M ,/ ,/ Did not attend workshop and had 30 Interviewee was very stressed because he was 
previously difficulties in priority setting mins so busy. It seemed he wanted to rush the 
decisions during interview and at CG interview and did not find it particularly 
meetings engaging. Rapport as previously established 
was there however 
SS2 M ,/ Instigated workshop and was a keen 50 The interview was very relaxed and informal 
advocate of'rational' decision-making mins 
SS3 F ,/ Did not attend workshop but had discussed 1 hr Interview was very relaxed. She was worried 
use of economics previously in interview about confidentiality at the beginning of the 
interview and stated that she did not know how 
she could be of help to answer topic of the 
interview 
SS4 M ,/ ,/ Attended workshop and had expressed 50 The interview went very well. Although he had 
dislike in making priority setting decisions mins said that he could only spare 30 minutes of his 
previously during interview and at CG time at the outset of the interview, he was keen 
meetings. He was criticised by the chair of to talk for almost one hour. He was very 
the CG about his clinical decision-making engaged in the interview 
SS5 M ,/ Attended workshop (although had to leave 30 The interview was held in the corner of the 
half way during the presentation). He was mins meeting room after one of the CG meetings, so 
a key informant from the PCf was difficult to conduct in the context. As 
before, he did not want the interview to be tape 
recorded 
SS6 M ,/ Did not attend workshop but had expressed 1 hr 15 Excellent rapport and although he needed 
some interesting ideas about the need for a mins constant affirmation that he was talking about 
strategy in the previous interview, 'the right thing' he got further into the topic and 
suggesting a systematic approach discussion was at ease. He appeared to be 
reluctant to end the interview 
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Study Sex Location Reason for interviewing Time Comments on interview 
code 
peT Hosp Clinic 
SS8 F ./ ./ Did attend workshop and had previously 45 Interview setting was very difficult because 
shown aversion to priority setting in mins some maintenance repairs were being 
secondary care. In the workshop she made undertaken outside and so difficult to hear her 
some interesting comments at some points 
559 F ./ Did attend workshop. Role meant that very 1 hr Interview was very relaxed. She expressed 
responsible for cancer services at the concern at the beginning of the interview that 
hospital (reports to 553) she would not have anything to say on the topic 
of the interview though and seemed initially 
pre-occupied with this feeling 
5510 M ./ Did not attend workshop and had 55 Interview was relaxed and friendly, although 
expressed some dislike in making priority mins was interrupted by a lengthy telephone 
setting decisions in primary care previously conversation half way through 
during interview and at CG meetings 
5516 M ./ ./ Attended workshop and was one of the 1 hr Although this was the first interview with 5516 
only ones in the CG meetings to show and he was new to the CG, the rapport was 
appreciation of what he had learnt from the good and he was very interested in revealing his 
workshop views and opinions 
SS17 F ./ Attended the workshop on behalf of 40 This was a first interview with 5517 and was a 
palliative care and was also new to the mins very difficult interview. 5517 appeared nervous 
group and reluctant to answer some of the questions 
5518 F ./ Various cancer informants recommended 40 This interview was very relaxed and friendly. It 
(SHA) 5518. It was important to gain her mins was held at one of the boardrooms of the 
impressions of health economics, to find out hospital 
whether health economics was being used 
more at the 5HA than at the PCf level 
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Table 3C: economists' backgrounds and interview descriptions 
Code Sex Experience Reason for interviewing Time Comments on interview 
Local Academia Natio,zal (N) or Priority 
Setting Forum (P) 
E1 F ./ ./ (N) Interest in public health and 30 As the first interview, it 
involvement in national decision- minutes immediately became apparent 
making body that was difficult to conduct 
telephone interviews because 
not face-to-face and rapport not 
previously established. 
Interviewer was slightly 
intimated by seniority of health 
economist. However, 
informant spoke freely and in 
detail 
E2 M ./ ./ (N) Involvement in national decision- 30 Interviewer was nervous at the 
making body minutes beginning as reflected by sharp 
answers. Rapport improved 
towards the end of the 
interview 
E3 M ./ ./ ./ (N) Involvement in national decision- 45 mins It was a very difficult interview 
making body and experience of because the interviewee was 
local decision-making questioning the questions put 
to him 
E4 M ./ ./ (P) Interest in methodological 30 mins Very good rapport and ease of 
developments in health economics responses 
E5 M ./ ./ (N) Concern with using economic 45mins Very good rapport and ease of 
frameworks in decision-making responses 
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E6 M -/ -/ Replied to health economics 30 mins Excellent rapport and ease of 
circular regarding how to help responses. Had established 
decision makers with using health rapport through previous e-
economics at the local level (when mails 
forming ideas about the 
workshop). Experience of local 
decision-making 
E7 M -/ Concern with using economic 20mins Very good rapport and ease of 
frameworks in decision-making responses 
and interested in use of economic 
evaluations in decision-making 
E8 M v' (N) Replied to health economics 40mins Excellent rapport and ease of 
circular regarding how to help responses 
decision makers with using health 
economics at the local level (when 
forming ideas about the workshop) 
E9 M v' Recommended by E8 30mins Very good rapport and ease of 
responses 
EI0 M v' Recommended by E6. Experience 30mins Very good rapport and ease of 
of local decision-making responses. Audio recorder 
failed to work properly during 
interview 
Ell F v' v' (P) Recommended by E7 and was 45mins Very good rapport and ease of 
concerned with using economic responses. Audio recorder 
frameworks in decision-making failed to work properly during 
interview 
E12 M v' v' (N) Involvement in national decision- 40mins Very good rapport and ease of 
making body responses 
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E13 F ./ ./ (N - but primarily Recommended by E6 and 35 mins Very good rapport and ease of 
local decision- experience of local decision-making responses 
making) 
E14 F ./ Recommended by E6 and 30 mins Very good rapport and ease of 
experience of local decision-making responses 
E15 M ./ ./ (P) Member of priority setting forum 25 mins Very good rapport and ease of 
responses 
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Chapter 4: lilt is all fire fighting": context for local 
decision-making 
This chapter explores local health care decision-making, according to the 
views and opinions of informants, providing a contextual basis for the 
findings in Chapter 5. This chapter comprises two main sections. The first 
section explores the formal structure and process of decision-making, in 
relation to three foci: formal decision-making; the organisational context of 
decision-making; and the process of decision-making. Findings in the second 
section, however, reveal a more complex and less transparent system in 
comparison to formal decision-making, suggesting pluralistic bargaining, in 
which individual rationalities are shaped by personal incentives and 
motivations. The final section of this chapter provides a brief conclusion and 
possible implications of these findings. 
Throughout the following chapters, distinctions in views and opinions are 
frequently made between PCT informants (those informants who were senior 
managers at the PCT and not members of the CG) and CG informants (who 
were interviewed in their capacity in the CG; although 52 and 55 were also 
senior members of the PCT). 5uch sharp contrasts in views and opinions 
were particularly evident during the CG meetings, but further shown in 
interviews with informants. 
On a final note, throughout this thesis, no detailed reference has been made to 
the health organisation's financial situation or the population covered, in 
order to retain confidentiality. It can be noted here, however, that the PCT 
faced a budget deficit throughout the period of the research. In addition, the 
area covered an average population typical for a PCT (about one hundred 
thousand people). 
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1. Formal decision-making 
The first half of this chapter explores the formal and explicit decision-making 
which was assumed by those interviewed at more senior peT levels. Here, 
the focus is on the perceived structure of decision-making, and organisational 
factors, mainly in relation to national policy. The process of decision-making 
discussed towards the end of this part of the chapter involved a relatively 
clear basis and discrete decisions being made within a formal setting (the per 
andjorCG). 
1.1 The fonnal structure 
The formal structure of decision-making is shown in Figure 4.1. This 
diagrammatic representation of decision-making was developed over time by 
the researcher, continually modified and revised through ideas obtained from 
observing decision makers in their natural setting and 
confirmingj disconfirming ideas in interviews with decision makers. Thus, 
Figure 4.1 represents the final representation of decision-making derived from 
this long, but fruitful process of trying to understand how decisions are 
arrived at locally. 
As is suggested by Figure 4.1, the majority of informants perceived the 
organisation of health care delivery to be "bureaucratic" or "hierarchical". 
However, there also appeared to be a network model in place. Although 
there were three levels of decision-making, different layers comprised the 
levels. For instance, 'below' the per level, the CG represented a formal layer 
of decision-making joining different decision makers together. Clinicians 
were also part of this level. Decisions fed up and down this process, as 
represented by the two directional flow arrows. It is difficult to assess from 
Figure 4.1 where in the organisation decisions are actually made (this issue is 
discussed later in the chapter). The point of the researchers 'entry' into the 
decision-making process was the CG (hence shown as a dotted circle in the 
figure). 
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Figure 4.1: formal structure of decision-making for cancer servicesxi 
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The three levels of decision-making and their corresponding layers are 
discussed as follows. 




There was consensus among informants that the PCT (consisting of the peT 
board and executive committee, a sub-committee or advisory group to the 
xi Information feeding from above and below was found to be typical for decision-making in any 
disease/treatment area, although the nature of the information would most likely vary for different 
programme areas (for instance, the Network is specific to cancer). 
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board of the peT) was the main decision-making body. peT board meetings 
were held bi-monthly, usually attended by the chief executive, the director of 
public health, chair of the peT, director of finance, clinicians, and nurses. In 
addition to these members, the executive committee also included 
representatives from the public. Informants believed that peTs were the 
main decision-making bodies in health care, largely because they were 
primary budget holders: 
53: ... The commissioners are the people who make the decisions. We have to help 
inform the decision-making, but the PCTs are the commissioners and they 
commission health care, they are the ones with the money and they decide how 
they are going to spend it and that is the decision-making forum .. . It's got to be 
the PCTs who make the final decision, because they are the ones with the purse 
strings, and if the MRlxii scanner is going to cost more money than we currently 
have for providing the current scanner, they have to give it to us and if they 
ain't got it, they're not going to give it to us. 
58: I think ultimately the decision makers are the commissioners. Ultimately in 
terms of where money gets spent, where money gets provided to deliver services, 
it's the commissioners and it's primary care. 
Informants agreed that the peT monitored the behaviour of local providers 
and ensured adherence to targets. In addition to these roles, PCT informants 
felt that some assessment of what was being provided was a necessary role 
for the PCT, and this involved efficiency appraisal (in terms of "what we 
expect to be getting for the money we are putting in"): 
S12: ... Looking at what we are commissioning from the [Trusts], what we're 
planning to do in terms of commissioning intermediate care so some level of 
control. And then we should be monitoring whether or not those decisions on 
commissioning [are achieved] and what we expect to be getting for the money 
we are putting in is delivered and ensure we are actually online with regards to 
both operational targets, and for example on access, and also we are achieving 
those within the financial envelope we have available to us. 
xii Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRl) is an imaging modality, which provides a view inside the 
human body. It is used for the diagnosis of many types of injuries and conditions including cancer. 
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This suggests, as also proposed in chapter 1, that the PCT does have a 
strategic role and its control of the budget would make it more likely to 
address efficiency issues. In this study, the PCTwas responsible for ratifying 
decisions made across all programme areas before they were submitted to the 
SHA for final approval. Approved programmes were then included in the 
LDP, which detailed local investments planned over a three-year period. The 
LDP, for 2004-2008, concerned two main areas: service development and 
financial planning. Apart from the obvious need to meet the targets (in the 
five clinical areas mentioned in chapter 1), which was the main focus of the 
LDP, service development encompassed the delivery of health care as a 
whole, categorised into four areas. Firstly, it included designing services 
around the whole patient pathway of care, which meant that it was not just 
limited to an organisation. Secondly, the LDP included planned development 
of accessible services in the locality, through out of hour's primary care teams 
and outpatient services supplied by a hospital doctor or specialist GP. 
Thirdly, the provision of high quality and accessible emergency care was 
proposed. Finally, access to tertiary care was also deemed appropriate for 
improvement. Most of the areas related to achieving national policy, in terms 
of strengthening the patient pathway (as specified in national rhetoric) and 
access targets. Financial planning was also subject to national measures, such 
as national target efficiency savings. 
Although the PCT appeared to have a clear strategy, its decision-making 
cannot be seen in isolation, being influenced from below and above. 
Influences from below 
Influences from below included the CG, groups feeding into the CG (the Trust 
board, palliative care board, and GP board) and decisions made on a day-to-
day basis by both clinicians and managers at the local level. 
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CG 
The CG fed their recommendations into the PCT board and executive 
committee. The CG was an important facet of PCT decision-making since it 
brought together the relevant stakeholders (individuals in purely 
management roles and those in direct contact with patients) to discuss 
important issues about the funding of cancer services and treatments. These 
decisions were to inform PCT final decision-making. Several informants 
suggested that there was a two-way process between the PCT and the CG 
(again, as reflected in Figure 4.1 by the two directional flow arrows): 
52: ... Originally [decisions] will be made within a small group and then the 
decision which was made within a small group will go to the larger group, the 
committee, where it will be informed and discussed and the decision made, 
which will then be fed up to the board. The decision by the board will then be fed 
back to the committee, the site specialist group, or whatever group, so it's a two-
way process. 
Informants felt that the CG provided a way of uniting all relevant providers 
and commissioners of care to discuss cancer care. This might explain why the 
CG was termed a "hub and spokes model" by several informants, suggesting 
a network of health care delivery, with a clear focus of control. The hub was 
the PCT, which was attached to spokes, or local services in the community 
(mainly GP and hospital services). These groups had links with each other in 
the local community. PCT informants in particular suggested that co-
operation was necessary between members of the CG, in order to facilitate a 
"partnership" working. They felt that, on the whole, this was being achieved 
with some success: 
512: ... Theory is they should be coming together saying, "Right this is the model 
of service we want to have, we need to spend on that, we need to stop spending 
on that, and this is how we are going to monitor what is going on", therefore 
that's real partnership working whereas in the past perhaps ... you'd have a 
bidding process where the Trust would come in and say, "We'll have another 
MRI scanner" or "I want to have this or that" and primary care would say it 
would want something and someone would make the decisions, so the fact that 
we are working much more across a whole pathway ... 
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Most informants felt that the PCT was responsible for evaluating methods of 
delivering services appropriately, by rationing care, which involved making 
disinvestments where appropriate and setting priorities (although, 
interestingly, from observing the CG, it appeared that disinvestments or 
priority setting did not take place - this is further discussed in chapter 5): 
512: ... [Groups such as the CG have to] look at what key targets they have to 
achieve, look at what resources they're using, and also then try and ensure that 
they stop doing those things that aren't effective, and say how best they can 
deliver those resources, so working across health and social care together with 
patient and user input, community input. 
513: ... The danger is what then happens is that accountants and non-clinicians 
potentially make priorities which is not right, so we pushed it back to say that, 
"Well we can't tell what's going to be available for cancer or CHD because it 
just depends on what the big picture looks like, but what we want you to do is 
give us a one to ten priority ... " 
According to 512, rationing inevitably involved a larger group of decision 
makers than those attending the CG, including, for instance, social care 
workers, patients, user groups, and the community (typically through PCT 
board meetings which were open to the public). This again suggests a 
network model of organisation, with responsibility for rationing care being 
diffused among different individuals. 
Groups feeding into the CG 
Informants suggested that providers of care were responsible for assessing 
their own local needs and subsequent priorities. Option appraisal was being 
used by the Trust to formally request funding from the peT. Apart from 
requiring formal PCT approval, option appraisal required endorsement from 
various authorities within the Trust, such as the surgical board and 
management board. Although option appraisals were not used in primary 
(GP) or palliative care, they convened their own meeting groups to decide 
local needs and funding requirements related to cancer care. 
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Clinical decisions 
Decisions were made on a day-to-day basis by clinicians and managers. Some 
of these decisions were made in response to new and emerging problems, 
rather than in relation to previous policies or decisions. In this sense, often 
there was not enough information to be able to reach a decision. This 
inevitably meant that the process of decision-making was affected: 
53: ... More often than not ... there are things that people ask you to make 
decisions about or on and you don't have sufficient information to hand ... What 
I tend to do in those sort of situations is ask that person to provide me with a 
very small briefing in terms of give me a bit more history, give me a bit more 
information ... What I normally do is pick up the phone and speak to the 
appropriate individual, and usually it's a clinical issue. 
There appeared to be a degree of autonomy among clinicians and managers 
to use their best judgement for these decisions. For instance, 53 said that she 
would often consult clinicians in order to reach a decision. Indeed, key 
decision makers (the chair and chief executive of the PCT, as well as the 
public health director) supported decisions regarding resource allocation or 
rationing care being made by clinicians, or those closer to the patient: 
512: ... We are trying to get decisions made where they are best made, which is 
generally closer to the patient. Providing they are made within protocols and 
people are in power. So people should be in power to make decisions and 
clinicians should be making most of those key decisions and clinicians should 
actually be advising us very much on allocation of resources within service areas 
and overall within the context of having to deliver on the targets ... 
Again, such comments pointed to a two-way process of decision-making, 
where clinicians were able to influence decisions made by groups such as the 
CG, and ultimately the PCT. Clinicians are clearly as important a group of 
decision makers as the PCT. 
Influences from above 




The Network operated within a local geographical area comprising several 
peTs, Trusts, and hospices. According to one informant (519), the effective 
powers of the Network had diminished over time. In the past, the Network 
had led a decision-making body whose membership consisted of chief 
executives from HAs and Trusts. The Network's current role was restricted to 
facilitating rather than actual decision-making between relevant groups at the 
local level: 
520: We are just facilitators for the groups [such as cancer], we have no power 
whatsoever. We just try and get everyone together to talk and to move them 
along for a decision to be made, or if they can't make a decision, to find out 
reasons why they can't make a decision, why they are disagreeing, and then 
maybe to facilitate process between clinicians, or between managers or 
clinicians. 
53: ... They are not a group that has any real powers because .. . they are a virtual 
organisation ... 
It appeared that the Network had a more general role, involving ensuring 
adequate provision of services across a wide geographical area and 
encouraging local implementation of national targets: 
S19: ... We are pulling a lot of information, not looking at one particular service, 
we're looking at it across. How does not doing this affect other Trusts, other 
patients within the area? .. 
559: ... The network are trying to influence the SHA ... It's influencing the 
hospital and the 5HA, because the network's role is to implement what the 
Department of Health are saying in terms of quality and guidance ... 
There was a two-way process between the Network and decision-making 




519: ... What we try and do is get decision-making from the ground and feed it 
through a process up to the people that will pay, and back to the DoH for the 
targets, and it is a constant flow, so we get these are the targets, this is what 
we want you to do, Department of Health, 5HA, peTs, and ourselves, back 
down to the floor, where the Trusts and the GPs are doing their job, so it's a 
flow, they have got a requirement and it's about how you meet it. 
Informants believed that the SHA were responsible for monitoring the peT, 
performance managing local providers and commissioners to ensure 
compliance with national requirements, setting the overall level of finance, 
and assessing the needs of the local population: 
52: ... The 5HA, amongst other things, monitors [us]. So every now and then, 
it will ask us, "Have you got a simulator? Are you managing to see all 
patients referred to you, or referred to the hospital sector, inside a 
month?" ... But the other thing that it does is performance manages, it also sets 
the envelope ... so when we are all confused and arguing with each other about 
whether there is or there isn't money, or who is going to make the savings, or 
what's the size of the deficit, at the end of the day, the 5HA will say, "Stop, 
stop arguing, this is the way it is" ... 
518: ... It's working with each organisation to say, "OK, the financial envelope 
in which you are working, these are the constraints that you've got, this is the 
system that you're working in, how are you going to plan to reach that 
target?" But also, it is about .. .local priorities, to make sure that while they 
are looking at national priorities, they are also looking at the needs of their 
local population ... 
The 5HA's main role was to ensure that the PCT and Trusts complied with 
the targets. They were also responsible for approving the total amount of 
money secured for each programme area, such as cancer. One informant 
(513), however, suggested there was limited scope for the SHA in actual local 
decision-making, implying a less hierarchical structure than might be 
assumed: 
513: ... The 5HA, do they have a significant role in determining local policy? 
I am not actually convinced that they do. Their role is very much monitoring, 
how we are implementing and delivering national performance service, 
clinical objectives ... 
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This is unsurprising, given that the SHA were not directly involved in local 
policy, but were advised by the PCT and were less connected to groups such 
astheCG. 
1.2 Organisational context of decision-making 
All informants discussed the organisational context of decision-making, or 
external pressures on the organisation as a whole, which had implications for 
decision-making. The organisational context of decision-making was 
characterised by three factors: the need to comply with national directives; 
lack of financial resources; and organisational, personnel, and financial 
uncertainty. The need to comply with national directives is discussed in 
section 1.3, rather than here, since clear links are made between the process 
and the directives when examining specific case studies of decision-making. 
This section examines the influences on decisions that were made by the CG 
(shown in Figure 4.2). 
Figure 4.2: conceptual model of influences on decisions 
Pre-
commitments 
Risk t Change/ uncertainty ~ 
,/ Decisions 
~ 
Equity ~ 'a. Government 
Money policy 
These factors which influence the eG's decisions are discussed in relation to 
the organisational context of decision-making and the process of decision-
making, before moving on to examine how individual's behaviour and 
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perceptions influences the process (in informal decision-making in section 2 
of this chapter). 
a) Lack of money: ''we are scrambling to fit within the 
resources" 
All informants perceived limited local funds, which meant that decisions 
were driven by what was financially affordable. Most informants felt that this 
had implications for the priorities which were made: 
51: Actually the final decision tends to revolve around what we can 
financially afford. 
52: I have to say in the end, we are scrambling to fit within the resources we 
have got at the moment, and that is the dominant feature. 
510: The NH5 is extremely under-funded. As a result it means that decisions 
are very cost driven really and priorities are made on the basis of how much 
money you've got. 
Most informants suggested that the main reason for the financial problems 
was because of the need to allocate a substantial proportion of local funds to 
meeting national priorities. The situation appeared to be exacerbated by the 
high cost of retaining staff in the area. 
b) Change and uncertainty: "a huge pressure" 
Almost all informants suggested that constant change or uncertainty was a 
huge pressure. These concerned organisational, personnel, and financial 
change or uncertainty . 
Organisational change: "feeding the beast" 
Around a third of informants felt that organisational change, largely 
associated with the devolution of PCTs from HAs, was an important 
characteristic of the context of decision-making. The devolution was seen as 
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disruptive, causing unnecessary bureaucracy and difficulties in coping with 
the now smaller organisations: 
512: peTs don't have the same management depth and therefore capacity as 
the former Health Authorities, because the former Health Authorities split up, 
so they are a huge pressure. 
513: We have got so many small statutory organisations now: we have [Xl 
times the number of statutory organisations that existed 3 years ago, they are 
too small and you spend so much time feeding the beast and doing statutory 
reporting. 
510: The Government brought in peTs and ... before at a Health Authority 
level, decision-making used to be a lot more effective ... Youlve now got [X] 
peTs where you had one Health Authority and so youlve doubled everything 
by [X] ... 
One informant (56) was particularly sceptical about the motivations behind 
the recent organisational change. He felt that the Government were 
continually trying to change the organisational structure of the NH5 because 
none of the organisational models had worked so far: 
56: The NHS is in constant change, constant flux, because there are one or 
two absolutes in the NH5, and that is that the previous model didn I t work, the 
current model is causing different problems, and they are now looking at a 
different model. And anywhere in the last thirty years we have been at this 
stage ... The rate at which they change those is now just speeded up, so new 
models have come through at a much faster rate, which has appeared to be 
quite disruptive really. 
Personnel change: "turnover of management" 
Around a fifth of informants regarded a high turnover of staff in the PCT and 
Trust as exacerbating the organisational instability. Some suggested that 
either management staff was reluctant to stay or was forced to leave, as a 
consequence of financial deficits: 
56: Every year there's at least two changes in the personnel from the peTs. 
There has never been a period in which the personnel that we are dealing with 
has remained the same. They I re always constantly changing, that I 5 a feature 
of the NH5 management ... 
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512: ... There has been substantial turnover of management in the last few 
years and that always makes change much more difficult because there isn't a 
constant management with clear direction and purpose. If you have many 
changes in terms of chief executives or finance directors, or of directors of 
human resources, it's much, much more difficult to get stability sufficient to 
manage a very significant change programme. 
This uncertainty about the duration for which staff would be in post appeared 
to be disruptive and created feelings of instability among a range of 
informants from different backgrounds. 
Financial uncertainty: "no idea of what level of funding you are 
actually aiming at" 
Several informants, including the chair of the CG, felt that the quantity of 
financial resources available to cancer care was uncertain and there was not a 
fixed budget that they could work within. None of the informants seemed to 
be able to explain why this was the case, although there were urgent and 
unforeseen expenditures, which might have contributed to this perspective. 
Indeed, there appeared to be an element of fatalism, with some informants 
feeling that they just did not know how much funding was available and, 
further, that there was no possibility of finding this information. 
One informant, however, claimed that the financial uncertainty was a 
deliberate ploy by the Government to exert control over the local level by 
making them feel unsettled: 
56: It's all because the way the Department of Health works. To keep people 
from being too settled and questioning and getting stuck into things, you just 
constantly unsettle them. And the way to that is to have constant change so 
you reorganise them all the time, you move them around but also when you do 
give them money you give them money at very short notice with only a week 
or two to create an application for it ... 
Several informants suggested that financial uncertainty rendered it difficult to 
set priorities, or to develop a long-term strategy. Instead, the focus was on 
the attainment of short-term goals: 
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56: No idea of what level of funding you are actually aiming at and that 
actually cripples your decision-making because you can't grasp and say, "Yes 
right, that's the money we've got, how do we put that to best use?" 
Two hospital informants (58, 59) claimed that since they were not aware of 
how much money was allocated to cancer care, they tended to submit all 
requests for funding to the CG in the hope that some would be accepted. 
1.3. Process of decision-making 
Inevitably, both the formal structure and organisational context of decision-
making had strong implications for the process of decision-making, although, 
these factors do not fully capture the pressures from below the PCT. For 
clarification purposes, the process of decision-making surrounding several 
decisions that passed through the CG is shown in Table 4A at the end of this 
chapter. During the process, pressures from above were largely in relation to 
national directives, such as the targets and NICE requirements. Pressures 
from below the PCT included the need to provide a safe service within the 
Trust, distribute care equitably, and follow through any "pre-commitments" 
or decisions made previously. Pressures from above and below are discussed 
in turn. 
a) Pressures from above: "priority has to go to attaining 
targets" 
National directivesxiii were seen to constrain local decision-making because 
they were not regarded as local priorities but their implementation required 
additional financial resources, which, as discussed previously, were lacking. 
xiii National wait time targets are detailed in chapter 1. National directives also include implementing 
national screening policies and NICE guidance. 
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Mfordability: ''what I disagree is that it doesn't come with any 
funding" 
The vast majority of informants agreed that national directives were not 
affordable, as there was no funding provided by the Government to 
implement them. This was particularly in relation to recommendations from 
NICE. Following NICE recommendations was the largest item of 
expenditure, constituting more than 60% of the financial burden of all 
programmes in the locality. The burden from NICE recommendations was 
typically associated with NICE drugs. There were four cancer drugs newly 
recommended by NICE ("NICE drugs"xiv) during the period of fieldwork. 
These drugs are presented in Table 4B at the end of this chapter. The chair of 
the CG estimated that implementing NICE drugs would cost the PCT around 
£600,000 over a three-year period, largely because of the necessary additional 
services or staff that were required to monitor use of the drugs (such as 
additional nurses or specialist equipment). 
Apart from NICE drugs, national screening directives presented a huge 
financial pressure. Implementing the national directive to extend the age 
range for breast screening women from 50-64 year olds to 50-70 year olds 
would require additional capacity with an estimated cost in excess of 
£200,000, although this was only one-third of that needed for implementation 
of NICE recommendations. However, the majority of CG informants were 
frustrated about the a££ordability of national guidance, and they vented this 
frustration both privately and publicly. They felt that implementing national 
policies meant that other local priorities were forgone. 
The financial issue associated with implementation of NICE drugs further 
created concern among some decision makers, about how to handle the denial 
of NICE drugs to patients because the PCT could not afford them: 
xiv NICE drugs was a term used by informants to refer to drugs that NICE had approved. 
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S3: ... IfNICE suddenly announce today there's a new drug and you can use it 
for them tomorrow and that we have 400 patients clamouring at the door, we 
won't necessarily have got the money to pay for it ... PCTs might say, "Well 
sorry but you can't implement that immediately" and if you're the doctor and 
the patient's sitting in front of you saying, "I read yesterday that this 
particular drug was available and you can give it to me now because NICE 
have said so" what would you do as a doctor who's sitting in front of that 
patient? .. 
The chair of the CG appeared to be oblivious to these concerns when he 
informed clinicians, during a CG meeting, to 'stagger' or delay the use of 
NICE drugs and, in some cases, resist using the drugs, if there was clinical 
support for such resistance. In addition, the chair was adamant that clinicians 
should face their responsibility for clinical decision-making, of which NICE 
might be one facet. 
Directives "not our highest priority" 
The directives were not seen as a high priority locally, since they were 
national guidance, which did not correspond to priorities at the local level. 
The majority of decisions or recommendations made by the CG were seen as 
being based on requirements in the Cancer Plan, guidance in the NSFs, or 
from NICE: 
53: The Cancer Plan gives us very clear targets to achieve certain things by 
certain years, and clearly all these [meeting groups such as cancer], in the 
main, are based round either a Cancer Plan or a NSF. So all the priorities 
which are being put forward for decision-making on funding are linked to 
targets set out in either the Cancer Plan or the NSFs. So, they are not 
something that we have just plucked out of the air and said, "This might just 
be very nice to do and this is a priority" ... 50 to achieve this specific target the 
Government has set us, this is what we need to invest to do it and if we don't 
get the money we are not going to achieve the target. 
Most decisions were made solely upon the basis of being a national 
requirement [NICE drugs, breast screening, cervical screening, MRI scanning, 
endoscopy, Computerised Topography (CT) scanning, and Positron Emission 
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Topography (PET) xv scanning]. With regard to the MRI scanner, SS9 
explained how some decisions might not appear, on the surface, to be related 
to a national directive, but were in practice: 
SS9: ... A replacement MRI scanner, on the surface that doesn't seem as 
though it helps us with targets, but it helps us in attaining the 2-week target 
and also the 62-day target ... Diagnostics is one of the biggest bottlenecks that 
we have got here for MRI so by increasing the capacity, we should then be able 
to see patients in a timely fashion. Sometimes on the surface ... we must attain 
the 31 target for x and this is what we need to put in place is actually 
something else which is removing a bottleneck from the process in order to 
attain the target ... 
Most informants felt that national directives were not local priorities, 
although they clearly affected the policy of the PCT: 
S11: .. . My job is to deliver Government policy, that's what I see my job as. 
But ... about two years ago I would have said, #My job is to deliver the best 
possible services to the local population". And the two statements are equally 
true, but depending on which day you catch me on I'll describe it differently, 
because it depends on whether I've been focusing on the latest things we've got 
to deliver or whether I've been out talking to the public. 
This suggests that dealing with national directives was not necessarily 
optimal for the local population. CG informants also agreed that PET and CT 
scanners were needed to comply with the national targets, but were not a 
local priority. Hence, most informants felt that more local decision-making 
would be appropriate: 
554: .. .If we're really trying to do what's best for the local people, it may not 
necessarily be one of those Government targets, but one of the other issues that 
we should be concentrating on ... 
Apart from national directives not corresponding well to the local level, there 
was also an argument among some informants against the clinical benefits of 
following some of the national policies. Some informants with clinical 
xv This is a diagnostic examination that develops views inside the human body, which is then used to 
evaluate a variety of diseases. 
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backgrounds felt that the targets excluded those who did not have (or were 
not suspected of having) cancer but were in equal need of treatment. This 
implied that the targets did not address local need: 
51: The two-week wait for cancer is disproportionate to the seroice we are 
providing in other specialties. It is quite unacceptable that people should wait 
for two or three years for a knee replacement when they are crippled; 
meanwhile someone is getting in the next week because they happen to have 
cancer ... 
510: Most people that are on a waiting list for cataracts have got very small 
cataracts and they expect to wait a year and a half so they all go on the waiting 
list quite early anyway, but you've got loads of people who are waiting for 
exercise tests who ... are still having to wait years ... 
54: ... There are patients with severe lung disease, which is non-malignant, 
who would benefit from being seen urgently ... 
Furthermore, it was the view of these informants that tight treatment 
timelines may not offer substantial clinical benefits to cancer patients and that 
focusing on wait times could adversely affect clinical quality: 
56: Everyone thinks targets are a good thing but when the [hospital missed 
some of] its targets .. .it still rated very highly on its clinical side ... But the 
detrimental effect here is that if you are trying to be good clinically, i.e. you 
want to concentrate on people's health or their illness, you automatically 
cannot fulfil Governments targets ... you can't do the two. It's the peroerse 
nature of things. 
54 objected to using some NICE drugs based on his clinical experience. He 
felt that NICE drugs were not necessarily any more clinically effective than 
current practice and although some NICE drugs could prolong survival, often 
they were not associated with any improvement in quality of life because of 
side effects of the drugs. He felt that there were other drugs which NICE had 
not considered and which would be more beneficial to his patients. In 
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addition, 551 suggested that cervical cytology screeningxvi, which was a 
mandate from the Government, was not a local priority at all: 
551: ... Cervical cytology screening, which is a national thing, it's a must do, 
it's going to cost half a million pounds. I think we're agreed as a group that's 
not our highest priority and we wouldn't spend half a million pounds on that. 
If someone came to us with a bag full of money, then we would not be 
spending it on cervical cytology, but we have to. 
551 stated that even if the CG had sufficient funds, they would not choose to 
implement cervical cytology screening, suggesting that it was not just lack of 
money which meant it was not a priority but also clinical factors. He felt 
there were higher priorities, such as addressing waiting times for 
radiotherapy, providing computer aided oncology prescribing, and 
implementing community based chemotherapy. 
However, there were strong incentives to follow national policy. With regard 
to NICE drugs, the majority of informants' felt that they were unable to 
1/ disobey" the recommendations: 
53: ... They are not going to have a huge amount of option on NICE, because 
NICE is practically statutory, so when NICE recommends something, PCTs 
do not have the ability to opt out and not fund ... 
Although there were insufficient funds to implement NICE drugs, there was a 
strong incentive for providers to prescribe the drugs. According to 51, most 
GPs in his area were fearful of being taken to court by patients who had not 
received NICE drugs. Additionally, the chair of the CG mentioned that one 
area had tried to restrict use of NICE drugs and consequently the chief 
executive of the PCf was almost dismissed from his position. In addition, 
for PCf informants, there appeared to be no alternative but to follow the 
targets because of the fear of losing their jobs: 
xvi Cervical cytology is a liquid based technology designed to reduce the rate of clinically unsatisfactory 
smears, and hence the need for repeat smears. 
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511: The NH5 is becoming incredibly ruthless ... We've lost chief executives 
left, right and centre; the chief executives in this patch who are looking over 
their shoulder as to whether or not they have a job. 
512: .. .I don't think that a chair of a board or a chief executive could expect to 
be continuing in their roles [if they missed the targets]. They'd get the sack. 
In summary, although there was clear priority setting (and the word priority 
was spontaneously used by a range of informants), there was limited local 
discretion for considering local objectives and most decisions were nationally 
driven. This implies that non-(local) decision-making might be a feature of 
the NHS. At the same time, there were pressures from below for local 
priority setting, although these tended to be overshadowed by national 
directives. 
b) Pressures from below: local basis for decision-making 
Although the majority of decisions were associated with national directives, 
which had a clear national basis, there were also acknowledged local criteria 
for decision-making, induding the desire to achieve a safe service, achieving 
some notion of equity locally, and implementing decisions made previously. 
The bases for local decisions are discussed in turn. Note that where local 
decisions were made, they concerned employing extra staff or retaining 
particular services (such as ensuring paediatric oncology services were not 
located elsewhere). Decisions, therefore, did not concern different types of 
treatment for patients or effective delivery of a particular oncology 
programme for instance. 
Risk: "a safe service" 
During interview, around a quarter of informants suggested that preventing 
clinical risk to patients was an important, if not the most important factor, in 
local decision-making: 
511: .. Most decisions are about assessing the risk, "Am I going to do this or am 
I going to do that?" 
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For instance, quality of care might be adversely affected if a particular 
modality is not installed. Furthermore, shortages of required members of 
staff might create difficulties in ensuring patients are treated on time and by 
the correct staff: 
551: ... Clinical risk is the most important. Ifwe perceive there is a serious 
clinical risk issue then that makes that particular requirement for development 
number one and that's above everything really. If something is putting 
patients at risk because there is a particular piece of kit that is not there, or a 
particular nurse that should be employed but isn't, or particular shortage of 
one particular modality or something and that is putting patients at risk, or 
indeed staff at risk ... 
Two CG decisions that involved a clinical risk were shortages of oncology 
nurses and paediatric oncology nurses in the Trust. The request for extra 
funding for nurses is an important case study to reflect upon here, since 
option appraisal was prepared by the Trust and presented to the CG outlining 
the urgent and apparently unforeseen need. According to the Trust, 
additional oncology nurses were required mainly because of a shortage of 
staff and also to ensure that the standard of the oncology unit was maintained 
in alignment with standards set out in the Cancer Plan and NICE guidance. 
Other informants, who were not necessarily from the Trust, also supported 
this: 
53: ... The ward nursing ... was ... a qualitative issue and risk management of 
the patients, because of having the right level of staff ... 
51: Oncology nurses ... that is a safe service, it is nothing to do with targets, it 
is to do with the fact that we believe that the service that is being provided at 
the moment is actually unsafe because the pressures on the staff, work 
pressures they are working under and the things they are expected to do to 
meet the targets. It is not that they are not meeting the targets but they are 
doing so in a potentially unsafe way, not through any fault of their own. 
52: ... The oncology nursing situation ... is really another risk assessment and 
we are saying we feel we have no choice but to improve the staffing levels of 
the oncology service otherwise we would have to stop the service, it would be 
that extreme and serious. 
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However, it is interesting to note that there was no reflection as to why this 
urgent situation had occurred, what had led to the problem, and what other 
options might be in place to remedy it, other than to employ more staff. 
Furthermore, the option to withdraw a service was deemed impossible and 
informants appeared to use emotional arguments to justify the decision 
(comments along the lines of 'we can't leave patients without appropriate 
care' were made). Similarly, with regard to paediatric oncology nurses, CG 
informants agreed that the inadequate medical cover in the ward represented 
a clinical risk to children and additional staff was absolutely necessary 
because otherwise the unit would have to be closed and paediatric specialities 
located elsewhere. The latter option was not deemed possible (because it 
would mean that the service might be too far for patients to reach) and was 
therefore never discussed. The oncology nursing case study suggests that 
although clinical risk was a major factor in CG decision-making, it was not 
clear how this was actually being assessed and the risk of alternative options 
was not evaluated. 
Equity 
Concerns about equitable care (or care reaching as many people as possible) 
were raised by over half the informants, particularly those in clinical roles. 
Where equity concerns were raised most, they were in relation to NICE drugs. 
For instance, two informants (53, 56) questioned the basis of NICE drugs, 
feeling that local equity was not being contemplated by NICE: 
56: Although there is enormous pressure for say NICE drugs, if the local 
jigsaw picture says, "Look sod NICE drugs, that1s an enormous amount of 
money benefiting a very small number of people, what we need is to put that 
money to benefit ten times that amount with these things. You NICE drugs 
can come in ifwe've still got money after all that" ... 
There were also concerns raised about access to care. Two informants (556, 
552) felt that closing the paediatric unit would cause inequities, since an 
alternative unit in another area would be too distant for many families to 
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reach. GPs in particular felt that it was important for patients to receive the 
same access to care: 
510: Everyone should have the same sort of level of care and deserve the same 
access to health care. 
This would mean, for example, that all patients are able to access the Trust 
(which might involve ensuring that there is sufficient parking space available) 
and receive nursing at home if they needed it. There should be no difference 
in the level of care between patients undergoing the same procedure. At the 
same time, achieving equity locally was not desirable in all cases, as 510 was 
strongly opposed to Government initiatives, which proposed that all GP 
practices should offer the same services. He felt that this would bring 
everyone down to the "lowest common denominator" and restrict the type of 
services offered. This suggests he was willing to trade equity for other 
perceived values such as increasing the total benefits or increasing the range 
of choice available to patients. 
Pre-commitments: ''wedded to buildings and beds" 
Several informants believed that some decisions made by the CG were the 
result of previous decisions or policies, which they were not responsible for 
but which could not be changed. For example, for one decision concerning 
investment in a CT scanner, informants agreed that it was pointless not to use 
a piece of equipment that was already physically in the Trust and thus violate 
a purchasing agreement, for which the Trust could be penalised. However, 
purchasing of the CT scanner was not a decision that the CG made, nor did it 
appear to have been one they would have been likely to have made. This 
highlighted the limited potential for decision-making where decisions were 
perceived as being unalterable. At a more general level, one informant (513) 
described this situation as: 
513: ... The problem that you get is that money is being invested in a particular 
way for many years, actually disinvesting and changing it is very hard, not 
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for the want of not wanting to do it ... You'd have to have different 
infrastructure and the problem ... we are wedded to buildings and 
beds .. . actually the reality of trying to change that in a system that has already 
got this infrastructure that their community is already wedded to is very 
difficult. 
This reflects the nature of health care decision-making, in that service 
provision is capital intensive, in terms of buildings, beds, and equipment. 
Indeed,51 described the Trust as a "higgledy piggledy mess" and felt that 
many of the decisions by the CG would involve improving services provided 
by the Trust in an old and dilapidated building. 
50 far, formal or explicit decision-making has been explored, with the focus 
on the organisation as a whole, but this focus on the organisational structure, 
context, and process gives little insight into actual behaviour among decision 
makers. The next section explores informal decision-making, or how 
individual behaviour influences the process of decision-making, as this was 
found to be an important element of deciSion-making. 
2. Informal decision-making 
Formally, on the surface, there is a relatively clear (mainly national) basis for 
decision-making and also a clear structure of decision-making. It is assumed 
by the majority of PCT informants that the formal process of decision-making 
works well: a) the PCT is the final decision maker and; b) the two-way process 
between the PCT and CG is achieved. The focus of PCT informants was 
mainly on the organisational context of decision-making and the actual 
process in terms of how individuals make decisions was assumed to be 
adequate. In contrast, informal (or less transparent) decision-making revealed 
by the CG, exposed a far more complex system, where there were many 
different actors in the process, whose rationalities were shaped by personal 
incentives and motivations, rather than purely organisational concerns. There 
was not one decision maker, the PCT was not the final decision maker, and 
the two-way process was not working particularly well. 
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This informal decision-making was not something that PCT informants were 
aware of, or at least wanted to discuss during interview. The informal 
process was revealed by examining and recording individuals' behaviour 
during the CG meetings and their views and opinions during interview. 
Interestingly, CG informants were often unaware of the implicit nature of 
their decision-making. 
The nature of the CG meetings illustrates well this informal process. In 
practice, the CG meetings were quite chaotic. Although an agenda was 
distributed to members in advance of the meeting, it was possible to deviate 
from this agenda (for instance where clinicians spoke about individual 
patients). It seemed, from comments raised during interview, that the 
meeting agenda was of little value in representing the real underlying issues 
important to the group. In some cases, the discussion was dominated by one 
or two individuals, so that there remained little time to discuss priorities. 
Often it appeared that a resolution on the decision being discussed had not 
been made, yet it was not brought up in future meetings, although funding 
seemed to have been secured. Thus, information was presented to the group 
without being really discussed subsequently; moreover information outside 
the group was not fed back in a coherent way. 
This section describes the general nature of implicit decision-making in 
relation to five areas: 
2.1 Decision-making outside the Jonnal process 
The formal process suggests that decisions are made or discussed at the CG, 
approval or disapproval is given by the PCT, and decisions are fed back down 
to lower levels of decision-making (Figure 4.1). Although there was a two-
way process, the PCT was the main decision-making body. It appears 
however that decisions are often made prior to or subsequent to the CG 
meeting. This behind the scenes decision-making was much less transparent: 
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510: Before we get to the leG] meeting, most of the decisions have already 
been made and most of the priorities have already been set. 
Here, it appeared that individual clinicians or members of the Trust were 
responsible for decisions made on an "informal" basis, which directly affected 
groups such as the CG: 
520: ... There are 101 ways decisions are made in the NHS and within this 
network. And there are thousands and thousands of groups that get together, 
either socially, where work will get discussed, just like in any aspect, and then 
in a more formal basis, through groups to feed up to the board group. 
Unlike the two-way process where the PCT was the final decision-maker, here 
decisions are made below the PCT. Part of the explanation for this was the 
inadequate formal process of decision-making that existed between the PCT 
and Trust: 
53: ... One of the decisions I had to make just before we started was about 
allowing a particular type of drug to be administered tomorrow, which we are 
not funded for ... a drug that ... we won't get the money for ... 
In addition, it was difficult for the Trust to adhere to agreements when basic 
factors might change, such as the number of patients or the type of treatments 
available, suggesting that decisions made by the CGjPCT were often revised 
implicitly: 
53: ... We did agree that we would implement that particular NICE drug 
and ... we identified how many patients we thought would need it and we 
agreed with the peTs that we wouldn't go above that number without talking 
to them about it .. . because we got agreement they would pay for it. The only 
difficulty is often you get numbers wrong ... 
554: ... It's a new drug therefore it's not part of the baseline that we've been 
given from the peTs ... 
In particular, analysis of the observation transcripts revealed that the 
decision-making was 'non-linear'. A case study of decision-making around 
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NICE drugs illustrates this point. Initially the CG agreed that it would resist 
funding Rituxumab (MabThera®), Imatinib (Glivec ®), Trastuzumab 
(Herceptin ®), and Aromatase inhibitors (see Table 4B at the end of this 
chapter) because there was no extra funding available in order to implement 
these drugs and also they felt that there were other more important local 
priorities. However, they had no clear strategy as to how this resistance 
should be achieved, and presented no written case to the PCT, instead using 
terminology such as 1/ disobey" during meetings to refer to how they would 
respond to NICE's decisions. CG members were also aware of the potential 
for senior colleagues to be adversely affected by such resistance. Despite 
much time being discussed during meetings about not funding NICE drugs, 
they were eventually funded by the PCT; the chair of the CG 'told' the other 
members that there was no choice in this' decision'. When asked during 
interview about the funding of NICE drugs, the chair simply replied that it 
was inevitable. Throughout subsequent meetings, members expressed their 
frustration about the financial situation, fuelled by the chair's reference to 
NICE drugs constituting one of the largest items of expenditure in the budget. 
Thus, decision-making surrounding NICE was not transparent because 
although the group thought it had made a decision not to fund NICE drugs, 
this decision was subsequently revoked; even then, the CG continued 
discussion of the topic during future meetings. 
2.2 Lack of awareness of implicit basis for decision-making 
PCT informants believed that most decisions should have a clear basis, 
considering a "rational" approach. In addition, formally, there were clear 
factors which the CG needed to consider, such as clinical risk. However, 
decision-making below the PCT was often characterised by who II shouts 
loudest", personal preferences, and relationships between decision makers, 
which did not appear to be recognised by PCT informants. For some of the 
decisions made, informants were aware of their implicit nature. For instance, 
the cancer programme had received the largest amount of funding and it was 
unclear as to why this had occurred: 
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SS8: ... We have a biggest amount of investment into cancer than any other 
NSF or clinical area in the Trust last year and you've got to ask yourself, 
"Why?" Is it because [S21 is really good, is it because we were very 
persuasive, or was it because we had the better arguments because our needs 
were greater? 
Similarly, GPs suggested instances where clinical decisions could be informed 
arbitrarily: 
SSl: ... We have to make what we consider to be an informed decision and 
sometimes the decision is somewhat arbitrary. It goes down to personal 
preference at the end of the day as to what we feel might be the most 
appropriate thing to do. 
S10: .. .I think that probably there are some individuals that have their own 
little interest areas who push those within little groups and so sometimes you 
see things emerging [that 1 you just thought were a dead duck and then you 
realize that the GP on the peT is best mates with the consultant urologist ... 
However, in other instances, it was evident that informants were not aware of 
their implicit decision-making. For instance, informants did not recognise 
that they were not making any disinvestments in cancer care despite limited 
funds, that they were often not making decisions because they were arguing 
and could not reach an agreement, and that all their priorities could not be 
advanced (despite some saying that they knew about scarcity and 
opportunity cost, as discussed in the next chapter). 
2.3 Lack of clarity about decision makers 
Figure 4.1 suggests a discrete decision-making setting and identifiable 
decision makers. However, as the fieldwork progressed, it was apparent that 
decision makers themselves were not aware of the process and who was 
responsible for decisions made, suggesting huge ambiguity in the system. 
Several informants felt that it was difficult to establish where and when 
decisions were made, and who made them. Despite being part of this local 
decision-making process, some informants were unable to describe the 
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process because they did not know how it worked (51,54) and others 
expressed hesitation in describing a system (58, 59): 
53: .. .!t is complex enough if you're working within the organisation let alone 
if you are looking at it from an outsider ... 
OA: 50 [52's1 the one that's finally responsible for those decisions? 
5S8: I don't know 
OA: Because you said that he's responsible for making those decisions? 
SS8: Well I assume it's him, presumably he has to persuade the commissioners 
in the SHA, but I have no idea it works ... 
Although one informant (56) had extensive experience in local decision-
making, he was unsure whether what he knew was a "real" system. Among 
CG informants, only two (53, 52) could confidently express how they felt the 
decision-making process worked, although what they described reflected the 
formal process of decision-making. 
Decision-making at the local level appeared to be characterised by pluralistic 
bargaining. The representation of the formal process in Figure 4.1 suggests 
the ultimate power for decision-making rests at the national level. However, 
the informal process points to power being a more complex issue, with 
medical consultants and the PCT struggling to retain authority. On the one 
hand, 511 felt that team based practices (suggesting a network model of 
decision-making) was being used: 
Sll: ... There has been a lot of power around medical consultants in the past, 
the GP fundholding and primary care trust era is all about moving power to 
primary care. But whether any of that is real, it's all about moving power 
around. But we tend not to get the balance right ... There was a debate as to 
who was at the pinnacle of the hierarchy, two groups like the hospital, the idea 
that the chief executive was in charge would be challenged by the consultants, 
it was always changing, changing power structures, and it is quite 
hierarchical but it's trying to tackle that because the model of delivering care is 
much more team-based now, so actually getting multidisciplinary team work 
going and devolve decision-making down is all part of the new culture. 
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On the other hand, CG informants felt that decisions were, in practice, made 
by small groups of informants, even though a substantial amount of time was 
invested into discussion and understanding the proposals in the CG: 
52: ... 1 think for the first three quarters of that time, and the whole process, it 
was pretty much a consensus approach, that is a lot of discussion went on, a 
lot trying to understand what each proposal was ... 1 think the final quarter of 
the process, a much smaller group of people were involved and, if 1 were 
honest, it would be myself and one other person, a planner in this 
organisation, on the one hand, and another very small group of clinicians and 
managers at the [Trust] on the other hand. 
For final decisions made, the PCT clearly had substantial power: 
56: ... At the end of the day [decisions] usually come down to one or two people 
in the PCTs. 
For example, 510 felt that even though there would be a discussion around 
some areas of interest, such as hospital closures, the PCT would continue with 
its policy at the end of the day: 
510: .. . [The CG] is just a sort of talking shop really ... the Government expects 
there to be these groups where there's the GP and there's the consultant and 
there's a house wife, because they think that's how you should do things but, 
and so they set up all these meetings and the peT go along with it. And so, 
like they are going to close down all the local hospitals in [X] and all over the 
place so they're going through a consultation period where loads of, hundreds 
of people are turning up and saying, "No way we don't want them closed 
down" ... but they will still close down the local hospitals at the end of it. 
However, as discussed previously, there were many decisions made 
informally by clinicians which affected PCT policy. 
2.4 Lack of trust 
A particular problem for decision-making in the CG appeared to be the 
professional relationships between groups of decision makers, which are 
assumed to be exogenous to the formal process. PCT informants did not 
really discuss relationships between decision makers, although relationships 
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were emphasised as being important in almost all interviews with CG 
informants. They felt that although the CG was supposed to act as a team, 
this was not being achieved in practice: 
54: Hopefully the reG] meeting does actually help to ... provide an adequate 
interface between the primary and secondary care sector and improve 
understanding, but I am not sure that the meeting has achieved that so far. 
The main reason for team working not being fulfilled appeared to be as a 
result of a lack of trust between primary and secondary care. Informants 
regarded trust as the expectation that an individual would respond according 
to their role. Here, trust was in relation to an agency or advocacy role, since 
primary and secondary care were linked contractually to one another. Some 
felt that trust would only be sustained if it was reciprocal, so that all parties 
involved in the decision must trust each other. Trust, however, did not 
appear to be strong among groups involved in decision-making. There were 
various arguments as to why this was the case, although there appeared to be 
two central points, relating to lack of trust over financial issues and lack of 
trust in decision-making concerning referrals made by GPs. Firstly, some 
informants (54, 56) felt that the PCT were abusing their budget holder 
position, by diverting funds to other non-agreed, and potentially 
questionable, projects: 
54: ... Monies that are fed into the health service, a lot of it are being 
channelled through PCTs, and one wonders whether the PCTs are taking cuts 
off the money before passing it on. I don't know whether that is something that 
has any genuine truthfulness, but it's something that I am a bit concerned 
about. I do wonder somewhat about a lot of weird and wonderful zany projects 
that might have been going on out in primary care that mean that we don't 
finish up ever seeing the money Alan Milburn talks about. 
Similarly, 56 was concerned that many millions of pounds supposedly "ring 
fenced" or reserved for palliative care had been squandered by the PCT to 
cover their own financial deficit. On the other hand, several informants, 
comprising GPs and PCT managers, had a polar opposite perspective, feeling 
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mistrust towards secondary care's arguments for funding. Specifically, they 
believed that secondary care lacked the competence for priority setting, or 
that they treated the PCT as a "bank", being able to disperse money freely to 
them: 
56: There is no trust in decision-making from the [Trust] because we have no 
idea what it is that they are going for and why they've asked for this as 
opposed to that. I even mean that at quite a detailed level, we do not actually 
trust the arguments they put forward to people about some things. 
5510: ... They've wanted a breast surgeon, even though they don't need it but 
they just tend to get what they want at the end of the day ... They then come to 
the peT and say they want that funded. 
Secondly, some informants expressed a lack of trust in the qualitative 
decision-making made by GPs to refer patients to hospital. Three secondary 
care informants suggested that monitoring GPs' behaviour was difficult 
because GP practices worked fairly independently of each other. As a result, 
they felt that GP referrals, particularly those related to suspected cancer cases, 
were sometimes unreliable and did not reflect need: 
54: What was being found is there are a number of different ways that 
patients could finish up coming in through the system theoretically ... There 
was one GP whose patient had itching, a skin rash - now itching is sometimes 
a feature of Hodgkin's disease, although there was no evidence of that in this 
particular patient's case. But the GP knew that the waiting list to get the 
patient seen in dermatology was in excess of22 months but if he puts the 
words "suspected cancer" on the referral, then the patient gets seen within 
two weeks ... 
512: GPs feel that things need to be done, they will quite often in the end 
declare someone "urgent" in order to get the work done ... 
Here, there was a deliberate circumvention of the formal process of decision-
making. 
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2.5 Personal motivations 
The basis for decision-making in the formal process largely appeared to be to 
achieve the targets, which were seen as compulsory, and/ or maintain clinical 
quality. At the local level, on the surface, informants appeared to want to 
achieve a safe service, attain some notion of equity, and sometimes faced 
having to base decisions on previous decision-making or policy. By and 
large, different decision makers' motivations were therefore comparable. 
Beneath this process, however, there were other motivations, which were not 
related to the organisation and were more individualistic. For instance, GPs 
were seen as being focused on their own income. Some informants suspected 
that limited GP involvement in meetings was financially driven (since a GP 
practice would have to provide cover for an absent GP, which would incur 
additional costs for the practice, and would most likely affect GP income): 
54: GPs are regrettably, have to be, focused on their income, they can I t tum 
up to an afternoon's meeting unless someone provides some funding ... and it's 
very expensive ... their income would suffer personally because the practice 
would still have to get another doctor in to see the patients. Otherwise their 
colleagues just finish up having to see extra patients, is that fair? You should 
be dividing the workload up fairly. 
For GPs 551 and 5510, there were also incentives to generate income. 551 
referred to the temptation to record the wrong information for patients (such 
as blood pressure readings) because he would receive more income if able to 
show a reduction in patients' blood pressures:xvii 
51: There is a very easy way of making sure that your patients with 
hypertension have low blood pressures; you put down the wrong blood 
pressure. I know it sounds horrendous but you could knock a little bit off and 
nobody would know ... and therefore some of these things are actually 
manipulable ... it is very easy to do actually, and you can go through people 
and put a load of blood pressures down, you might not even see them, but you 
could actually put some blood pressures down to fit figures because this is 
going to be measured by somebody just looking at your computer. 
xvii As far as I was aware this practice was not going on, but was an illustration of what might happen. 
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This situation reflected an asymmetry of information between GPs and other 
decision-making bodies. Only the GP could record patient data and the 
commissioners or those responsible for monitoring GPs could only interpret 
recorded data. Again, this also reflected a situation where the clinical 'level' 
were affecting outcomes of policy, and, in this sense, they were far less 
distinct than might be assumed. 
Hospital clinicians also appeared to have their own incentives. For example, 
there was a suggestion that the Trust were accustomed to being 'bailed out' if 
they exceeded their expenditure, in which case they could advance requests 
as they liked: 
5510: In the NH5, at the end of day, it is just people that sit around in a room 
deciding figures that everybody else completely ignores, do you see? People 
decide on budgets and everything else. In theory it's a good idea but in 
practice it doesn't work because there is no real constraint on spending. The 
[Trust] will spend how much it wants to spend, because at the end of the day if 
you were to have how much money you have to spend, you couldn't carry on 
spending thousands of pounds, because you'd lose your home, your car, and 
everything else and be declared bankrupt, and that would be it. But the 
hospital can carry on, it hasn't got a limit has it? 
3. Conclusion 
At the formal process of decision-making that occurs at the PCT level of 
health care decision-making, it appears that there is a relatively clear 
structure, organisation, and process of decision-making. Informants were 
fairly unanimous in their opinions against the strong role of the Government 
in priority setting and there was a clear focus on organisational concerns such 
as NICE and the targets. However, the clarity of decision-making is strongly 
assumed by informants from the PCT, whose ideas are shaped by their 
position in the organisation. The pressures that are related to by PCT 
informants mainly concern organisational factors, such as the need to comply 
with Government targets. Among PCT informants, there is also the 
assumption that the CG acts as a good agent for the PCT, prioritising 
expenditure and informing them about where to invest or disinvest. PCT 
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informants felt that the network model of health care organisation was 
working effectively, and did not question issues of trust or partnership 
working. This suggests that they viewed decision-making in line with classic 
rationality, where there was a clear decision maker and clear decision to be 
made. 
PCT informants seemed unaware of the pressures on groups feeding 
information to them, such as the CG, despite basing much of their decision-
making on such information. The informal process was strongly 
characterised by: decision-making outside formal settings (before or after CG 
meetings); unawareness of implicit decision-making; lack of clarity as to 
where decisions are made; lack of trust; and personal motivations in decision-
making, as opposed to purely organisational concerns. All together, these 
factors suggested that there was more of a focus on personal factors in 
decision-making than might be assumed, and that PCT informants were not 
clear about how decisions that reached them had been made and could not 
therefore judge whether the basis had been appropriate. At the CG level, 
there appeared to be a system of pluralistic bargaining, whereby individual 
rationalities were shaped by personal incentives and motivations (such as 
keeping a job and obtaining power). Decisions were made by many different 
actors, even before reaching the PCT, and there appeared to be an unclear 
basis for this. Often this created a lack of trust among decision makers, 
suggesting that the network model of decision-making was not working 
effectively in practice. 
One important insight so far is that lack of trust among some decision makers 
and perverse incentives (for example relating to the issue of the Trust being 
'bailed out') largely appear to be an internal problem among the CG. Thus, 
only the targets and other guidance, such as from NICE, were an external 
factor in decision-making, but they did not directly affect the intrinsic 
working of the group. Whilst decision makers appeared to spend a 
substantial amount of time being frustrated about national policy, they did 
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not recognise their own internal problems associated with, perhaps, an 
inability to take control of their situation. It is not clear how rational 
approaches such as economics would be able to cope with such chaos by 
enforcing a more systematic approach. 
One final point should be noted from this chapter. Economists usually 
assume clear and distinct levels of decision-making: national, local, and 
clinical, each with their own set of clear and distinct decision makers. The 
process of local decision-making outlined here, however, includes a strong 
influence from national policy, but, more importantly, a much less clear 
distinction between local level decision-making and clinical level decision-
making. Not only do the clinical actions of doctors circumvent local decisions 
(as in the case of referring GPs for example) but clinicians are inextricably 
involved in the process of local decision-making as the agents of the PCT in 
groups such as the eG. The following chapter investigates informants' views 
and opinions about use of economic evaluation in decision-making. 
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Table 4A: case study of. decisions 
Decision Type Basis of decision Process of decision-making Conflicts during the process 
NICE drugs Drugs National decision Debated extensively in CG, but decision eventually reached by Concerns about lack of money to 
(see Table 4B) PCf, who agreed to fund the implementation of the services and fund drugs, responsibility for 
equipment required for use of the drugs rationing, actual (cost) 
effectiveness, and equity 
Breast screening Screening National decision Limited discussion and priority was seen as unavoidable. Pcf Some private concerns, expressed 
agreed to fund additional capacity during interview, as to whether 
breast screening was a needy 
clinical issue 
Cervical Screening National decision Discussed during CG but was seen as unavoidable. PCT agreed Concerns that was not a clinical 
screening to fund additional capacity need and also very expensive 
Cfscanner Equipment Pre-commitment Discussed during CG as a result of option appraisal. PCT agreed No opposition expressed 
(also standards and to fund 
targets) 
MRIscanner Equipment National targets Discussed during CG as a result of option appraisal. Originally No opposition expressed 
was not intended for allocation under cancer budget, but 
decision was reversed by PCT and was included in the cancer 
budget 
PET scanning Equipment National decision Discussed at CG, although no decision made Some opposition that this was 
another national directive 
Oncology Staff Clinical risk (also Discussed during CG as a result of option appraisal. PCT No opposition expressed 







Endoscopy Location of 
care 
Brachytherapy Trial 
Basis of decision 





Process of decision-making 
Discussed during CG as a result of option appraisal. 
Assessment was undertaken to determine whether the service 
should be terminated. The PCf eventually decided to fund the 
priority 
Discussed at CG but decision went outside the group 
Discussed at CG. Since there was money from charitable 
sources, the per decided not to try to stop patients from 
receiving the procedure in their locality, but not to allocate any 
money for it 
Conflicts during the process 
No opposition expressed 
No opposition expressed 
Concerns regarding cost and 
capacity required 
Note: Option appraisals were essentially funding proposals prepared by the Trust to obtain funding from the peTs; a national requirement refers to a wait time target (or, in 
tire case of NICE, specific cost-effoctive drugs or procedures); and national standards consider clinical quality of care, usually specified in public documents (such as the 
Cancer Plan). 
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Table 4B: recommended NICE drugs for cancer 
Drug Recommendation 
Rituxumab (MabThera®) Aggressive non-Hodgkin's lymphoma 
Imatinib (Glivec ®) Chronic myeloid leukaemia 
Trastuzumab (Herceptin ®) Advanced breast cancer 
Aromatase inhibitors Early breast cancer 
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Chapter 5: Use of economic evaluation in decision-
making: "the right way?" 
The previous chapter has set the context for local decision-making, as well as the 
distinction between the formal and informal process which is useful for 
understanding the findings here. This chapter begins by examining the use of 
evidence in decision-making and moves on to investigate the use of technical 
knowledge, including economic concepts, as well as economic evaluation. It is 
found that whilst there is some knowledge of economic concepts, there is no use of 
published economic evaluation. The possible reasons for this situation are 
explored, followed by propositions for facilitating greater use of economic 
evaluation in decision-making. The chapter ends with a brief conclusion. 
1. Use of evidence in decision-making 
This section explores use of research evidence and non-research evidence (referred 
to as "learnt" evidence here), which comprises decision makers' experiences, 
professional beliefs, and opinions. 
1.1 Research evidence: "decisions on the best possible 
infonnation" 
Members of the PCT were keen for the basis of decisions to be transparent and 
objective. This implied using formal evidence containing information about 
efficacy, effectiveness, and efficiency. Informants suggested that use of such 
evidence was associated with the PCT, CG, and clinical settings: 
511: ... 0ne oftlte big things in the NHS is about trying to force managers to make 
their decisions on the best possible information, analysed appropriately, as opposed 
to learnt experience or emotional attachments .. .I remember reading in a director of 
public health annual report once about decision-making based on value judgements 
that we weren't even aware of that you take to the table because you are who you are. 
515: ... He [a clinician] is giving you his personal advice [during CG meetings], but 
it doesn't necessarily represent the views of his colleagues ... nor has he actually 
made the effort to go around and speak to them before the meeting ... that's why the 
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whole base of the decision must be based as much as possible on evidence ... efficiency, 
efficacy ... 
Consequently, PCT informants believed that it was their role to ensure that 
decisions were not based on opinions or emotional attachments. The importance of 
making decisions on the basis of research evidence was also recognised by those in 
managerial positions: 
559: ... r think we have to be making the best decisions for the health community 
based on evidence. 
519: ... Without information, you can't draw up a shopping list, you can't succinctly 
put in a bid and say, "And this is what we need." 
The chair of the CG (52) suggested that evidence was used about numbers needed 
to treat, cost to patients in terms of side effects of drugs or treatments, the financial 
cost, and benefits from treatment, such as the five year survival rate. Some 
informants claimed that they often searched for appropriate evidence on the 
Internet and used web sites or databases, such as the Cochrane collaboration 
database, the British Medical Association (BMA) website, DoH and NICE websites. 
Such methods appeared to allow quick and easy access to relevant information for 
clinical decision-making: 
58: .. .I am aware of the literature relating to aspects concerning cancer nursing, so 
some of it's published in books ... just a search will lead you to various people who 
have written extensively on it. 
514: As a GP I could use any number of resources at my fingertips on my computer, 
which is really helpful. First of all there's the kind of local guidance that we might 
have, you could look on the BMA evidence website. A lot of practice systems have 
clinical support software on them; our system that we use has a thing called mentor, 
so if you click onto that, or you could use the British Heart Foundation website ... 
Where mentioned spontaneously, the evidence that was useful related to that 
shown in clinical papers. SS4 referred to recent cancer treatments in his field: 
554: ... The evidence [for treating high-grade lymphoma] is .. .in the New England 
Journal of Medicine ... The paper suggested that the drug reduces the relapse rate, it 
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increases the event free survival, and it increases the overall survivaL .. This is a 
straightforward clinical paper comparing standard CHOP chemotherapy, which is 
what we give to people with high-grade lymphoma, CHOP with or without 
rituximab, and it improves it in the order of15%, which is the first known 
improvement for the treatment of high-grade lymphoma in 25 years. 
It appeared that once research evidence is accessed, how it is used depends on the 
particular context. Three PCT informants (512,514,515) believed that groups such 
as the CG were responsible for reviewing a wide range of research evidence on 
particular topics, in order to reach a decision. This implies a direct application of 
research evidence, prior to making the decision (as in the problem-solving or 
knowledge-driven models of research use): 
515: [Groups such as the CG1 I would have thought make decisions in an evidence-
based manner. So if they had to prioritise expenditure in one area compared with 
expenditure in another, they may look at the evidence that underpins that and decide 
which provides the better health outcome. 
514: [Groups such as the CG] ... take a lot of the evidence and the national guidelines 
and the N5Fs and they kind of produce some evidence, or produce guidelines or 
suggested ways of delivering work. In general practice that's underpinned by the 
data that practice needs to provide on an annual basis, which is basically searches 
and audit. So you've got a clinical condition, ischaemic heart disease, you then have 
to identify your group of patients with that condition, so you get a disease register, 
you then have to implement recognised and accepted treatments for them or clinical 
management, you then decide who's best to deliver that ... 
514 suggested that the primary care meeting group (which was a similar group to 
the CG, but related to issues concerning primary care) might use research evidence 
directly in deciding treatment for patients with hypercoagulation (excessive blood 
clotting) disorders: 
514: ... There is very good evidence that if you treat a certain group of people with a 
certain condition with warfarin you actually reduce the risk of them having strokes 
... the numbers needed to treat is 50, so actually that's quite a low number needed to 
treat to prevent a condition like stroke, when you consider if you treat hypertension, 
you've got to treat a thousand people for about a year to prevent one stroke in the 50-
60 age group. So it could make quite a dramatic impact but the number needed to 
harm is 300, so there is a risk with this treatment. So on one hand you've got a very 
effective treatment that can actually make quite a big impact on patients particularly 
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but also health care seroices, but also it is potentially very harmful treatment and 
therefore you want to actually have this done in the safest way possible. 
This informant went on to say that, based on the evidence on the risk of treating 
patients with warfarin, it would be best to locate an anticoagulation service at the 
hospital, rather than in primary care, where administration of warfarin could be 
controlled and monitored. 
However, there appeared to be few examples where the CG used research evidence 
to inform a decision that came to the group. In the brachytherapy case, although 
there was no firm evidence to support its use, the procedure was provided anyway 
to some patients since charitable funding was available: 
52: ... Brachytherapy - this will continue to be on the 'interoentions not normally 
funded' list because there is still no firm evidence to determine its place in treatment 
BUT since there is money from charitable sources, the peT will not try to stop it for 
its residents - merely not put any money into it. This sounds like sophistry and r 
suppose it is. The whole thing has now been approved by the Board. 
(From e-mail correspondence) 
More likely, research evidence might be used by the Trust to support funding 
proposals (hence research evidence could be used as political ammunition): 
53 ... There is a lot of written evidence to support the use of planning system [for the 
simulator] ... 
53: ... We got an external review done of the nursing staff that we have already on 
the ward .. . [from] the main cancer hospital in England, and asked their deputy 
director of nursing to come and review, so [it is] that report that we're basing our 
nurse establishment requirement. 
One informant (58), a nurse, further suggested that research evidence would be 
most likely used to strengthen a case for a decision already made: 
58: ... r definitely use [information] to my best advantage, wherever an issue arises, 
for example the whole issue around communication skills, then you just quote the 
Cancer Plan .. . and, you name it, everything else that contains anything to do with 
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communication skills. You can use those documents to your advantage and then it's 
a harder argument for people to discredit. 
Consequently, it appears that research evidence does not always influence 
decision-making to the extent that might be desired by PCT informants (so that 
evidence is not being used directly to determine decisions made). As discussed in 
the next section, there appeared to be three reasons why research evidence might 
not be used directly: research evidence was generally thought of as something 
divorced from clinical practice; local information was often seen as more valuable, 
hence research evidence was not necessarily relevant; and there was a perceived 
lack of appropriate research evidence. 
a) Unfamiliarity: research evidence from a "cupboard" 
Informants appeared to be "divorced" from using research evidence and felt that 
gathering and using this information was the responsibility of others: 
515: We would say, #What's the evidence for this?" We'd send [the public health 
consultant] off into his cupboard and his computer and say, "Go and find some 
evidence and tell us whether there is any evidence for this or not. " 
There were some fleeting comments which suggested that no-one knew who 
should be responsible for using research evidence. This might reflect the 
complicated nature of the decision-making process, as discussed in the previous 
chapter. Based on observations of the CG meetings and interviews with the public 
health consultant, there was minimal use of research evidence in priority setting in 
practice and was restricted to evidence prepared by the Trust to support funding 
proposals. This is surprising given that several informants felt the chair of the CG 
would be relied upon to bring any evidence to meetings. 
b) Relevance 
Almost all informants suggested that local data about activity within the Trust was 
often more relevant for priority setting than research evidence: 
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59: ... We don't have enough information on activity, so we don't actually know 
what their activity is within the departments, we don't actually know what the 
demand is coming through and therefore we can't quantify what our backlogs are ... 
54: ... [1 get asked] "How many patients do you think you're gonna be able to put 
into the trial?" I don't know, you lick your finger and waft it around in the air ... 
511: ... We are very poor in the NH5 about using benchmarking, partly because the 
NH5 is so big, so you've got lots of information but it's about using it 
constructively .. .I think the [Trust] will say what's their relative status compared 
with other areas ... but an average is not very helpful. .. 50 the case mix will be 
different, there aren't two hospitals that work exactly in the same way, so 
benchmarking information is there but is harder to use because people can always 
find something that's wrong with it. 
Part of the problem was the unpredictability of the inflow of patients within the 
Trust at anyone point in time. However, the other problem was that there were 
inadequate systems in place to record information correctly. This inevitably meant 
that the CG was more concerned with recording local information correctly during 
CG meetings and research evidence was of little value in these cases. 
c) Availability of evidence 
For those with clinical roles in particular, there appeared to be a lack of availability 
of research evidence relevant to the clinical decisions that needed to be made. 
Hence, some informants suggested that there was a tendency to rely instead on 
clinical opinion. For instance, 58 perceived that "robust" evidence required for 
nursing care was lacking: 
5B: ... We don't tend to do randomised controlled studies in the sense of what the med 
profession does. Our research base is much less .. . there is a lot that needs to be done 
to get us to that point and just doing a small piece of research doesn't really help, it 
has to be something that's robust to change practice fundamentally. 
It also became apparent during the CG meetings that decisions were generally 
based around service provision, such as whether to employ oncology nurses in the 
Trust, for which there was not appropriate research evidence available. 
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1.2 "Learnt" evidence: "personal, professional beliefs" 
Although some informants appeared to use research evidence, there were clearly 
situations where it was not, or could not be, used. In contrast, "learnt" evidence 
was used to some degree by all informants, and was particularly supported by 
those with clinical responsibility: 
558: It's subjective, it's based on experience; it's based on my personal, professional 
beliefs on what's the most important thing at this moment in time. 
51: ... The clinician may have decided [the drug] wasn't appropriate, which obviously 
there isn't much argument against that ... 
These informants felt that the clinician's role was to interpret the guidance in order 
to inform decisions, suggesting that research evidence could rarely be used directly. 
For instance, one GP (5510) claimed that there would always be a choice over the 
use of cost-effective drugs: 
5510: .. . Basically if you were to take something to lower somebody's blood pressure, 
you have about 50 different drugs you could potentially use on anyone patient. 
Now how you decide what is the most cost-effective drug to use for that patient is 
not easy basically .. .It may be a diabetic which might eliminate some of the drugs, so 
you may narrow it down to about 4 or 5 potential drugs to use for that patient, some 
of them might cost £20, some of them might cost hundreds of pounds, some of them 
might have fewer side effects, it is a balance isn't it? If somebody somewhere has to 
make the decision, there is no one cost-effective drug because it is always a balance ... 
This suggested that learnt evidence, based on personal experience, could have an 
effect on the use of research evidence. (It further reinforces the point that formal 
decisions could be reinterpreted at lower levels of decision-making, as raised in the 
previous chapter). 
Apart from clinical level decision makers, other informants, including PCT 
members, suggested that they often made decisions using their best judgement: 
511: ... When it comes to a board [of the peT], all people in the NH5 have value 
judgements but they are not necessarily exposed ... Our culture, we cannot escape 
it... 
203 
One informant from the PCT who was also a member of the CG (55) suggested that 
he often made decisions based on his feelings at the time. However, these 
informants felt that learnt evidence should not cloud rational decision-making. 
Thus, although they accepted that some other decisions might be informed by 
learnt evidence, they felt that priority setting should be based on objective criteria. 
The rest of this chapter considers a specific type of evidence related to economics 
and economic evaluation. 
2. Use of economic terms: scarcity, opportunity cost, 
and efficiency 
This section considers use of economic concepts since these concepts were often 
raised by informants (although most were prompted by the focus of the topic of the 
interviews following the workshop in health economics). This suggests that these 
concepts were not part of typical decision-making and were only discussed in 
response to attending the workshop and discussion around it. 
It is important to note that over one third of all informants had received some kind 
of training in health economics. This included training during short courses, 
training as part of degree studies (in economics) in one case and, in another case, a 
correspondence course from the University of Aberdeen. Three informants with 
health economics training were members of the CG. The vast majority who had 
received training were at the PCT/5HA level; no clinicians (hospital doctors/GPs) 
had undergone training. 
2.1 Scarcity: "not a bottomless pit" 
During interviews, although there was no mention of the word scarcity, all 
informants appeared to understand the concept: 
515: Within a limited budget, when this would produce, almost double of the 
expenditure, is this an appropriate use of funds, will it actually identify more people 
with breast cancer and will it actually save lives at the end of the day? So that's a 
case where you'd go to [52] and you'd say, "VVhat's the evidence?" so that we can 
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make a decision on affordability and if we spend more on that what are we going to 
spend a little less on? 
510: .. . Cost is an issue and you haven't got a bottomless pit, and you have to make 
, 't' d 't ? pnon zes on you .. .. 
They perceived a limited amount of funding available for priorities. 558, for 
instance, stated that the priorities the Trust submitted to the CG were not a "wish 
list" of investments, but were carefully thought out because finance was limited: 
58: ... We are not putting forward that enormous great big wish list to make [the 
Trust] a gold standard perfect cancer unit, so we are already making those decisions, 
we're saying, "Lets be sensible here, we know that there is a problem with our 
finances", we are already being rational. .. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, however, whether this was the case, as 
proposed by 58, would be debated by other informants on the grounds that the 
Trust were advancing requests to the PCT with a view to obtain as much funding 
as possible, irrespective of whether programmes were really needed. 
2.2 Opportunity cost: "if we spend more on that what are we 
going to spend a little less on?" 
Some informants took note of opportunity cost, whereas others did not appear to 
be so familiar with the notion. Those who were familiar comprised around half of 
the informants (although only 53 referred to the term): 
553: ... [Ofthe CG] cancer's probably pretty rigorous if I think through the health 
seroice in general, certainly how the [Trust] has worked in the past, saying "Well 
we'll have one of these" and not thought through how ... you get best value for 
money, what's the opportunity cost? ... 
In particular, there was concern among some informants (such as 53 and 56) that 
the opportunity cost of pursuing NICE drugs was very high: 
553: ... What could one do with that money that could have made us much better 
off? .. . 
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However, it was not at all evident that opportunity cost was really being taken into 
account during CG meetings. There was never any discussion about what could 
have been done with the money that was being invested in a particular way and 
lack of realisation, it seemed, that pursuing one activity might mean forgoing 
something else. 
In practice also, clinicians (554, SS8) appeared to argue against opportunity costs. 
They seemed to find it difficult to think in terms of trading between costs and 
benefits and felt a duty to provide treatment irrespective of cost: 
SS8: ... My job is to outline what the case of need is, for the service and for patient 
care, and I can't say because we don't have the money, we don't need what I am 
suggesting we need, it's not fair on the patients. I also understand that we need to 
argue the case for cancer, I don't like to think of it affecting patients with heart 
failure or diabetes, I think that's all hugely emotive when you start rationalising on 
them, but my job is to say what the need is to deliver effective patient care, so 
irrespective of whether they tell me there's no money, the argument doesn't 
change ... 
Further, even comments made during interview about opportunity cost were 
limited to how new money might be spent differently. There was no discussion in 
interviews about the opportunity costs associated with current provision or 
attempts to think in terms of disinvestment so as to produce greater overall 
benefits. These issues were certainly never discussed during CG meetings. 
2.3 Efficiency: "the best value for money" 
A third of the informants used the term "value for money" to denote efficiency. 
Within the Trust, this involved option appraisal: 
SS9: ... What we do is our own option appraisal here, so if we identify a requirement 
for a development here, we do our own option appraisal to come up with the best 
solutions and the best value for money, plus the risks of not doing anything at all ... 
However, 551 was not convinced that value for money was really being taking into 
account: 
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551: .. .I'm not sure [the Trust] can tell you how much money they spend on 
orthopaedics and if they spent it differently whether they could get better value for 
money out of it ... 
The comment from SS1 also incorporated the notion of opportunity costs and the 
idea that undertaking a different practice would be better than current practice. 
Although there was mixed opinion as to whether the best value for money was 
being taken into account, those who seemed to understand the concept of value for 
money highlighted that it was important to assess whether optimal methods of 
service delivery were being undertaken, which involved effectiveness as well as 
cost considerations: 
511: ... You should also state how you would improve efficiency. Now some of that 
maybe about technology and some of that would be about a judgement about how 
efficient you are; are you using the best practices in the best possible way? 
552: ... The terrible thing is if they need further treatment from that, often the 
[Trust] will repeat some of the tests that are done, so there's both expected gains 
from a better quality service and there is gross inefficiency. 
551: ... Locally we are really expected to do certain things and we're having to do the 
cheapest way of managing to do that probably; it's not always cheapest, it's 
efficiency as well. .. 
515: ... [Groups such as the CG] might have to look at ways of doing it differently, 
maybe to do the same thing but do it in a more efficient way ... 
These comments suggest some understanding of allocative efficiency, or the best 
way of providing different services. In addition, although no one specifically 
referred to the term technical efficiency, some PCT informants, as well as Trust and 
palliative care managers, appeared to understand the concept (related to meeting 
an objective with the least possible expenditure). The chair and chief executive of 
the PCT, for instance, wanted to expand some community services and withdraw 
hospital services, which they felt would save money and provide the ~ quality 
of care. One GP (551) also perceived that in terms of generic prescribing, the 
quality of different alternatives was identical: 
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551: ... Generic prescribing is all about providing baked beans rather than Heinz 
baked beans, even though those baked beans may have been made in Bulgaria or 
something, it's all about finding an equivalent cheaper product and it's a very big 
thing in general practice ... 
There was no mention of situations that involved higher costs and higher 
effectiveness than current practice however (although this may have reflected the 
poor financial situation of the peT). 
Two informants in managerial positions felt that technical efficiency should be 
associated with innovative and creative working practices: 
511: 50 you've got lots of what we call demand models and supply models, which 
really inform your decision-making about how much you get out of it, but alongside 
that you've got, "Is the current service efficient or not?" 50 it's all very well to do a 
model, which is based on current supply, but is that current supply being 
sufficiently challenged, so should the length of stay be shorter and then you can get 
through less throughput and you put everyone on shorter waiting times? 
516: ... Radiologists within the Trust say, "We need more CT scanners and we need 
more radiologists" ... 50 the [Network] said, "We'll test it". So they went out and 
tested it across the Trusts ... and they came out with a report .. . which demonstrates 
that the demand and the capacity is actually balanced, there is plenty of 
capacity ... We demonstrated that by new ways ofworking ... working more 
inventively, would require them not needing a new CT scanner ... 
The chair of the PCT (512) was one informant who appeared to want to base 
priority setting on technical efficiency criteria. For instance, with regard to 
paediatric oncology services provided locally, he felt that the rational option was to 
provide these services in one central location: 
512: ... There needs to be some rationalisation in the provision of cancer 
services ... For example you said you were providing paediatric cancers at all (X) 
locations ... the cancer network might well say, "Well actually, is that a good idea, is 
that actually good use of resources or would it be better to centre on one location 
given they are really not that far away?" ... 
It is likely that such views would create conflict with some informants' concerns 
regarding equity. As mentioned in the previous chapter, some felt it would be 
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infeasible for patients to travel far to access care. Such equity concerns were not 
voiced by the chair of the PCT however. 
On a final point, interestingly, the discussion of efficiency by informants seemed to 
avoid contemplation of the cut backs which the budget deficit would suggest that 
the locality faced. All comments raised by informants related to stopping 
something that was seen to be inefficient; reduction in services was not seen as an 
option. 
2.4 Economic evaluation: "cost effectiveness" & "cost benefit 
analysis" 
Around a quarter of informants from a range of backgrounds referred to the terms 
II cost-effectiveness" and II cost-benefit analysis." In most cases, it was not evident 
that these terms were really understood, and they seemed to be used in a different 
way than would be understood by health economists. For instance, in relation to 
outcome measures typically used in economic evaluation, although 5517 
mentioned the term "QALY", she felt (despite having received health economics 
training) that she did not understand what the term encompassed and used it to 
reflect outcomes in general. 
In other cases, it appeared that understanding of the term economic evaluation was 
restricted to what was generated by NICE guidance. For instance, SS4 referred to a 
threshold cost per QALY of £30,000 used by NICE, although, interestingly, he 
believed that his own experience would be the most important factor in clinical 
decision-making: 
OA: What's your viewpoint as a clinician? The cost of these drugs in comparison 
to the length of life saved ... 
554: Well I could cheat couldn't I and say, "Well NICE use £30,000 for one QALY, 
so a course of rituximab is less than £30,000." 50 a year is something I would be 
hoping to get out of a course of ritiximab. If I didn't feel that a patient was likely to 
get that sort of response then I wouldn't be suggesting it. But it's quite a difficult 
decision to make. It comes down to experience; you don't always get it right. 
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It appeared that although informants were familiar with measuring benefits, they 
were unfamiliar with health economists' methods for measuring outcomes. In 
addition, they seemed unfamiliar with valuing and measuring costs, as would be 
typically undertaken in an economic evaluation. 
In summary, decision makers, to a greater or lesser degree depending on their 
professional role, understood the following economic concepts: scarcity, 
opportunity cost, and some notion of efficiency. (Note that generally those who 
were absent from the workshop but were familiar with health economics' concepts 
showed a greater understanding of these concepts than those who attended the 
workshop. Given the nature and length of previous training, compared with the 
two-hour workshop, this is not surprising). However, although most informants 
were familiar with the terms used by health economists, some (551, 559, 556) 
appeared to be confused about how economic principles could be incorporated into 
priority setting in practice due to lack of financial resources. SS6 stated that in 
other financial climates, where there was more money available, economics might 
be used as an aid to decision-making. Others had similar perceptions: 
OA: ... Could what you have learnt at the workshop be useful? 
559: Yes definitely, but also it always comes down to the cheapest option ... 
SSl: .. .It's all about saving costs as far as we are concemed ... We can spend an 
awful lot of money, more money on health care than we do, and therefore we're 
forever looking at ways of being more cost-effective, or more economic, or indeed 
reducing choices for patients so that it saves money ... 
SSl: ... We are all about cost containment essentially and trying to develop services 
essentially within a cost envelope, which for us is an overspent envelope, so the 
economics are such that we are in an overspent situation and we're trying to do 
developments within that .. .I think it is just economics per se which describes the 
environment you're trying to operate, the financial environment in which you're 
trying to operate ... 
3. Use of economic evaluation as an aid to priority 
setting 
This section explores the use of evidence from economic evaluation as an aid to 
priority setting. Although there was found to be no use of published economic 
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evaluation, there was use, in theory, of economics as a way of prioritising at 
different levels of local decision-making. 
3.1 peT: "rationality" or "opinion and consensus & policy"? 
According to some PCf informants, the board and executive committee of the PCT 
first examined the clinical effectiveness of a programme and then the costs or 
outcomes associated with pursuing it. Some PCf informants saw the PCf as acting 
"rationally" in this respect. Although this term would not fit well with the 
economists' standard definition of rationality (evoking certain objectives being 
pursued, together with the maximisation of utility), it is likely that the notion 
expressed here incorporates the idea that costs and benefits of alternative courses of 
action are evaluated, in order to make an informed decision: 
511: ... Knowing the costs, knowing you've got the right information, building a case 
about arguing it rationally. So you are usually talking about things like how much 
it will cost, how much will you produce, who will benefit, who will lose? .. 
Although there was no apparent use of published economic evaluation to inform 
decision-making, and no cases where in-house evaluations had been conducted 
and used, PCT informants suggested that there were instances where option 
appraisal provided similar evidence. Upon reviewing these appraisals, however, 
there was no systematic identification or valuation of costs and benefits. In 
particular, a comprehensive assessment of the benefits was missing. Hence some 
informants stated explicitly that health economics was not being used: 
511: ... We do use option appraisal but they tend not to be at the level of health 
economics. 1AIhether it's value for money and affordability would be two big drivers 
in our decision-making. 
511: I remember the days when all Health Authorities were going to start using 
health economics to make their decisions. But we here have not been in a position 
actually ... 
52: ... {Ofhealth economics not being used] It is a great source of sadness. The only 
process where I know it is going on is in the NICE process. Everything else is, 
frankly, opinion and consensus and policy. 
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3.2 CG: "the quicksand of reality" 
Some informants, notably from the PCT, felt that the CG was adopting a rational 
approach to prioritising, again in the sense of using costs and benefits to make the 
'best' decision. Indeed, the chair of the CG in particular was very keen to adopt a 
more rational basis for decision-making within the CG and had been encouraged 
by the workshop in health economics: 
52: I like to think that personally I have got more of a kind of desire to drive things 
on a cost and benefit approach already, but that my enthusiasm for that is 
strengthened by events like [the workshop] and I think to myself once again that this 
is the right way to do it ... 
Several other informants, such as 51 and 53, also perceived the advantage of using 
a weighting mechanism to rank CG priorities (notably this was discussed before the 
workshop). 51 referred to this as a "common sense approach", which he believed 
was being used for prioritising community services: 
51: .. .In our local community, over community services, we've tried to score things 
basically, we've tried to get a way of priori tisa tion, each with weighted factors and 
then we've tried to score each thing on a weighting, and basically the ones with the 
highest numbers at the end of the day are the ones that get done. That's not how 
we've done it for the [eG] ... 
In the CG, scoring of priorities was perceived as being hard to conduct since it was 
"very difficult to comparatively score and to get it right" (51). He felt that 
community services were easier to prioritise because: 
51: ... This is something we can do, we both pay for and provide the service, and 
commission the service, we do the whole lot, and then if we want to change it we 
can, we can stop doing it - we have to consult with the public and this sort of thing, 
but it can be done ... 
Apart from difficulties in comparing different priorities, there appeared to be two 
additional problems in scoring priorities for cancer care. Firstly, in cancer care 
there were few decisions to make locally, since there were strong national dictates, 
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with regard to the type of treatments and interventions that cancer patients should 
be able to receive (although such restrictions did not only apply to cancer care): 
S11: ... We've never had to make a big decision about whether to spend money on 
cancer or coronary heart disease, because we are so clear about what the targets are 
and because there is no longer clarity about whether the services are important ... so 
it's no longer easy to say, HWell therefore that gives us the rationale for doing X, Y 
and Z." 
Sll: ... 0nce upon a time, much more local decision-making - can we afford it and 
does it make sense? Now we've got a national body that tells us, anything that 
NICE tells us effectively we have to implement so they make announcements about 
whether a certain drug should be available on the NHS, whether or not we should be 
providing IVF treatment, so again ... making those decisions for us ... 
However, the existence of national dictates was not the only reason for lack of use 
of economic evaluation and there appeared to be another, more complex, problem 
hindering priority setting, although this was not always recognised explicitly by 
informants in interview. The issue centred on CG members not always acting as if 
resources were scarce, even when they were supposed to be adopting a population 
perspective. Often programmes were advanced in the form of a "wish list". There 
were an ever-increasing number of investment opportunities being brought to the 
CG, despite the acknowledgement that financial resources were extremely limited, 
with limited thought for disinvestments that could be made. 
It is not surprising that given this context, there was no use of economic evaluation 
at the CG. On a few occasions, the chair of the CG referred to published economic 
evaluations of cervical and breast cancer screening, but this was in passing and his 
comments did not form the basis of any specific argument, so that the evidence was 
not subsequently discussed. In fact, there was only one specific example where a 
published economic evaluation was brought to the CG. Here, evidence of the costs 
and benefits of a high cost procedure (brachytherapy) was brought to the CG by an 
invited speaker. Some informants felt that the evidence could not be applied to 
local settings and questioned whether there was sufficient physical capacity to 
provide treatment. Clinicians also voiced concerns that the costs of the therapy 
should be borne by the pharmaceutical company endorsing the trial. They might 
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have been concerned to ensure that financial resources were not drawn from their 
funds. 
There appeared to be no effect on the decision-making process or decisions made 
subsequent to the workshop. The format of the meetings was the same, there was 
no disinvestment list, and there was no attempt to try and revise/reconsider some 
of the decisions that had been made previously. This is perhaps unsurprising given 
the timing of the workshop (in that most of the decisions/priorities had already 
been set for the next financial year or so) and the duration of the workshop (only 
one workshop was help, where in practice it might have been better to have two or 
three). 
3.3 Trust: "option appraisal" 
As discussed previously, option appraisal lists the costs of the proposal, although 
benefits were not defined in the way health economists would typically think of. 
Instead, benefit statements tended to concern cost savings, meeting targets, and/ or 
preventing clinical risk to patients. Costing was also not achieved in a rigorous 
way, as would be typical in a research based economic evaluation. Option 
appraisal was a more local assessment in some cases: 
559: We consider all of the options, so, say for example, we wanted to develop 
brachytherapy ... 1 will assess what's the risk of us not doing anything at all, what is 
the risk of us implementing it, what is the risk of implementing it as a clinical trial, 
and also considering the other options of sending it to another hospital or sending it 
privately. So doing an options appraisal means that you have covered everything, so 
when you're presenting a case, what you're saying is "Yes, we want to develop it 
here on the site, and these are the reasons why we wouldn't consider it elsewhere". 
Option appraisal was not typical economic evaluations, but they did seem to 
provide a way of assessing the cost and benefits of programmes and their 
alternatives, which incorporated economic concepts alongside other objectives (for 
instance guidance from NICE and the DoH). Palliative care also used some form of 
needs assessment, although it was recognised by 5517 that evidence was scarce for 
the type of decisions they needed to make. There was only one mention of 
economic evaluation, with regard to a study which had been performed about 
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fifteen years previously, although no details of the study were available and 5517 
did not know the study's effect on decision-making. 
3.4 Clinicians: "balancing cost against quality of life" 
Cost-effective drug prescribing (by GPs) appeared to be the main way in which 
economic evaluation might be used in decision-making by clinicians: 
51: ... Every single patient I see I make a decision and I don't necessarily give them 
the best treatment that there might be, because it happens to be the most expensive ... 
51: ... There are some very good ulcer drugs and there are some less good cheaper 
ones, so we tend to give them the less good cheaper ones because it saves money ... 
There was also some indication of age-based rationing, which incorporated notions 
of costs and benefits: 
5510: ... To some extent you're balancing cost against quality of life .. .If somebody 
was younger you may give them a more expensive drug with a better side effect 
profile. If they were older, they may be more tolerant, they may be on other 
medication, so you are less concerned with side effects ... 
However, it remained the responsibility of the GP to decide what was cost-
effective, as there was often a choice between many cost-effective treatments and 
the GP would have to make a decision for an individual patient. 
4. Explanations for limited use of economic evaluation 
Apart from there being no use of published economic evaluation at the local level, 
there was also a lack of interest among some to incorporate an economic way of 
thinking into priority setting. There appeared to be three main reasons why 
economic evaluation was not used to inform priority setting: evidence from 
economic evaluation was not relevant to decisions made; there was a lack of local 
basis for decision-making, meaning that decisions were made about how to achieve 
national directives; and there were other incentives among clinicians, relating to 
difficulties with rationing and wanting to avoid blame from rationing care. 
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4.1 Evidence not relevant: "doesn't often centre around 
some of the issues that I am concerned about" 
Published economic evaluations were not relevant to local priority setting, since 
important issues, discussed during meetings were whether to employ additional 
staff or where to locate care. Decisions concerned, for instance: 
51: ... a particular nurse that should be employed but isn't, or particular shortage of 
one particular modality ... 
Such decisions were not easily identifiable with the usual topics addressed in 
economic evaluation. 
Two informants (558, 5517) spontaneously offered specific examples of where 
published economic evaluations might be insufficient for decision-making locally, 
where they were unable to capture effects on quality of life: 
558: ... [Economic evaluation1 doesn't often centre around some of the issues that I 
am concerned about in nursing care ... 
5517: .. .It is not easy to define what the benefits will be ... How do you define 
psychological support if you invest in nurses to provide critical support for people 
with cancer? How do you define that with an outcome and relate that to cost-
effectiveness? .. It would be difficult to say, "It would prevent that number of people 
from getting depressed." 
5517: ... How do you quantify the benefits of a user group, carer and patient views, 
and yet that is a really important priority ... 
This suggests that the type of outcome measure typically associated with published 
economic evaluation is not comparable to the benefit measures viewed as 
important by decision makers [mainly concerning emotional and psychological 
benefits, such as preferences for dying at home (5517) or provision of videotapes 
for cancer patients on the development of their condition (58)]. Furthermore, there 
was concern that economic evaluations produced by NICE were not in accordance 
with the values important for patients and therefore decision makers: 
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53: ... NICE guidance that says, "You can give this type of drug to this particular 
class of patient ... and it will extend their life for 3 months", ... but actually, people 
have got to think through what that 3 months of life might be like ... 
The point, that published economic evaluations would not be relevant to local 
decision-making, was further reiterated by a 'project' that the researcher undertook 
as an aside for the chair of the CG. A major area that the CG were involved in 
debating concerned an extreme backlog of patients in the Trust waiting for 
endoscopies. Some of these patients had suspected cancer and had exceeded 
maximum wait time targets. In order to resolve this problem, the chair of the CG 
was keen to relieve the pressure on the Trust and allow a proportion of 
endoscopies to be performed in primary care, by an experienced nurse or specialist 
GP. However, no economic evaluation could be found to inform this decision-
making, nor was it possible, within the time frame, to estimate the costs or benefits 
associated with ways of dealing with this backlog of patients. Eventually, a 
strategy was developed by the chair of the CG to manage the demand for 
endoscopy services, by developing an appropriately skilled workforce (involving 
training nurses and GPs in performing endoscopies). This decision was based on a 
personal opinion of the chair of the CG rather than informed by evidence (although 
the Government was encouraging specialist GPs). 
4.2 No decisions made: "we don't often have that freedom 
of decision" 
As discussed in chapter 4, there appeared to be little freedom for decision-making 
at the local level. There were two reasons for this, related to the political 
imperatives and lack of financial resources, both of which 52 described as lithe 
quicksand of reality" (pursuing national policy in turn meant limited funds 
available for local policy). There was a perception among some informants that 
Government policy ignored economic rationale: 
556: .. .If [politicians and civil servants] understood health economics better we 
wouldn't be driving some of these targets. 
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Around two thirds of informants felt that targets dictated priorities and restricted 
the incorporation of an economic way of thinking in decision-making. For instance: 
56: ... You think you're going along and something comes that completely scuppers 
the plans that you had, usually new Government targets that mean you've got no 
money left for anything at all ... 50 the new targets for cervical cancer screening for 
instance, economically they are completely a waste of money, but they are going to 
drain all the plans that we would have had for two years time, but that's life in the 
NH5 ... They haven't been properly thought through so the economic implications, 
at a local level, are simply horrendous compared to everything else that's happening. 
511: ... I would say to [the public health director], "What's the evidence for doing 
this and what's the cost of making that decision compared to the benefit?" But as we 
have no money, we don't often have that freedom of decision. Any money we've got 
will be spent on national policy, so we are very much, at primary care trust level, 
even I think at the strategic level as well, driven by national policy. 
These feelings were strongly reflected during the workshop discussion, where 
national directives dominated local priorities. Of the workshop, two informants 
said that: 
554: .. .It seems to me that the prioritisation came in line with entirely what the 
Government were putting forward and forced us to ignore all the other important 
issues ... 
59: ... In an area such as cancer where the Government set so many IImust doll 
targets this will be very difficult to achieve practically. 
(From evaluation of workshop form) 
On the other hand, one informant (55) had a very different view of the extent to 
which Government policy restricted the use of an economics way of thinking. He 
felt that most decision makers did not view the targets, as they should correctly be 
seen, as an end product that could be reached in different ways. For instance, 55 
was of the opinion that there were two possible ways of attaining the target related 
to the maximum wait in A&E not exceeding four hours. One was to employ 
additional staff and the other was to invest time and money into changing habits 
and behaviours so that people worked more effectively. 55 felt that in most cases 
the first option, employing additional staff, was chosen, because of the "myopic" 
nature of local decision-making (employing additional staff was the easiest option 
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in the short run). However, the rebuttal to this would be, as 551 suggested, that for 
most decisions there was no choice: "cervical cytology screening ... has to be done, 
there are no other ways of doing it .. . " 
According to two informants (53, 57) lack of financial resources in the locality was a 
potential barrier to using economic evaluation. They felt that because of the focus 
on cost containment, there were few local decisions to make: 
53: .. .If you were having this conversation with the peTs, I am absolutely sure that 
they would say, "Blow to the economic evaluation, the only thing that matters is do 
we have the money to pay for it. " 
A particular aspect of this problem perceived by one informant (57) was the need to 
fit in with the short-term orientation of the NH5, even if the economic evaluation 
study showed the intervention to be "cost-neutral" over time. 
4.3 Incentives: "doctors tend to make decisions on the 
individua I" 
Among some clinically based informants, there appeared to be few incentives to 
adopt a wider perspective (as typically assumed in economic evaluation) as they 
associated their role with responsibility for the individual patient, rather than a 
community or population of patients: 
556: .. .If you're looking at ... health economics, I think oncologists would be 
swamped because doctors tend to make decisions on the individual, not in the 
general sense ... 
Even when clinical informants were taking a population role, they tended to bring 
with them the viewpoint associated with their individual role. Consequently, they 
appeared reluctant to make rationing decisions or to deny care to patients, because 
it conflicted with their usual role. There were two aspects to this: the difficulties, 
they felt, with rationing; and the responsibility attached to rationing care. 
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a) Difficulties with rationing: "it's very difficult to deny a single 
patient" 
These informants suggested that rationing care was difficult because it was hard to 
be objective and unemotional: 
558: ... Giving up is often quite difficult, so it's often easier to them [the clinicians] 
to say, "Lets keep going, lets keep working on this cancer", than to have the difficult 
conversation about, "VYhere do we go from here, what's in your best interest?" 
554: ... It's all very well to take yourself away from the one-to-one consultation ... the 
patient wants you to do something, you have it in your power to do ... 
551: .. .It's very difficult to deny a single patient that drug because it's expensive ... 
551: ... The conflict between the greatest good for the greatest number or the greatest 
good for an individual patient ... 
Such informants had individual patient responsibilities from which they often 
appeared to be unable to divorce themselves when making population level 
decisions within the eG. Hospital clinicians, in particular, found rationing difficult 
because they did not feel it was appropriate to base decisions on monetary costs: 
558: My job is to outline what the case of need is for the service and for patient 
care ... irrespective of whether they tell me there's no money ... 
In contrast, it could be argued that GPs were able to make some trade-offs of cost 
against quality of life, as shown previously. The issue of GP rationing is probably 
less stark because they are not usually responsible for deciding between the life and 
death of a patient. 
It was unclear from the research how clinicians' focus purely upon individuals 
might be overcome since they are always likely to have a patient centred 
perspective. However, as discussed in the conclusion to this chapter, enabling 
clinicians to understand the principles of economics and recognising that, for 
instance, treating one patient could mean not treating other patients (i.e. 
opportunity cost), could be helpful in this respect. 
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b) Avoidance of blame: "it's not my job particularly to decide" 
Some clinical informants (551, SS4, 558) felt they did not want to be responsible for 
rationing treatments between individuals. Another clinician, who attended the CG 
but who was not available for interview, appeared to also take this stance. 551 felt 
that it was the responsibility of politicians to specify what was affordable rather 
than clinicians, and pointed to the problems with equity if rationing was 
undertaken by the latter: 
SS1: .. . Politicians need to ... be a bit more upfront about what our current economy 
can afford and what it can't afford and give us some precise guidance ... rather than 
leaving it to us to make some local decisions which will then result in postcode 
treatment ... 
Other informants, notably a hospital clinician and nurse, asserted that PCf 
commissioners should be responsible for difficult decisions that essentially 
involved someone's life. They wanted to be sure that if they rationed care, the 
responsibility for dealing with any public or individual resistance would not rest 
with them: 
SS4: .. .I brought out my question of drugs developments and how clinicians were 
supposed to deal with them and this is where I had my answer from the peT chief 
executive, basically saying, "It's up to the clinician. There isn't any extra money in 
the pot, we are very sorry". That is not supporting clinicians- that is not saying, "] 
understand the difficulties that you are having, maybe we ought to concentrate on 
this or that." ... We need somebody that is going to back us up and say, "Yes [he] was 
quite right when he denied the patient this drug, we aren't able to give it and the 
reason is we are overspent." Somebody who can stand up on the telly when the 
patient goes to their member of Parliament ... 
SS8: As clinicians, when we are face-to-face with patients, if someone comes to us 
and says, "According to this document I meant to have my scan within a certain 
period of time", why should we be the ones to explain to the patients that actually 
the peTs didn't fund this? ... The onus shouldn't be on the clinicians to inform the 
patients on a one-to-one basis in a such emotively fraught situation. 
In the PCfs defence, some felt that explicit rationing was hindered by problems 
with the media creating adverse publicity, especially relying on powerful lobby 
groups. 57 felt that an action might be II cost-effective", /I clinically safe", and 
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"rational", but if there were" too much noise politically", the peT would be unable 
to enforce the action. In addition, 556 felt that clinicians were aware of the threat of 
being "pilloried" in the press if they had not offered treatment to patients for 
monetary reasons. However, fear of being seen to be cost-driven was an 
inadequate explanation for the CG not using evidence to inform local decisions. 
The researcher's efforts to find evidence that concerned some of the local decisions 
being made was not fruitful and hence it appeared that relevant evidence was 
lacking. 
5. Potential to facilitate use of evaluation: JJ[we] are 
not health economists; we need assistance when it 
comes to these difficult decisions" 
Findings revealed that the main way in which economic evaluation might be used 
was if decision makers were to receive training or expert help in explicit priority 
setting in deciSion-making. Several informants recognised the difficulties in trying 
to decide between priorities and that they needed assistance in prioritising. Part of 
the problem rested in the comparison of diverse priorities: 
51: ... Basically you are having to prioritise a lot of, sometimes, quite small requests 
and you can get something like the request for a CT scanner or something that's 
going to cost half a million or something compared against the requirement for 
another couple of secretaries in the oncology department because the system is not 
working I cos it's short of two members of staff .. And trying to make a decision, 
trying to balance those two and actually trying to say, "We can support one but not 
the other" and which one is it that actually we are going to support is very difficult 
because they're completely different things ... 
5517 also felt that it was difficult to compare priorities that concerned quality of 
life, such as in assessing the value for patients of being allowed to die at home, 
rather than in care. For 5517, it was difficult to comprehend how an economic 
evaluation could address this issue: 
5517: .. .It may be very easy to compare some of these things and certainly in relation 
to breast cancer screening and cervical cancer screening we should have some 
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evidence to support that decision-making ... but how do you compare them with the 
ones that are not so easy and it is about quality of life rather than more absolute 
health outcomes? .. 
However, there was also a clear lack of knowledge of economic evaluation among 
decision makers: 
5517: .. .I don't know whether everyone understands QALYs, that was taken as a 
given really, but, I don't know much about quality of life indicators, I wouldn't be 
able to apply it, unless there was somebody there at future meetings to explain it ... 
Even informants with some background or experience in economics mistakenly 
associated health economics with money: 
551: I think we apply economics, I don't think economics is something you 
understand, it's just part of a decision-making process, you have to have an 
economic view as to something that involves money and that sort of thing, when 
making a decision ... 
This suggests a sustained commitment to educating decision makers' in health 
economics throughout the process of decision-making would be worthwhile. 
Furthermore, it might even be worth highlighting the importance to decision 
makers of the role of health economists, given that one informant (556) felt that an 
epidemiologist was needed to assess the cost-effectiveness of services provided 
locally: 
556: ... In terms of what is the most cost-effective for the whole population .. . that's 
actually very difficult to sort out and expertise isn't there, you'd have to be an 
epidemiologist to even sort of grapple with that ... 
Several informants felt that it would be beneficial to rank priorities in order of 
importance, although there appeared to be limited scope for achieving this in the 
CG in practice. With respect to a decision about where to locate a breast clinic, 552 
felt that it would be necessary to undertake the following, which had not been done 
previously because it was a "big piece of work": 
223 
552: ... You'd look at the costs, that wouldn't be difficult to do. The benefits would 
not be utility type benefits and it wouldn't be particularly rigorous. I think the way 
we'd look at benefits would be almost a kind of impact assessment, we'd make a list 
essentially of all the ways you'd assess benefits, and it would be things like access, 
which is partly about travel and partly about ... discomfort and distress and also 
about volumes to deal with capacity ... If we were really rigorous we would score 
those criteria on one to five, where one is not terribly impressive and five is a good 
thing ... 
This comment suggests that maximising health was not the only criterion for 
decision makers, and that other factors were relevant, such as access, discomfort 
and distress for patients. 552 felt that measuring costs would not be difficult, but 
benefits would be harder to value, supporting the comments made by 5517. 
552 suggested using an "impact assessment", examining the costs and benefits of 
programmes, which would be a rigorous approach and for which practical help 
would be beneficial. This opened the potential for an economic approach to 
priority setting: 
552: ... Where we argue and we mostly work is that fluctuating amount which is 
making changes - either buying extra things or changing things. It's often said that 
if we were to discuss changes in the total budget, not just the margin, the tiny bit 
that we add or subtract, we would have more control... 
Although this comment arose after the workshop, other suggestions along the same 
lines were made before (for example, in terms of scoring priorities). From 
observation of the CG, it is likely that co-operation with other decision makers 
would be necessary in order to implement this approach. Apart from issues such 
as trust and partnership working highlighted in the previous chapter, there might 
be value in initiatives aimed at increasing knowledge of economics among decision 
makers, perhaps through workshop(s), similar to the one carried out in this study: 
552: ... The concepts that came out, that were elaborated, were not new to me. But 
they were very clearly new to others round the table. At first I thought they were 
going to dismiss a lot of it and say, "This is common sense, we know all of this", but 
I think several of them hadn't realised that there was a systematic and almost 
learned approach ... 
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559: ... There were a lot of things that I never appreciated before, about how decisions 
could be made, about setting priorities, so the whole economics part of it ... 
SS8: ... Perhaps it did raise my awareness a bit more about the frameworks within 
which you can prioritise ... 
6. Conclusion 
There was no evidence in this study of published economic evaluations being used 
to inform decision-making. Some form of priority setting did exist at the local 
level however. Option appraisal, encompassing an understanding of economic 
concepts such as scarcity and opportunity costs, was conducted. In addition, GPs 
claimed to prescribe cost-effectively (although it was not possible within the scope 
of this study to observe clinical decision-making by GPs to confirm this). 
There were three explanations for the limited role of economic evaluation locally: 
lack of relevance of studies to decisions being made; lack of ability to ration locally 
on areas important for the local level; and lack of incentives to ration care. The 
barriers mentioned in this chapter are not entirely in line with those in chapter 2. In 
the literature, lack of relevance of studies was not considered as very important, 
and there was greater emphasis on the bias and quality of economic evaluation. 
The notion that decision-making might not be achievable locally, largely because of 
national policies, has not been explored in-depth in chapter 2. Incentives to ration 
care are also vaguely considered in decision-making. 
There is little indication that the accessibility of economic evaluation (in terms of 
quality of studies and time to access studies) was a barrier to use for decision 
makers in this study, although availability of appropriate topics for the types of 
decisions being made was lacking. This does not mean that accessibility would not 
be a major barrier to the use of published economic evaluation. On the contrary, in 
this particular case, decision makers did not ever reach the issue of accessing 
published economic evaluation because of the other constraining factors, such as 
decisions being focused on the attainment of political objectives. Although one 
informant (556) stated the use of" surrogate data and assumptions" in published 
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economic evaluations had caused him concern, he said that this applied to any 
research evidence and was not based on his own experience. Again, it is likely that 
because decision makers never reached the issue of accessing economic evaluation, 
they were not concerned with the quality of studies. 
Findings of this research have implications for the work of health economists. For 
instance, it is difficult to understand how QAL Y sand QALY league tables, 
discussed in chapter 2, would have practicality at the local level. Furthermore, 
there is little to suggest that there would be any value in further refining 
methodology of economic evaluation if the objective is to encourage use of 
economic evaluation among decision makers locally. Although none of the 
respondents in the study proposed a way forward for economics (since, as 
mentioned in chapter 3 they were not aware of the focus of research) health 
economists have an important role in being able to articulate economic principles 
among decision makers, since this study found that only a proportion of decision 
makers understood economic terms and even then they did not appear to know 
how economics could be useful for priority setting. Specifically, it would be useful 
to create awareness among decision makers of the possibilities for disinvestment. 
In addition, decision makers should be given more scope to feel empowered to 
make local decisions, creating incentives to ration care. 
The following chapter explores how health economists view the use of economic 
evaluation in local decision-making. The data from the study of health economists 
are presented separately from the study of local decision makers and limited 
comparisons are made between the two groups. Data from both studies are more 
fully compared and contrasted in the discussion chapter of this thesis (chapter 7). 
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Chapter 6: Health economists' views 
This chapter investigates health economists' views about health care decision-
making and the use of economic evaluation at local and national levels. The first 
section of this chapter presents informants' views about health care decision-
making in the NHS. This is followed by an exploration of views about the use of 
economic evaluation at national and local levels, with the fourth section exploring 
the perceived barriers. Measures that health economists perceive to be important 
in increasing the use of economic evaluation in the NHS are also presented. The 
final section provides a brief conclusion to the chapter. 
As detailed in Table 6.1, informants were working, or had previously worked, at 
the locallevelxviii; had an academic profession; and/ or were members of national 
decision-making bodies, such as NICE, or priority setting forums}xx Most 
informants had more than one role; only two informants were solely academic 
health economists. The largest group of health economists consisted of those who 
were largely academic but were also members of national decision-making bodies 
or priority setting forums. Only three health economists were solely in local 
decision-making positions, working in groups such as peTs as health economists. 
All informants were senior health economists. 
Table 6.1: summary of role of health economists 
Role 
Academic 
National decision-making body/priority setting forum 
Local decision-making 
TOTAL 






\XX For confidentiality reasons, the names of these forums and their geographical locations have not been 
specified: However, in general, according to informants, the priority setting forums include representation 
from declsion makers, both from the commissioning and providing side of health care, and, in some instances, 
patients and health economists. The purpose of forums was to discuss issues around decision-making for 
difficult cases, in particular where clinicians had requested funding for a treatment not routinely prescribed in 
theNHS. 
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1. The decision-making process: II a hard question" 
This section addresses the main themes surrounding the decision-making process 
that arose from the interviews with health economists. These concern the model of 
decision-making typically assumed, notions of power, the types of decisions made, 
and national constraints. 
1.1 Stylised model of decision-making 
Most academic health economists with no previous local experience had limited 
knowledge about how decision-making operated at the local level. Although two 
informants (E2, E4) referred to the "levels" of decision-making, they seemed not to 
fully comprehend how these levels operated and affected the decisions made. 
Academic health economists felt that an amorphous group labelled" decision 
makers" within" the Pcf" (or even" decision maker" as the Pcf) was responsible 
for priority setting locally. Often they were unable to specify the roles and 
responsibilities of these decision makers, as for instance: 
~A ... Who do you think are responsible for decision-making in the NHS? 
E8: .. . [.3] Oh gosh that's a hard question. 
Most academic health economists perceived a stylised model of decision-making: 
E7: .. . Policy makers [are those] at the ultimate level or whoever is responsible for 
providing services, so in England and Wales, [it is] the Department of Health [and] 
the National Institute of Clinical Excellence ... 
E12: ... NHS decision makers includes NICE at the national level through to mainly 
peTs and possibly hospitals ... 
The representation of decision-making assumed by some health economists 
interviewed is represented in Figure 6.1: 
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They placed the DoH/Government at the top of a hierarchy, clinicians at the 
bottom, and the" decision maker" covering all (population) levels of decision-
making in between. 
E2: .. .I suppose you could argue that in the end, in a sense, the Secretary of State is 
the decision maker for pretty well everything in the health service ... 
E4: .. . Local decision makers, who are making perhaps decisions for the local area, like 
the old Health Authorities and the new peTs; people concerned with the practical 
management of health care resources in their localities ... 
1.2 Clinicians 
Although most academic health economists perceived a stylised model of decision-
making, the majority, irrespective of background, suggested there was power 
residing with clinicians (hospital doctors and GPs) for local decision-making. 
However, because of this power, they felt it was often difficult to understand how 
decisions were made: 
E3: ... The processes by which decisions are made on non-drug technologies in 
hospitals is very unclear, and is, almost certainly, made by clinicians using their 
best judgement ... 
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E7: ... My perception is that there's no standard pattern as to who determines 
decision-making ... it's maybe clinicians ... 1 think ultimately a lot of power is resting 
with clinicians .. . 
E13: ... GPs are an enormous decision-making [body}, as are individual 
consultants ... they do have a huge amount of power ... 
Some informants suggested that decisions made by clinicians could distort, or 
override, decisions previously made by higher authorities. E3 offered the example 
of individual clinicians treating coronary artery disease deciding to use a particular 
procedure, which had not been agreed by the DoH. This informant said that the 
procedure was so widely used that by the time NICE conducted their evaluation 
they could not object to the established practice. 
Three informants (E7, E8, E12) without local experience felt that clinician discretion 
over treatments was inefficient and that treatment decisions should be made at a 
"higher" level of decision-making: 
E12: ... 1 am not convinced GPs should be making ... decisions [about which 
treatments to provide} ... the broader brush questions about who you should make 
statins available to .. . those sorts of decisions 1 think really ought to be made at a 
higher level. ... 
E8: ... The hospital isn't the biscuit factory and in the biscuit factory the people who 
make the decisions are the managers and the workforce actually carry them out, but 
in the hospital, the consultants are of the workforce, but they don't listen, it's as if 
you have a biscuit factory where the workers were determining what type of biscuits 
they were going to produce and what type of production techniques they were going 
to use, and what raw materials they were going to use, and no biscuit factory could 
stay in business that way, but that's what happens in a hospital, because it's the 
people on the ground who ... make the decision about what biscuits to produce and 
what production processes to use, and we live in a world where it is very, very 
difficult to take that away from them ... 
E8' s comment, although showing awareness of clinical deciSion-making, appears to 
ignore the complexity of health care decision-making. E8 felt that ideally the 
purchaser, or the Pcf, should be responsible for deciding which services or 
treatments (not) to provide. He felt it would be more appropriate to impose service 
agreements on clinicians to ensure they were providing what was agreed and 
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nothing else. He also felt that due to the autonomy of individual clinicians in the 
system, this process was not working in practice. This is interesting because it 
suggests that the model provided in Figure 6.1 is not really the way some, such as 
E8, believed decisions are made, but the way that they would like them to be made, 
following classic rationality. 
In contrast, the majority of informants with local experience did not allude to a 
stylised model of decision-making. Both E6 and E10, for instance, referred to two 
levels of local decision-making not corresponding to Figure 6.1. Here, one level of 
decision-making involved programme groups making decisions about particular 
disease or treatment areas.XX The other level consisted of members of the PCT 
responsible for allocating financial resources between different programmes, such 
as cancer and CHD. 
1.3 Types of decisions made 
Having greater familiarity with the decision-making process, those with local 
experience were able to offer examples of decisions made at the local level. 
Decisions at the local level tended to concern the "reconfiguration" of services 
within secondary care: 
E13: ... The biggest decisions that we make are not around technologies, they're 
around individuals and labour is the really scary decisions that we make. So it is 
not, "Should a consultant provide drug X?" it's, "Should we have that 
consultant?" ... 
This point, that the majority of local decisions involved whether to employ 
additional staff, or where and how to locate care, was not referred to by any of the 
academic health economists. The latter group tended to regard local decision-
making as concerning the provision of drugs or procedures, but E13's experience is 
certainly backed up by the fieldwork reported in chapters 4 and 5 here. 
xx Based upon the description, these programme groups seem to be similar to the eG. 
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1.4 National constraints 
Similar to decision makers interviewed for this fieldwork, most informants felt that 
decision-making at the local level was being constrained by national policy: 
E6: I see the local level as being more and more constrained ... the targets ... seems to 
me to be what's driving the system. 
E3: Ohh no, hardly any decision-making is left at local level .. . [because of decisions 
made by NICE and the DoH]. 
Those with local experience felt that local decision-making was also constrained by 
other factors, such as the constant change in the organisation of the NHS, the need 
to simultaneously balance the budget and meet the targets, and the lack of financial 
resources to implement change. Informants did not comment on what they felt to 
be an appropriate basis for local level decision-making, instead focusing on what 
they believed to be the constraints in the pursuit of efficiency. 
2. Use of economic evaluation at the national level 
The main focus of the interviews with health economists was their views and 
opinions about the use of economic evaluation at the national level (involving the 
DoH and NICE) and particularly the local level. 
2.1 The DoH and NICE 
Informants perceived several outlets for economic evaluation at the national level. 
These included NICE, Health Technology Assessment (HTA) reports, NSFs, 
guidelines for the use of cost-effective prescribing, and screening 
recommendations. The consensus was that the DoH and NICE were the main 
target audiences for economic evaluation: 
E3: ... The DoH is presumably the target audience in mind ... 
E15: ... The target audience .. . is clearly likely to be a relatively small number of 
individuals ... the DoH ... 
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E2: .. .I would argue that increasingly health economic studies are being written and 
presented for fairly defined decision makers .. . NICE is a prime example of that. 
Several informants believed that NICE provides an important" audience" (E3) or 
"customer" (ES) for economic evaluation, as well as a "success story" (ES) for 
health economists. However, they also suggested that the exact extent of use of 
economic evaluation by NICE was unclear and they pointed to the ambiguous 
criteria used by NICE in their decision-making. For El, the question of how NICE 
reached their decisions was a "deep psychological question". Although these 
informants perceived that other criteria, such as burden of disease, were being used 
in NICE decision-making, they were unaware of the extent of the influence of these 
factors. One informant (E14) believed that economic evaluation was used as an 
ornament or "bauble" on the guidance (suggesting that there were other factors in 
NICE's decision-making that were more important). Furthermore, another 
informant (ES) felt that, where economic evaluation was used by NICE, the 
evidence was often part of a large trial, rendering it difficult to assess the impact of 
the economics on the decision. 
This ambiguity about the exact use of economic evaluation by NICE extended to 
the debate on the existence of a threshold cost per QALY. Some informants 
claimed that often programmes recommended by NICE exceeded the threshold 
and other programmes were rejected, even though their cost per QAL Y was lower 
than the threshold: 
E9: ... NICE operates to a sort of cost per QALY threshold of £30,000; we can debate 
it, I suppose, and they would deny it, but when you look at their appraisals, there are 
some which have gone through at above £30,000 and some which haven't gone 
through at below £30,000, so I don't think that's a threshold which is established in 
stone. 
One informant felt that NICE would be reluctant to admit to a threshold cost per 
QALY for fear of that threshold being contended: 
E3 ... IfNICE was explicit and said, "Look there's a threshold of X cost per QALY" 
and it said, "Yes" to something that's X plus Y, then by implication the other factors 
are worth Yper QALY. And that's tricky because that would then constrain NICE's 
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future decision-making because it would then mean, "Look you said yes to two 
things. One is X plus Yand the other is X plus Z" ... 
Another possible reason for not establishing a formal threshold cost per QAL Y was 
related to the questionable nature of the ultimate power of NICE's decision-
making. Some informants alluded to a power struggle between the DoH and 
NICE. These informants felt that the DoH was able to overturn NICE guidance. 
The examples given included the case of a drug, beta-interferon, prescribed for 
multiple sclerosis (MS) patients, which NICE rejected on the grounds of the cost-
effectiveness evidence, but the DoH subsequently advocated for funding: 
E4: It's quite clear that although NICE is meant to be the central Health Authority, 
the Department of Health ... effectively overturned a NICE decision on beta 
interferon .. . basically saying that although NICE had given guidelines that it 
shouldn't be used in the NHS, multiple sclerosis patients do not have options ... so it 
was an ironic situation where NICE says, "Don't do this" and actually what you see 
is a huge increase in prescriptions of beta interferon because the Department of 
Health has got involved. 
E7: NICE comes up with conclusions and they are supposedly an independent body, 
but then again their conclusions and recommendations may be overturned by the 
Department of Health, particularly when a decision is highly controversial, like beta-
interferon. 
E9: If you look at the MS scenario with NICE, whichever way it seemed to go, beta 
interferon's were not coming out as cost-effective and yet the Government, you 
could argue, shifted the goal posts to look at other ways of getting interferon into the 
prescribing setting ... 
These informants suggested that, for political reasons, the DoH could not support 
NICE's recommendation to constrain using beta-interferon. The need to avoid 
controversy and show that the DoH was a "caring body" (E7) overrode "rational" 
decision-making. In other cases, it was felt that the DoH would be inclined to use 
economic evaluation when it supported their political agenda: 
E9: .. .1 think they will use agencies like NICE ... and they will use economic 
appraisals in a manner which they choose to see fit. I remember ... a piece of work 
... which actually got sent to the Minister of State for Health, it was to do with 
[equipment], and he turned round and said, "Yes, this is interesting, but what's the 
cheapest [equipment] now?" and he seemed to miss the bottom line message, and 
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there seemed to be another agenda which he was playing out and so I think they will 
use evidence as evidence in the argument and they will use it in order to furnish 
arguments to suit themselves ... 
The use of economic evaluation by the DoH is therefore indirect (akin perhaps to 
the political model of decision-making). Evidence is used if it supports a position 
already taken. 
Despite concerns about the power of NICE in national decision-making, most 
economists viewed NICE a having a prominent position in the decision-making 
process. Thus, Figure 6.1 can be amended to include NICE as an important body in 
their own right in decision-making, although they can be influenced by the 
Government/DoH (Figure 6.2). 
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3. Use of economic evaluation at the local level 
In line with the focus of this thesis, informants' perceptions of the use of economic 
evaluation at the local level were explored. Here there were several important 
factors that emerged: the use of NICE guidance at the local level; the limited use of 
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economic evaluation locally; and alternative ways in which an economic way of 
thinking is perceived to be useful. 
3.1 Value of NICE guidance 
For the majority of informants, the main, and perhaps only, use of economic 
evaluation at the local level was perceived as being through NICE guidance. They 
felt that NICE guidance was practically mandatory, even though the guidance is 
officially regarded as recommendations. Hence they felt that local decision makers 
were obliged to follow NICE, although, in practice, one informant (E7) suggested 
that there was limited inspection of local decision makers' use of such guidance. 
This implied that, in some areas, there might be ways to avoid the guidance: 
E7: CHIxxi was supposed to ask in their inspections, "Have you been using NICE 
guidance; ifnot, why not?" but there's not been much on that ... 
Several informants were sceptical about the appropriateness of the NICE guidance 
at the local level and perceived that there was little evidence about whether the 
guidance had been useful for local decisions: 
E12: ... When they review the guidance, I don't think they review it in the sense of, 
'Well has this guidance done any good?", they review it in the sense of, "Should we 
change this guidance again?" 
Informants gave three reasons why implementation of NICE guidance might be 
problematic for local decision makers. Firstly, some informants felt that the range 
of topics covered by NICE was often restricted to new fields of medicine, rather 
than existing treatments or procedures: 
E12: There are big issues about services that NICE hasn't looked at .. . there are lots of 
gaps, things aren't covered by NICE. 
E15: ... NICE has become ... very focused on new things to the exclusion of things 
that are being done already and I am actually becoming more interested in finding 
out what are things that we know are effective and cost-effective but we are not 
xxi Commission for Health Improvement (CHI), essentially an inspectorate at the DoH level now replaced by 
the HCC (see chapter 1 for details). ' 
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doing enough of, rather than putting all our resources into evaluating every new 
thing that comes along, which may only affect a small number of patients and may 
not be contributing very much to total welfare. 
For example, E15 felt that there are many diabetic patients not being adequately 
treated at present and that national guidance would be welcomed. 
Secondly, several informants felt that implementing NICE guidance at the local 
level was often financially infeasible. For instance, E4 felt that: 
E4: .. . People often say that NICE makes pronouncements without thinking of the 
affordability in the guidance that they're giving, which is probably a fair comment. 
And at the local level it's the affordability of the guidance that is important. 
As a result, some informants with local experience believed that NICE 
recommendations were, in practice, not always implemented: 
E14: ... .If we've got sets of guidance for £3 million and we only have half a million 
pounds to increase that budget ... we are still saying, "No" to some things that 
[NICE] tells us to fund ... 
Although refusal to fund NICE drugs by the PCT was not the experience of this 
fieldwork of local decision-making, there was heated debate surrounding the 
difficulties in financing NICE guidance. None of the health economists with local 
experience discussed cases in which programmes or investments were cut back to 
be able to implement NICE guidance (which is similar to the experience of the local 
study), although it might also be a more positive financial situation. Moreover, 
these health economists were aware of the need to prioritise, although they felt that 
this might not be achieved by decision makers locally. 
Finally, one informant (E4) suggested that NICE guidance was obstructing the local 
decision-making process. He felt that because decision makers were waiting to 
receive NICE guidance, they were delaying their treatment decisions: 
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E4: The biggest impact is what people have been calling the "NICE blight". The fact 
that actually people stop doing things or don't start doing things, if they know it's 
coming from NICE ... 
There was no evidence of this occurring in the fieldwork study of local decision-
making, despite their being some cancer treatments undergoing the NICE process. 
3.2 Limited direct use 
In general, informants believed that there was limited direct use of published 
economic evaluation, other than those coming from NICE: 
E5: ... I am not sure if the people in .. ,peTs or hospitals are necessarily engaged in 
[economic evaluation] or see the relevance of it... 
The view that economic evaluation was of limited use to local decision makers was 
most strongly supported by those with local experience. E6, for instance, felt that 
hardly any evidence from economic evaluation he had provided to the local level 
had ever altered decisions eventually made: 
E6: .. .In terms of decisions altered, I think my success in the [X] years could be 
counted on the fingers of one hand, if not the fingers of one finger ... 
(From e-mail correspondence) 
Furthermore, two informants (E13, E6) believed that if they resigned from their 
positions as heath economists, they would not be replaced. In addition, E3, who 
had local decision-making experience, confirmed that he had not been replaced 
when he resigned from his position. 
However, these informants felt that the director of public health at the PCT would 
be the person most likely to be interested in economic evaluation (which resonates 
well with the findings in the previous chapter): 
E13: ... I would have to say the remainder of the board [apart from the director of 
public health] was, and remains to this day, utterly disinterested in economic 
evaluation, totally disinterested. 
238 
The reason for this was due to public health directors' exposure to health 
economics methodology during public health training: 
E6: ... The public health people I think are usually the best disposed towards health 
economICS. 
In contrast, several informants viewed clinicians as being disinterested in economic 
evaluation because it was not relevant for their individual decision-making: 
E6: .. .I think doctors are generally interested in the interests of the patients that are 
in front of them, whereas economic evaluation assumes, of course, a broad societal 
perspective ... 
E8: .. .I think producing [economic evaluation] for the benefit of [clinicians] is often 
quite a waste of time because they are not going to change ... 
E12: .. .I cannot imagine GPs would ever read economic evaluations, not to inform 
their own decisions ... 
At both levels of decision-making, PCT and clinical, around a quarter of informants 
perceived that the only way economic evaluation would be used would be in 
justifying an action or position decision makers already wanted to take: 
E14: I must say at times I am a bit nervous that [economic evaluation] is kind of a 
fur coat, to provide a justification for the answer they would have got anyway, 
rather than genuinely approaching things with an open mind. 
E6: ... At a Health Authority ... .! presented data ... and did it have any impact? I 
would say only when it agreed with what the pre-conceived views of the audience 
[were], which is not really an impact but might be about reducing uncertainty ... 
(From e-mail correspondence) 
These informants appeared to believe that clinicians were particularly likely to use 
evidence" circumspectly" to justify their spending to PCTs: 
E9: Clinicians may utilise the information if they felt that it was going to benefit 
them ... They use information circumspectly, if they want to make a business case for 
example, then they will use an evaluation, which shows that particular programme 
in a very positive light ... in trying to develop an argument for additional 
resources ... 
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E15: ... [Clinicians} attitude towards [economic evaluation} ... {has} got a load to do 
with whether they think it is going to help their argument or not and they would 
certainly use it if they thought that it would increase the chances of getting funding. 
If they thought it was going to work against them, they might discredit it or put 
more emphasis on other factors. 
This suggests a more political use of evidence as also found in the previous chapter. 
These views appear to depart more radically from those in chapter 2, where 
evidence is assumed to be used directly to make a decision. 
Almost half of the informants, from a range of backgrounds, raised issues about the 
measurement of use of economic evaluation. They believed that economic 
evaluation was often part of a wider body of evidence, so that it was difficult to 
measure use of economic evaluation: 
E8: ... We tend to produce the evidence along with other things ... 
E15: ... A lot of the studies I have been involved in were only one part of the jigsaw. 
These informants felt that it was also difficult to isolate the effect of economic 
evaluation on decisions that are made, because of chance factors, meaning that it 
might be coincidental as to whether economic evaluation is used: 
E2: There was no significant way in which [the decision] differed from what we were 
recommending ... but what I ask myself is, "Well what would have happened if we'd 
come up with the opposite conclusions?" ... 
E7: ... The problem I have with all of this is that has anyone made a decision or done 
something different because of what you've said or the economic evaluation that 
you've produced because it may just be chance, it may just be good timing, it may be 
a thousand other reasons that have coincided with the production of your economic 
evaluation and that's the really difficult thing ... 
This leaves the questions of, if published economic evaluation is not likely to be 
used, or used circumspectly, when might economics contribute to decision-
making? This is discussed in the following section. 
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3.3 Economics way of thinking: improvement in process 
and "quality" of decision-making 
Informants, tending to have local experience, felt that economics as a way of 
thinking among decision makers was of greater importance than the use of 
economic evaluation. These informants felt that an economic way of thinking 
could be used to improve the process and quality of decision-making: 
E14: .. . Economists in Health Authorities probably need to do quite a lot of stuff that 
isn't economics, to kind of get through the door and then you can kind of bring out, 
"Well this is what you should be doing in terms of making better quality decision-
making." 
E13 and E14 suggested that option appraisal or cost impact analysis was more 
useful than economic evaluation at the local level: 
E14: ... Your classic 'defining the problem, brain storming options, short listing 
them, and then kind of evaluating each of those options' ... so there are probably fairly 
major strategic issues ... 
E13: ... Very much back of the envelope things, we are not down to cost-utility 
analysis, we're talking about almost cost impact analysis, not even more 
sophisticated than that. 
In addition, one-third of informants from a range of backgrounds suggested that 
PBMA was a useful local framework for making decisions. These informants felt 
that it was important for decision makers to be able to consider their total budget, 
what programmes money is currently being spent on, and any disinvestments 
(stopping or reducing programmes) which might be used to fund new investments. 
PBMA was raised by these informants spontaneously, feeling that this would be 
where economics could play the most important role in the health service: 
E13: .. .1 would say that probably my biggest success story ever was in using PBMA 
in [a particular medical field] ... 
E6: ... My main thrust is to get more information about outcomes so we can use 
programme budgeting and marginal analysis, and to try to work in more ideas of 
allocative efficiency.(From e-mail correspondence) 
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El:[Local decision makers] need more on the range of needs and the needs 
assessment; they need their total budget figures and they need to have tools for 
helping them not just do the marginal decisions but also the total allocations. 
(Emphasis added) 
These informants further suggested that PBMA aided both the process and 
outcome of decision-making, rather than focusing solely on the outcome of 
decision-making (as in a cost-effectiveness ratio). 
4. Barriers to using economic evaluation locally 
The majority of informants appeared to be sceptical about the direct use of 
economic evaluation in local decision-making, feeling that, at most, it would be 
used to justify spending decisions to the PCT. There appeared to be three main 
reasons why this was the case: accessibility and relevance (knowledge of economic 
evaluation and economics and relevance of economic evaluation to decision-
making); the health care environment (budgetary inflexibility, political barriers, 
and perceptive of clinicians); and incentives faced by decision makers and health 
economists. These are discussed in turn. 
4.1 Accessibility and relevance 
There were two issues raised with regard to this topic: lack of knowledge of 
economic evaluation among decision makers; and lack of relevant topics addressed 
in economic evaluation. 
a) Lack of knowledge 
Approximately one third of informants felt that there was a lack of understanding 
of economic evaluation among local decision makers. One informant (E9) felt that 
health economists were partly responsible for this situation, because of their 
tendency to use jargon and overcomplicated techniques. 
E9: I wonder sometimes ifhealth economists do overcomplicate things. It doesn't 
always come across in what one might call as readily available English. When you 
start looking at some of the health economics journal articles and see the formulas 
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and the diagrams and the actual subject that's being investigated, they don't exactly 
lend themselves either to decision-making and I wonder if we need to perhaps take on 
board some of those issues and try and get the health economic bottom line message 
across. 
Furthermore, two informants (E6, £3) believed local decision makers had limited 
knowledge of economics: 
E6: ... TIrey [the Health Authority] just didn't really know what to do with me ... or 
the alternative would be to try and get [me] involved but mainly as a sort of a kindly 
accountant, "We don't want to get a Finance Officer along, you do something 
similar, don't you? Can't you cost it for us?" and what they were basically asking 
for was a budget impact thing ... and you start thinking, "Do you know the 
difference between an economist and a finance officer?" and I don't think most of 
them did, they thought they were roughly the same. 
E3: ... My experience ... was that there was no economic input other than which came 
from accountants and looked at what they told you what cost might be ... 
Similarly, some informants in the previous chapter also confused health economics 
with accounting. 
b) Lack of relevant economic evaluation 
Several informants with local experience or involvement in priority setting 
suggested that local decisions typically relate to reconfiguration of services and 
deployment of staff. These informants found that there was a lack of useful 
economic evaluation to address such decisions: 
E14: TIre lack of [economic evaluations] is a bit of a problem and the type of things 
we evaluate and publish as economists are very rarely the types of decisions we face. 
So for example, presumably what you've [is the need for1 a specialist lung cancer 
nurse, and so you go, "OK I will go and have a look for some evaluations" and there 
are none. TIre biggest decisions that we make are not around technologies, they're 
around individuals ... 11ze kind of crunch decisions are, "Do we have a specialist lung 
cancer nurse?", rather than the detailed evaluations of, Ills providing key 
counselling for that lung cancer nurse good to do?" So it's the type of decisions I 
think often have absolutely no evidence at alL .. 
E15: ... Most of the budget decisions were not about identifiable interventions, they 
were often about capital investment of a new ambulance station or the relocation of 
laundry services, modifying the pension arrangements for nurses and so on, so it 
was very hard to see how economics can playa strong part ... 
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This finding is strongly supported in the previous chapter. Two informants (El, 
E15) also felt that where economic evaluations existed they tended to be performed 
for the general setting and it was difficult to translate them to the local situation. 
4.2 Health care environment 
The majority of informants, irrespective of their background, mentioned barriers 
related to the health care environment. These barriers relate to budgetary silos, the 
political context, and (differing) perspectives among local decision makers. 
a) Budgetary "silos" 
More than half of the informants felt that the need for local decision makers to keep 
health care expenditure within their budget was a hindrance to the use of economic 
evaluation: 
E4: Tire major problem appears to be that the decision makers are fundamentally 
responsible for budgets. T1zey are not fundamentally responsible for the health gain 
of tlreir population ... 
E9: ... People do not look outside of their own budgetary boundaries and decisions are 
made within tlwse rather than looking at the implications of some of those decisions 
as budgetary holders. 
E6: .. . Managers, especially in hospital, only care about their own budgets (which 
might not even include the drugs budget (or alternatively might solely be confined to 
tire drugs budget!» and are only really interested in gross budget impact in the next 
year or two ... 
(From e-mail correspondence) 
E4 added that the chief executive of the Trust in his region was effectively sacked 
because of an overspent budget, and no thought was given as to how the money 
was spent or whether it improved the health of the population. 
These informants also felt that whether recommendations from economic 
evaluations saved money in the future was irrelevant to local decision makers 
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because they were not allowed to overspend in the current period and could not 
transfer money between budgets: 
E2: The health economist constructs seem very unreal to decision makers. We 
assume that essentially you could move costs over time and provided you discount 
them then it doesn't matter what year they occur in, how you treat them as seen in a 
present value. But, those decision makers say, "Well it's not like that, we haven't 
got any more money this year" ... 
E13: [The intervention] ... was incredibly cost-effective, it was cost saving, it was 
the totally preferred option, but we could not get the Trust to agree to implement 
that change because it involved employing another member of staff ... The bottom line 
is affordability and it's not even affordability over a period of time when you would 
look and say, "Well you would save that salary within 6 months", it's budget 
specific .. . because everyone's accountability are under their budget headings. 
E13 went on to offer an example of where budgetary silos had meant that a 
"rational" approach could not be used: 
E13: ... You hear things about low molecular weight heparins, great for the patients, 
they have less side effects, they don't have continual injections, they don't have to 
have their blood checked on an ongoing basis, but the benefits, the reduction in the 
cost of blood tests are borne by the labs and the increased costs of low molecular 
weight heparins over ordinary heparin is born by pharmacy, and never the twain 
shall meet. 
E13 felt that the main driver in local decision-making was affordability within 
budgets. Again, this meant that, even if an economic evaluation proved an overall 
cost saving, it might not be used because of a discrepancy between the groups who 
saved money and those who lost as a result of implementation of the study. 
According to one informant (E6), there was an additional complexity: costs were 
fixed in the short run, which meant that tangible savings could not be made 
immediately from implementing an economic evaluation. In the short run, the 
costs of a Trust were seen as almost invariant to the number of patients seen. 
E6: 70% of NHS costs are staff costs so if you stop some type of elective surgery and 
switch it to day cases, if you look at the accounting figures they'll say, "Inpatient 
operation costs, £1000, day case costs, £SOD" so you'll be like, "Brilliant, we've 
switched 100 patients, that's £SO,OOO to play with so we can invest that in a new 
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community physio seroice or something like that." But how real are the savings? So 
you've stopped doing something in inpatients and switched it to day cases, so, how 
have you actually saved £500 per case because all the surgeons are still there, all the 
nurses are still there, all the pharmacists are still there, they're all fixed costs 
basically. 
b) Political context 
Almost half of the informants, from a range of backgrounds, felt that national 
targets and directives were a major cause of local decision makers' lack of use of 
economic evaluation: 
E6: ... 1 think there are so many targets, so many commitments made at national 
level, which then have to be delivered at local level. .. Locallevel now seems to me 
just to be about implementing what Milburn or John Reed has thought and dreamed 
up and made a commitment to, rather than local decision-making. So I see the local 
level as being more and more constrained and less and less able to respond to 
economic data ... 
Informants suggested that because of the targets there were few local decisions to 
be made and hence minimal opportunities to use economic evaluation: 
E4: ... Everyone agrees that maximising health is a good thing, but that we have 
certain performance targets which tend to be process based rather than health 
outcome based ... 
E5: What it's doing is distorting priorities in the sense that to deal with the access, if 
you define it in terms of waiting lists, it's a problem with hospitals. What we're 
doing is pumping more resources into hospitals, which seems to be against all the 
notions of primary care led health seroices ... All that's qualitative and wishy-washy 
so it just gets brushed under the carpet, but actually that might be where some of the 
health gains are to be had. 
E6: .. .It seems to be quite a different world from the one I lived in 10 years ago when 
you could sit around and think, "What should we invest in? Shall we invest in 
here, or shall we invest in over there?" 
c) Perspectives 
Several informants felt that the perspective of decision makers was in conflict with 
the perspective adopted in economic evaluation. These informants felt that 
clinicians tended to assume an individual or patient perspective: 
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E8: I do think you have got the ethical conflict between the individualistic ethic in 
the doctor-patient relationship and the health care ethics at the higher level, where 
your duty is to the population rather than to an individual. 
E8: I have a lot of sympathy, even for the clinidans who often say to me, "Yeah 
that's very, very good what you just explained to us, but when this class is finished 
you're going back to your desk but I have to go and look patients in the eye and say, 
'I am trading changing the way that I am treating, because of economics'" and I 
accept that totally ... r don't have to look the patients in the eye and say, "Yes there is 
something available but your peT is not going to pay for it", or "I am the guy at the 
peT who made the dedsion at the peT", which is worse. 
Furthermore, three informants (E10, E5, E4) felt that local decision makers might 
feel uncomfortable with using outcome measures commonly used in economic 
evaluation (such as QALYs) because they relate to population averages: 
E4: ... QAL Y analysis ... is very relevant to the individual. It's less clear once you 
add in the cost, because of course the costs aren't relevant to the individual, but they 
are relevant overall. So we are interested in what essentially are the differences 
between individual and sodetal dedsion-making. 
Three informants (E12, E14, E15) suggested that factors beside efficiency, such as 
equity, were relevant in local decision-making and could compete with the use of 
economic evaluation: 
E12: ... There are some barriers [to using economic evaluation] which, you might say, 
are legitimate ... they are competing objectives .. .like equity and health and access ... 
Few informants however expanded on this issue, although one (E15) suggested that 
economic evaluation would be disregarded if there were a lack of alternative 
treatments available: 
E15: ... Tltere are patients who have got some problem or disease that is very difficult 
to treat and there is no alternative to tltis, so even though it might be expensive, if 
you don't do tltis you can't do anything for them ... 
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4.3 Lack of incentives 
The third category of barriers to using economic evaluation is the incentives or 
motivations for local decision makers to use the research, as well as the incentives 
for health economists to produce utilisable work. 
a) Incentives for decision makers 
There were three general factors identified which affected the incentives of decision 
makers to use economic evaluation. These related to the political environment, 
organisational change, and the negative perception among the public of using costs 
in decision-making. 
Politics: "stick their heads in the sand" 
NHS decision-making appeared to be conducted in a political environment, which 
made changing practice less likely: 
£13: .. .1 think it's incredibly difficult to effect change because you're not dealing 
with anything in isolation, every change that you're proposing has a political angle, 
it has an equity angle ... ifyou change the benefit of one group within the NHS, the 
other groups are up in arms, and it's not even just medics versus nurses, it's one 
type if medic versus another type of medic. These types of barrier to change are 
huge ... 
E6: ... People who feel themselves to be under siege react in one of two ways. They 
can grasp Iwld of something like economics and hang on to it like a drowning man. 
Alternatively they can close ranks, arguably stick their heads in the sand, and hope 
it will all go away. 
(From e-mail correspondence) 
Informants with local experience therefore felt that decision makers faced a set of 
conflicting demands, which made the use of economic evaluation less likely. 
Organisational change 
Two informants (E9, E14) felt that organisational change hindered the use of 
economic evaluation because there was ambiguity as to who was responsible for 
decision-making and hence the use of such techniques: 
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E9: ... 1 think that we are in such a changing environment in the UK that it's going 
to take time for these bodies to get on board with some of these techniques and what 
the consequences of economic evaluations are ... 
E15: ... The whole change of structure involving peTs makes it very hard to know 
who actually is making decisions and the reason why the priorities forum 
approach ... has, for the moment, collapsed is because it's not clear if the health 
authorities are not making these decisions or having these discussions, who else is? 
Difficulty in knowing who were making decisions implied that it was difficult to 
appropriately target economic evaluation. 
"Bad press that anything to do with costs and economics" 
Only one informant (E8) felt that decision makers might be reluctant to use 
economic evaluation because of the public perception that decisions are concerned 
with money: 
E8: ... We the economists can say, "That's fine, here is the evidence - A has a huge 
leER over B cannot be justified." They then translate that into policy or put 
pressure on our [Health Authority boards], then the press gets onto it and says, 
"What do you mean you're giving second best treatment and even the MPs say, 
" .. .I am sure there is something you can do in their case to see that they get the 
best?" ... We as the academics don't have to take the flack, but they, the politicians 
and the others, have to stand up in front of TV cameras and public meetings and 
defend what they're doing ... The headlines of the newspapers is just going to be the 
sound bite, "You're trying to save money by refusing to pay for the best 
treatments." If you're the poor sod whose name and photograph is going to be there, 
then maybe you want to ignore the economist and go for the easy option. 
b) Incentives for health economists 
Two informants (El, E13) commented that health economists produce economic 
evaluations largely with their own careers in mind, rather than to affect local 
decision-making: 
El: 1 think [economic evaluations are] aimed at getting something published on the 
whole. They're aimed at getting a career for a health economist. 
E13 ... Most of them are written up for other economists, that's the honest answer ... 
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Both these health economists were engaged in local decision-making and were thus 
aware of the limitations of published economic evaluations for the purpose of 
decision-making. 
5. Measures to increase the use of economic evaluation 
Most informants spontaneously discussed ways in which they believed the use of 
economic evaluation could be facilitated at the local level. There were two main 
measures that informants suggested: increasing the accessibility of economic 
evaluation; and interdisciplinary working. 
5.1 Increasing the acceSSibility of economic evaluation 
Around a third of informants, from a range of backgrounds, felt that increasing the 
accessibility of economic evaluation would enable greater use at the local level. 
Some of these informants suggested that increasing decision makers' knowledge 
and understanding of economic evaluation could increase accessibility. However, 
two informants with local experience (E6, E13) felt that decision makers needed 
training in the principles of health economics (incorporating concepts such as 
opportunity cost): 
E6: .. . One of my hypotheses is that decision makers often do not realise the implicit 
value judgements in their decisions. For example, IIWe have this drug, there's 
nothing else we can do. II This ignores the opportunity cost which means someone 
somewJrere is getting less Jrealth gain than they otherwise would have done ... 
(From e-mail correspondence) 
E13: He fa health economist] started his talk by saying that you have to have a 
whole day discussion with clinicians to explain to them welfare economics, and I put 
my hand up and said, IIThat is complete rubbish, what you need to say to them is, 'If 
you have a limited amount of money and you want to do one thing then you can't do 
something else. "' And he was really taken aback by this ... but I said, III've done this, 
this is my job." People don't have a day to go away and learn about paradoxes and 
all t/rese other things ... 
As practical help, two informants (El, E6) felt that decision makers should be 
provided with a testable model, containing a structure of an economic evaluation 
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into which local data could be incorporated, to work with under different 
circumstances and incorporate their own local data into the analysis. 
5.2 Interdisciplinary working 
Interdisciplinary working between health economists and decision makers was 
mentioned by around a quarter of informants, from a range of backgrounds, as a 
way of increasing the use of economic evaluation. Informants suggested that 
health economists should not expect their work to be used if they are not actively 
engaged with local decision makers: 
E13: VVhat would be nice would be an engagement with decision makers and I think 
that these need to include everyone from CPs to chief executives of organisations and 
I suppose my problem with the way economic evaluation goes is that there seems to 
be a view that you can be an academic economist sitting in a unit writing paper on 
health economics and somehow that influences decision makers ... 
Two informants (E5, E10) felt that local champions (decision makers who are 
willing to promote and encourage an economic basis of decision-making within 
their organisation) were required to promote the use of PBMA: 
E5: The biggest thing though is that these things need local champions who are 
willing to lead the process through and they need to be people who actually are 
within the organisation. We can do so much and have a continuous involvement as 
academics, with our local environment, and they are great test beds for us, but ifit's 
never adopted by the organisations as such, then it will never take off ... 
Those with local experience perceived health economists and decision makers as 
two polar opposites with little access to each other's worlds. They believed it was 
necessary to create a bridge between health economists and decision makers' 
worlds in order to sustain the use of economics as a way of thinking in local 
decision-making: 
E6: ... The more valuable contribution is to change the way people think about 
things .. . Whenever I bump into an ex-student for the first time I always ask whether 
tlzey have used any of the things from the econ toolbox. Invariably the answer is the 
same: "No, but the way of thinking about things, in terms of opportunity costs, for 
example, is still very useful and something I use on a day-to-day basis." So is that 
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impact? Probably not in terms of converted decisions but in terms of slow 
"colonization" of the NHS it makes a bit of difference ... 
(From e-mail correspondence) 
(Emphasis added) 
E14: ... Our role is not only to do primary evaluations and analysis but is around 
providing that bridge: if you characterise economics as one world and the NHS as 
another, then actually providing that interpretative bridge between the two is 
actually quite a lot of our role as welL .. 
(Emphasis added) 
This recognises the limitations of assuming that economic evaluation can directly 
influence decision-making, but highlights the potential importance of economics in 
decision-making. 
6. Conclusion 
Health economists, particularly those without local experience, appeared to view 
decision-making at the local level according to a stylised model, where the 
Government is the prime decision maker making national decisions, the local level 
comprises the PCI' making local population decisions, with clinicians making 
patient level decisions. This view strongly opposes that presented in chapter 4 of 
this thesis, where levels of decision-making were not so distinct, and where 
clinicians are heavily involved in making decisions at the population level. 
However, the findings here do support those from the local decision-making 
fieldwork regarding the strong emphasis on Government policy, through the 
targets for instance, currently in the NHS. Since neither decision makers nor health 
economists appear to support such initiatives, the question of who champions these 
targets remains. 
This chapter has reiterated the potentially limited use of economic evaluation at the 
local level found in the previous chapter. Health economists' views about the 
barriers to using economic evaluation at the local level appear to reflect, to some 
extent, the barriers discussed in chapter 2, in terms of, for instance, lack of 
knowledge of economic evaluation, budgetary inflexibility, and the political 
context. Among health economists with local experience, however, there was 
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confirmation of the fieldwork conducted here regarding the types of decisions 
made locally, in terms of them being largely related to reconfiguration of services, 
which, in tum affected the applicability of typical economic evaluations. In general 
though, the barriers referred to by health economists interviewed here do not 
resonate well with those found in the previous chapter where there is more focus 
on the decision-making process and context. 
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Chapter 7: Use of economic evaluation - the decision-
making perspective 
Introduction 
This chapter explores the main findings of this thesis in the light of other relevant 
research. The chapter is divided into six sections. The first section compares and 
contrasts views and opinions of decision makers and health economists about local 
health care decision-making. This section further examines findings in relation to 
the organisational and decision-making models described in chapter 1. The second 
section discusses the focus of this thesis: the use of economic evaluation; barriers to 
use; and incentives for greater use. These are discussed in light of the views of 
decision makers and health economists, and in relation to the literature presented 
in chapter 2. The findings have important implications for health care priority 
setting and the work undertaken by health economists, explored in the third section 
of this chapter. The fourth section evaluates the methodology and methods 
employed, and there are suggestions on methodology for researchers wishing to 
conduct any future work in this area in the fifth section. The final section of this 
chapter provides a brief conclusion to this thesis. 
1. Local health care decision-making 
Chapter 1 presented the context of local decision-making, which is important for 
the use of economic evaluation. This section reviews the context of local decision-
making in view of the findings of the fieldwork, suggesting that there are four 
fundamental aspects of decision-making, which to a large extent limit the 
assumptions typically made by health economists. These factors have important 
implications for the targeting of economic evaluation. 
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The four aspects, discussed in tum, are: 
o The role of complex network models of organisation (in comparison to the 
hierarchy typically assumed by health economists and the stylised model of 
decision-making assumed by health economists interviewed); 
o The lack of societal perspective (meaning that those regarded as being 
responsible for priority setting may not have a societal perspective even 
when they are involved in population decision-making); 
o The different incentives and motivations of decision makers (meaning that 
there is not a single decision maker and individual rationality does not 
amount to collective rationality); 
o The breakdown of the principal-agent relationship between the PCT and the 
CG (so that those typically regarded as being responsible for societal 
decision-making are unaware of how decisions below them have been 
made). 
Although these aspects appear to be quite diverse, they collectively suggest that the 
levels of decision-making are less distinct than is typically assumed by health 
economists and that societal decision-making, often taken for granted in health 
economics, may not be a major focus of decision-making. These arguments are 
further developed in the conclusion to this section. 
1.1) Complex networks versus clear structure of decision-
making 
As indicated in chapter I, there are two types of network models: wheel (hub and 
spokes system)22 or all channel22• In the former, there are a series of networks 
controlled by a single unit, whereas in the latter there is no clear hierarchy and all 
bodies are connected to one another in the organisation. In this research, 
Williamson's hub and spokes model22 is an appropriate description of formal 
decision-making locally and several informants also used the term "hub and 
spokes". There were two possible areas where the hub and spokes model would 
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apply. Firstly, the CG and other such groups (such as those for CHD and mental 
health) had a common hub, the PCT. Secondly, there was a wider network, 
operating between the CG, the PCT, the SHA, the cancer network, and all other 
clinical bodies within health care decision-making. Here the hub was the cancer 
network, which set the central direction for cancer services. 
There also appeared to be a network organisation within the CG. Going back to 
Knoke and Kuklinkski'S21 definition of networks, the "persons" were those at the 
CG, the" object" was decision-making in cancer care, and the" events" were the 
decision-making of the CG: 
A specific type of relation linking a defined set of persons, objects or events ... called the 
actors or nodes. These elements possess some attribute(s) that identify them as members of 
tlte same equivalence class ... 
(Knoke and Kuklinkski, p.17521) 
Within the CG, there were many different individuals from various groups, all 
linked together through a common focus on cancer care but without any clear 
hierarchy, suggesting an all channel organisation. 
The various forms of network organisation in health care are not typically 
recognised by health economists; those interviewed tended to assume that the only 
organisational structure was the hierarchical model. Health economists 
interviewed tended to view local decision-making as essentially about the delivery 
of national policy, implying that the organisation of health care featured the 
Government at the top of the hierarchy (as depicted by figures 6.1 and 6.2). It is 
important, however, for health economists to acknowledge the network 
organisation of care beneath the PCT level, since it reveals how disparate groups 
interact and have influence on the PCT, having implications for the targeting of 
economic evaluation. Thus, the PCT might not be the only appropriate body to 
target economic evaluations towards, since there is another level of decision-
making, comprising several layers of individuals from various backgrounds who 
may strongly influence decision-making. 
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Only the new institutional economists have considered network relationships,21,22 
although there has been a focus on transactions costs, rather than aspects of co-
operation and partnership working,25 which is not particularly helpful in 
understanding these organisations. The other typical models of organisation 
considered by health economists in the literature, (the hierarchy and market 
models), are not appropriate explanations of the organisation of local health care. 
In the literature, it has been suggested that the hierarchy model dominates the 
organisation of health care and there are specific identifiable periods where 
different models were appropriate in health care.9 However, in this study of local 
decision-making, although there was an overall hierarchical structure and many 
decisions were based on national policy, this model is inadequate in explaining 
how health care is organised locally and the relationships between decision makers. 
Similarly, the market delivery of health care was not found to be an important 
organisational feature in the study of local decision makers. 
These findings imply that health economists, in general, are not aware of the basic 
structure of the local health care organisation. It is unclear how a body such as the 
CG, comprising individuals from different decision-making levels, would fit into 
health economists' notions of decision-making. 
1.2) Other objectives versus societal objectives 
In the literature and in this study, "decision maker" is a term used by health 
economists to describe individuals perceived as having a societal role. Health 
economists interviewed tended to view a decision maker as being responsible for 
priority setting. However, the local study found that individuals taking the role of 
"decision maker" do not necessarily have a societal perspective and might not be 
focused on maximising the health of their population, as assumed by health 
economists. Decisions did not appear to be based on a health maximisation 
principle. During the fieldwork, the CG, who was largely responsible for priority 
setting in cancer care, did not discuss what might be best for the health of local 
citizens. Most decisions were not related to health outcomes but were intended to 
257 
achieve national targets and provide an accessible and equitable service. For 
instance: 
510: Everyone should have the same sort of level of care and deserve the same access 
to health care. 
Although this is from a societal perspective, it is not necessarily related to health 
maximisation. 
Furthermore, other local decision-making bodies did not conform wholly to the 
economists' view of a societal basis. Although 1/ the PCT" is typically viewed in the 
literature as a single united body responsible for societal decision-making locally, 
the per here comprised both the executive or board level functions along with 
groups such as the CG acting as its agents in developing policy and making 
decisions. The notional responsibility for decision-making was in practice diffuse 
so that clinicians (hospital doctors and GPs) who are usually regarded as being 
confined to a separate clinical decision-making level by health economists, here 
were part of the process of population decision-making. Those with clinical roles 
participating in groups such as the CG were found to have a clear impact on the 
decisions that were made and, of course, brought with them to this role their 
perspective of focusing on the individual patient or patient group. Health 
economists who were interviewed did not, however, see this involvement of 
clinicians in societal decision-making. There was an implicit understanding among 
health economists that clinicians were hugely powerful and that they could 
circumvent societal decision-making but there was less realisation that clinicians 
are actually part of the decision-making process. Previous work, on the use of 
economic evaluation in decision-making has also focused on the HA/PCT level, 
and where clinicians have been involved in studies, they are treated as a separate 
entity, in their patient-doctor decision-making, with little/no acknowledgement of 
their societal role.232. 233, 247 
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The local study therefore suggests that decision-making in health care cannot be 
viewed as comprising separate and distinct levels, with a clear role for societal 
decision-making. Previous studies have not been conducted using methods that 
would be likely to observe such findings. Although Coastl20 showed how decisions 
are often reinterpreted at various levels of deciSion-making, her work did not focus 
upon the extent to which the initial decision-making (both formal and informal) 
involves a variety of actors from the different levels of decision-making. The work 
of Jones119 hints at this problem, by noting that decision makers are confused about 
whether to act from an individual perspective or from the perspective of their 
organisation but, again, the interaction between the levels of decision-making is 
unclear. 
1.3) Different incentives and motivations of individuals 
versus unity of purpose 
Apart from the assumptions of a clear hierarchical structure and clear societal 
objectives being pursued, health economists also tend to assume that there is classic 
rationality in decision-making (as the basis of neo-classical economics which most 
health economics is theoretically dependent upon). Classic rationality assumes that 
there is unity of purpose among decision makers. However, there is, albeit limited, 
evidence that decision-making at the local level might involve pluralistic 
bargaining, incremental decision-making, and also garbage can approaches, which 
conflict with classic rationality. 
This local study found that the pluralistic model is applicable to decision-making at 
the local level, where there are different incentives facing usually rational 
individuals. The fieldwork has found a collection of individuals with a multitude 
of objectives, incorporating different levels of decision-making. Within the CG, 
each individual can be seen as being 'rational', having their own clear objectives 
and competing for a limited 'pot' of money held notionally by the PCT: 




56: No that's very naive. It's about distribution of money. 
The different motivations and incentives of CG members influenced the informal 
decision-making, as did the relative power of these individuals within the group. 
In particular, clinicians are powerful individuals in a societal decision-making 
body, both because of their role in treating patients and their greater level of 
expertise in oncology. Bargaining took place between clinicians (including GPs) 
and PCI members attending the group (52, 55), with those with clinical power 
often seeming to be able to dictate the choices made by the CG: 
52: ... There was a very veiled threat from the paediatrician that if we tried to stop the 
service, the public would be very cross. 
Thus the individual rationalities of those involved in the process did not amount to 
a collective rationality, let alone to a specific objective of acting on behalf of society 
to maximise the health of the local population. There was no process here by which 
a collective rationality could be facilitated, as was recognised by one informant: 
52: ... What we should be spending our valuable time .. .in doing is talking to each 
other about how to make the best of what we have got ... 
52: .. .I'd like to say [the decisions] were all done on a rational basis that we had at the 
beginning done a gap analysis, that is knew where we wanted to get to, knew where 
we were at tlze time, that we had calculated the gap and then we had made rational 
choices between different options of getting there ... 
As discussion revealed (particularly at the workshop), a local strategy could not be 
agreed upon because decision makers found it difficult to discuss priorities from a 
societal perspective and were protective of their own interest groups. 
1.4) Perfect agency versus breakdown of principal-agency 
So far there has been a distinction between decision makers' and health economists' 
perceptions of local decision-making. However, this section also reveals a 
difference in views and opinions among PCT informants and those in the eG. This 
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is an important finding because it suggests that solely examining Per/senior 
informants' views of decision-making is unlikely to offer an accurate description of 
decision-making or the use of economic evaluation. 
In the local study, per informants assumed that local decision-making operated 
according to a formal process, where individual motivations and incentives are 
ignored and there is a focus on organisational concerns. per informants perceived 
a clear principal-agency relationship, between the per and the groups, such as the 
CG (where the per was the principal and groups such as the CG were the agents), 
with specific objectives being pursued by both principal and agent. Although there 
was acknowledgement of a two-way process between these groups and the per, it 
was assumed that this worked well. In particular, PCf informants felt that group 
members should be, and were, advising the per about where to allocate resources. 
In this respect, they believed it was the group's role to act as their agent and inform 
them about where they should be investing and disinvesting based on a strategy. 
However, the fieldwork suggested that it was not at all clear that the CG at least 
was acting in this way, as they did not have a clear plan of what they should and 
should not invest in. Furthermore, some informants were adamant that priority 
setting was not part of their role: 
SS8: .. .It's not my job, it's not what I am employed to do ... 
As suggested in the previous section, it appeared that it was difficult for some CG 
informants to take a population perspective, even when sitting on a body that was 
meant to take a societal view. Indeed, this even applied to the chair of the CG, who 
was sometimes influenced by the emotional pleas of CG members. The PCf tended 
to view the CG decision-making process as being rational, and informed by 
evidence, although this was not how the CG were operating in practice. Whilst 
per informants were aware of the organisational difficulties in decision-making, 
shaped by their position in the organisation, they were not aware specifically of the 
problems faced by groups such as the CG. Their lack of understanding of the 
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informal process revealed that they were not entirely sure how the decisions that 
reached them had been made in practice. 
Although there were some references to agency relationships among the health 
economists interviewed, these agency relationships were largely perceived as being 
between the local (PCf) level and the national or SHA level. The notion of agency 
between those lower down in the decision-making process and the PCf was not 
recognised by health economists, as it was largely assumed that the PCf is the 
main decision-making body. There is an implicit assumption among health 
economists interviewed that the PCf are making societal decisions, with little 
recognition of the information feeding into their decision-making. Furthermore, 
although the literature has discussed principal-agency in health care, the focus has 
been on whether this achieves efficiency, and the appropriate role for the 
Government.17 Principal-agency at a local level has only been covered in depth by 
one study,226 finding that there was a weak link between the principal-agent chain 
of commissioning, which often led to non-compliance with decisions. 
Another area of principal-agency relationship that appears to be important from 
the fieldwork, but has not been covered in any great detail in the health economics 
literature, is trust. It is often assumed that the principal cannot trust their agents, 
and thus must devise contracts to ensure their co-operation, but as this study 
revealed, there was also mistrust by agents of their principal. In the local study, 
some clinicians (hospital doctors and GPs) felt that the PCT might be taking a 
proportion of the budget even before it is allocated in order to cover their deficit. 
Although previous studies on the use of economic evaluation have recognised the 
low-trust relationships that are common in the NHS,48 they have not reflected upon 
the implications for decision-making in any great depth, as here where lack of trust 
is likely to lead to a breakdown in principal-agency relationships (where agents do 
not trust that their principal is acting fairly and the principal does not trust the 
arguments being put forward for funding proposals, meaning that neither feel that 
they are basing their decisions on 'perfect information'). Other studies have also 
sought to examine trust largely in relation to contracts in service provision.66 The 
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notion of trust was not mentioned by any of the PCT informants interviewed, 
because they assumed that partnership working was being achieved. Likewise, 
health economists interviewed did not refer to issues of trust and it is missing from 
neo-classical economic theory, which is unsurprising given that social relationships 
are largely ignored. 
Summary 
The study of local decision-making found that pluralism is of importance in 
understanding local decision-making. Individuals were guided by their own 
rationality, but this did not amount to rationality being pursued by the CG as 
agents of the PCT. The garbage can model of decision-making has been applied at 
the locallevel119 but there was little evidence to support this here since, 
individually, decision makers appeared to behave rationally. Furthermore, the 
garbage can model ignores individuals' attempts to make the process more rational 
as was certainly desired by some informants. Incrementalism can be applied to 
some aspects of decision-making by the CG, in terms of them making decisions 
based on what had been agreed to be funded previously, but, again, this model 
does not reflect most of the decision-making that took place locally. Pluralism 
seems to best represent the nature of decision-making, with decisions being the 
product of bargaining between individuals pursuing their own rational ends. 
Although classic rationality is of limited relevance since there was not one decision 
maker operating in a clear decision-making environment with an obvious decision 
to make, adaptations to rationality, notably game rationality, are important for 
understanding some aspects of decision-making in health care at the local level. . 
For instance, as to why a priority for breast cancer treatment was included in the 
funding list to the PCT, the chair of the CG replied: 
552: ... Because the lead clinician is the person who runs the breast clinic and she 
would be very upset if we didn't have it in ... 
The chair knew that the priority would not be accepted by the PCT (since he was 
not really planning to advance it further), but including it in the list was a means of 
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pacifying the clinician and maintaining the social relationships that were vital to 
the working of the group. 
To summarise these findings: at the local level, the network model of decision-
making, without a clear hierarchy, was present. There were different actors, with 
clinicians having a role as part of the populationj societal decision-making. This 
study implies that the levels of decision-making cannot be so clearly characterised, 
as is typically understood by health economists, who assume distinct levels of 
decision-making, more in line with formal decision-making, but not even 
recognising a two-way process. In some respects, PCT informant's views may be 
similar to health economists, in assuming classic rationality. This study has further 
shown how the PCT is not necessarily aware of how decisions that reach them have 
been made. These findings suggest that health economists' view of the 
organisation of local decision-making is too simplistic and that, to enhance 
understanding they need to develop broader models of decision-making. In 
particular, conducting studies that focus only on the per level, without exploring 
groups feeding into this level, are likely to offer limited understanding of decision-
making in practice. 
Thus, the organisational structure and process of decision-making is of great 
importance to understanding the behaviour of individual decision makers, which 
inevitably affects their use of economic evaluation. These have largely been 
ignored in the literature on use of economic evaluation. The next section focuses on 
the findings in this fieldwork on the use of economic evaluation, where, again, 
contrasts are made between the views and opinions of health economists and 
decision makers, particularly those situated within the CG. 
2. Use of economic evaluation 
The local study found no instances where decision makers used economic 
evaluation to inform or make decisions. Although option appraisal was performed 
for some services by the Trust, these were by no means economic evaluation and 
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did not incorporate benefit measures common to health economists, as also found 
by McDonald.48 The majority of informants, however, did understand basic 
concepts of economics, such as scarcity, opportunity cost, and efficiency, although 
they were not applied in any systematic way and they did not appear to be always 
at the forefront of decision makers' minds (since the concepts tended to come to 
light only when probing questions were asked following the workshop). 
Efficiency was an important criterion according to some informants in making 
improvements in the future to the way that services are delivered. However, this 
term, as with the term 1/ cost effective", was used in a rather colloquial way to mean 
something 1/ good", rather than in the way typically understood by health 
economists. These findings imply that economics is only ever likely to be used 
indirectly, as in the enlightenment model of research utilisation,148 whereby 
knowledge penetrates into individuals' ways of thinking over time. Findings, 
therefore, that economics is mostly likely to be used indirectly contrasts with health 
economist's assumptions of economic evaluation being used directly to make a 
decision.298 Interestingly, the assumption that economic evaluation will be used 
directly was not the opinion in general of health economists interviewed, who 
believed that such evidence might be used by decision makers as political 
ammunition to support decisions they wanted to make. Since economic evaluation 
was not used in the fieldwork, it was not possible to test this assumption, although 
some decision makers suggested that they would use research evidence to support 
their funding proposals. 
There are three explanations for the limited role of economic evaluation in decision-
making. These factors, discussed below, were not considered before the research 
began. In addition, PCT informants were unaware of these barriers to using 
economic evaluation, feeling that groups feeding into them, such as the CG, were 
using such evidence already. 
2.1) Lack of clear societal decision-making 
Health economists tend to assume that there is a clear decision-making setting, 
with identifiable decision makers, all interested in maximising the health of their 
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local population. As the previous section suggested however, this was not the 
case. Decision makers did not necessarily have a societal role and often had 
differing incentives, which meant that a clear objective was not being pursued, 
even within a societal decision-making group such as the CG. As a result it is 
difficult to know how economic evaluation could be used: 
52: This is possibly why rational techniques, like health economic approaches, don't 
take hold. There isn't enough stability in the system to allow custom and practice to 
include deeply rational approaches like health economics. 
Here, the garbage can analogy may be more appropriate. In the garbage can 
modeF5, problems, solutions, participants, and choice opportunities are thrown 
together, and it would be purely by chance whether economic evaluation entered 
into the decision-making process or not. Considering the fieldwork however, it 
seems that neither problems (largely managerial), solutions, participants (each with 
their own objectives) or choice opportunities (the nature of decisions relating 
mostly to the employment of staff) supported the use of economic evaluation. 
Although a wide range of barriers at the organisational and decision-making level 
have been suggested in the literature on use of economic evaluation, it has not 
previously been found that the lack of a societal perspective means that economic 
evaluation would not be used directly. The literature on the use of economic 
evaluation suggests that those in clinical roles may not take a population 
perspective4, but it is assumed that other groups do have this perspective.4 In 
addition, health economists interviewed tended to assume that the PCT is the local 
societal decision maker, without being aware of other 'societal' groups. 
2.2) No relevant studies 
Findings from the local study revealed that the topics typically addressed in 
economic evaluation did not concern the type of decisions being made. Most 
decisions were about the reconfiguration of services: 
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51: ... We are talking about the need for more nurses, the need for specialist nurses, 
and things like chemotherapy, the need for new pieces of kit .. . 
In contrast, economic evaluation tends to evaluate specific treatments. As a result, 
it was apparent that the applicability of economic evaluation was limited, as 
observed during the CG meetings and mentioned by one informant: 
52: [Economic evaluations] are not available and it is difficult to translate crude 
questions ... 
52: If I can say this, studies do not apply ... 
This was also recognised by health economists with local experience who were 
interviewed, although academic health economists did not mention this as a barrier 
and felt that most decisions in the NHS concerned treatments. Although lack of 
relevant economic evaluation has previously been identified as a barrier in the 
literature on the use of economic evaluation, it was difficult to interpret what this 
meant since some studies suggested that data were not generalisable,230, 235, 243 
rather than they were irrelevant. This is likely to be the case since most studies did 
not explore the decision-making context and in some studies, barriers to the use of 
economic evaluation were presented on a list, with little scope for decision makers 
to offer their own opinions. The study by McDonald48 did, however, suggest that 
there is a difference in the type of work undertaken by health economists and 
decision makers: 
Problems do not present in neat packages for economists to tackle and ... the mainstream HA 
business was carried on elsewhere, outside the orbit of the health economist. 
(McDonald, p.9548) 
2.3) No incentives to produce utilisable work 
Some health economists suggested that there were few incentives to produce 
utilisable research. The literature on the use of economic evaluation has ignored 
the incentives facing health economists, viewing them as an external and 
exogenous factor. In the study of health economists however, there was some 
indication that health economists' primary concern is to produce research that 
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benefits their career, rather than work aiding decision makers. Part of the 
explanation for this might be the lack of incentives for health economists to be 
involved in decision-making (health economists with experience at the local level 
suggested that they were demoralised because their work had little effect on 
decision-making). However, it is also likely that health economists view 
publication of economic evaluations as a positive step in their career and wanting 
to produce work in order to enhance a career has been found to exist for 
researchers in general.149, 162,167 
2.4) Facilitating use of economic evaluation 
Health economists and decision makers interviewed had very different views about 
how to increase use of economic evaluation. As suggested in the literature, there is 
a common view among health economists that: 
Economic evaluation ... should more often be used, and ways can be found to increase its 
use ... 
(Drummond, p.9174) 
This might explain why health economists interviewed have focused on incentives 
to increase use of economic evaluation, through methodological developments and 
improvements in techniques of economic evaluation.2,3, 168 Health economists 
interviewed also suggested that overcomplicated techniques and jargon were used 
in economic evaluation and that to remedy this would facilitate greater use: 
E9: I wonder sometimes ifhealth economists do overcomplicate things. It doesn't 
always come across in what one might call as readily available English, when you 
start looking at some of the health economics journal articles and see the formulas 
and the diagrams ... 
It is assumed that once economic evaluations are improved, this will facilitate their 
use. However, the study of local decision-making suggests that such initiatives 
would not enhance the use of economic evaluation, since this was not a barrier to 
their use. In areas where economic evaluation is already being used, it might well 
be important to concentrate on improving the quality of studies. 
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Some health economists interviewed suggested that there ought to be 
interdisciplinary working with decision makers at the local level. However, there 
was little indication as to how this might be achieved. Health economists 
interviewed might be aware that their research is not going to be used if not 
actively disseminated, but they did not propose any way in which this could occur, 
except through I interaction', which was a rather vague term. 
More likely in contexts such as the one observed for this thesis, it would be useful 
to concentrate on attempts to make decision makers' implicit priority setting more 
explicit. The majority of CG informants were not aware of their implicit priority 
setting and what they were "really" doing. Although they felt they were 
prioritising already, they were unaware of the value judgements in their decision-
making and some felt that their priorities must be funded irrespective of anything 
else. This lack of awareness of implicit priority setting among decision makers was 
also recognised by a health economist with local experience: 
E6: ... One of my hypotheses is that decision makers often do not realise the implicit 
value judgements in their decisions. For example, "We have this drug, there's 
nothing else we can do." This ignores the opportunity cost which means someone 
somewhere is getting less health gain than they otherwise would have done ... 
(From e-mail correspondence) 
These findings suggest that it would be useful for health economists to present and 
explain the implicit behaviour of decision makers, and to "translate" it within 
explicit economic evaluation approaches. This would help decision makers to 
understand where economic evaluation could be used, and possibly escape from 
pre-conceptions of economic evaluation by some decision makers, as found in the 
local study: 
51: [Economic evaluation1 is not something I am terribly interested in to be honest, 
this is public health type of study, it's comparative, you have to look at the quality of 
the research, and that is potentially very time consuming, unless you know quite a 
lot about it, which I don't. It's not something I am personally interested in so I keep 
well clear of it to be honest ... 
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If it had been possible to extend the research reported here, one option would have 
been to hold several more workshops which could have offered practical ways of 
prioritising, based on the notions of scarcity and opportunity cost, possibly within a 
PBMA framework. Health economists could aid the comparative scoring of 
priorities, which was felt to be difficult to achieve by decision makers. 
52: It is difficult to make decisions between programmes ... 
51: ... [Scoring priorities based on certain factors 1 is very difficult to do because it is 
very difficult to comparatively score and get it right ... 
PBMA attempts to find out how decisions are made and what the relevant 
information is. PBMA has assumed a more interactive model of research utilisation, 
focusing on the collaborations between decision makers and health economists. As 
Weiss points out, it is likely to be more rewarding to start from exploration of the 
decision-making process (as done in PBMA) than to start from a desired outcome 
from this process (which is the focus of economic evaluation): 
Social scientists who talk about research use always seem to start at the research end. They 
ask: How can we induce people in decision-making positions to pay attention to our work? 
A more fruitful entry into the discussion seems to me at the policy end: How do policies get 
made? What information do decision-making groups seek to pay attention to? 
(Weiss, p.l0149) 
An opinion leader would be required to follow the process through since it is worth 
noting that the workshop was only facilitated because of the insistence of the chair 
of the eG. This is further supported by some health economists' experience at the 
local level in which they felt that without some key members of the board of the 




In summary, the barriers found in the study of local decision-making are in part 
associated with the decision-making context, where there are few societal decisions 
to be made and the type of decisions are related to reconfiguration of services, 
rather than treatments. These barriers are not typically recognised as being of great 
importance either in the literature or amongst academic health economists 
interviewed in this study. These findings suggest that there needs to be greater 
awareness of the local decision-making context among health economists if the use 
of economic evaluation is to be understood further. In addition, to counter the lack 
of societal decision-making, decision makers ought to be made aware of where 
societal decision-making could be used within the CG. Overall, PBMA is a useful 
tool for decision makers, possibly dealing with the problem of relevance of 
economic evaluations and the importance of local data as highlighted by some 
informants interviewed. 
Finally, there are also barriers to the production of useful economic evaluations on 
the researcher's side, as acknowledged by some health economists interviewed in 
this study. This point has not been recognised in the literature on the use of 
economic evaluation, highlighting the value of the research presented in this thesis. 
3. Implications of the findings 
The study of decision makers and health economists has important implications for 
improving the local priority setting process and the work undertaken by health 
economists. Implications for local priority setting presented here are largely related 
to the CG where most of the recommendations that the PCT received were 
developed. 
3.1) Implications for local priority setting 
Williamson27 claimed that networks are likely to eventually fail because of 
management and co-ordination problems. However, within the local study, health 
care decision-making could be, and was only ever perhaps, negotiated through 
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some form of networking. Most decision-making is informal, comprising many 
different individuals and groups, often linked together, but without any clear 
hierarchical structure. Since the creation of the NHS, there has been an active role 
for a wide range of decision makers, including clinicians and managers. 
Understanding the organisation of care in terms of hierarchy or (quasi) market is 
therefore likely to offer little explanation for the way in which decision-making 
occurs at the local level. In this sense, there is no reason why Williamson would be 
correct in assuming that networks fail in time. There was evidence, for instance, 
that partnership working, facilitating trust and potential commitment among 
decision makers, had enhanced during the sixteen months observation of the eG. 
This suggests that it would be useful for local decision-making groups in other 
geographical areas to be organised in a similar way where no such processes 
already exist. These groups would require strong leadership from the chair, which 
was felt to be fundamental to the success of the CG by some informants 
interviewed in this study. For instance, as 58 pointed out: 
58: ... [TIre chair of the CG] has worked really well on our behalf and I am sure that 
comes as a result of having a good relationship with him. 
In addition, it would be helpful to improve upon the shortcomings of the CG, since 
many decision makers felt that they needed help when making decisions and there 
was no scoring of priorities, which hindered a clear approach to priority setting. 
This suggests a potential for other people being members of such groups, other 
than decision makers, such as health economists. 
It would appear that approaches for priority setting based on economics (scarcity, 
opportunity cost, and the margin) which are also attuned to the process of decision-
making will be helpful at the local level. Several decision maker informants (such 
as 51 and 52 in particular) said that they wanted to be able to score or rank 
priorities, but they were unsure how to proceed in this respect. They felt that it 
would be useful to weight different criteria, but 51 acknowledged that this would 
be a complex task as many of the programmes typically considered are very 
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different from each other (for instance, comparing the employment of extra 
oncology staff versus buying a new piece of expensive equipment). Although 
decision makers did not mention the use of economics as an explicit way in which 
to prioritise, it was evident that economics could help decision makers to compare 
the costs and benefits of different programmes that they are considering and to 
consider potential disinvestments that could be realised to fund new investments. 
Use of concepts such as opportunity cost could create awareness among decision 
makers of explicit tradeoffs (e.g. cutting back on one service to fund a new service). 
However, if economics is used as a way of prioritising, there must be some 
realisation of the budget available for cancer services (which was not known to any 
of the decision makers), so as to assess which investments are feasible and the 
magnitude of cutbacks that are needed. 
One approach based on economics is PBMA, as recommended by some health 
economists in the UK, although it has had mixed success.112 PBMA, as discussed in 
chapter 2 of this thesis, is an economics approach to prioritising (resting on the 
notions of opportunity cost and the margin), but it also emphasises the importance 
of the decision-making process (since in various PBMA studies, stakeholders meet 
to discuss the factors that are important to them when making decisions and the 
relative weights that they should receive, in order to rank priorities). Such ideas 
resonate well with the findings at the local level, where the CG comprised the main 
cancer decision-making forum and already involves various stakeholders. The 
literature on PBMA suggests that the approach is most likely to be sustained if it is 
supported by opinion leaders112 and there is trust among decision makers;112 both 
of which were found to be important factors influencing decisions in the CG. 
PBMA could be facilitated through workshops such as the one conducted in this 
study, allowing greater familiarity among decision makers about ways in which to 
prioritise using economic principles. Such workshops, by being 'hands-on', could 
also permit familiarity with research evidence such as economic evaluation. 
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3.2) Implications for work of health economists 
Health economists' focus upon maximisation of QALYs may not help in ensuring 
utilisation of economic evaluation at the local level. Decision makers' objectives are 
multi-faceted and they are motivated by different organisational, financial, and 
personal concerns. Furthermore, QALYs are rarely applicable to the local level 
since benefit measures are broader - they are not necessarily related to health but to 
other benefit measures - than those typically considered in economic evaluation. 
This might account for two health economists' experience of local decision-making: 
E6: ... We're drifting away from things like maximising cost per QALYs within a 
given budget ... but that's one of the lessons from the health service ... 
E3: .. .It's not economic evaluation of a technology, unless you define technology very 
widely to include the process by which funds are allocated to units within the health 
service. You could just about squeeze it in if you want, but it would be a very broad 
definition. I spent a lot of my doing that, I saw that as economics, but it doesn't fit the 
kind of standard definition of economic evaluation ... It's not doing a cost per QALY, 
it's not cost effectiveness analysis ... 
E6 felt that there was the potential to drift away from maximising cost per QALYs 
because, at the local level, there were a variety of objectives of local decision makers 
being pursued at anyone moment in time, such as equity and politics. 
Thus, there needs to be an appreciation among health economists that cost per 
QALY might not be an objective being pursued at the local level. Although 
maximisation of QALYs has been strongly questioned in the literature193, 340, 341, 276, 
342 for many health economists it is still seen as an appropriate objective.193, 278,343 
Instead of being directly used in decision-making, economic evaluation could 
contribute to a general culture of information about cost effectiveness. Health 
economists need to understand this process of decision-making in order to be more 
aware of how the principles of economics can be useful to local health care decision 
makers. 
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Furthermore, health economists could usefully widen their understanding of 
human behaviour by focusing not just on neo-classical theory, but on epidemiology 
and psychology, as well as being more aware of health policy, in order to 
understand different ideas about human behaviour not related to classic rationality. 
This could potentially be achieved by encouraging employment of health 
economists in medical departments, rather than (health) economics departments, as 
has also been suggested by Phelps and Maynard,344/345 as well as training during 
degree studies in health policy and disciplines related to other research 
methodologies. These initiatives, however, need to be sustained in the long run, 
and it would be useful for funding bodies to request work where economists 
engage with decision makers. Within academia, Research Assessment Exercises 
(RAE's) may produce perverse incentives to focus on methodological quality rather 
than the likely impact of work on decision-making. Certainly health economists 
require incentives to produce utilisable research since they are, essentially, like 
decision makers, looking for work: 
An organisation is a collection of choices looking for problems, issues and feelings looking 
for decision situations in which they might be aired, solutions looking for issues to which 
tJzey might be the answer, and decision makers looking for work. 
(Cohen, March and Olsen, p.275) 
These findings do not suggest a wholehearted abandonment of economic 
evaluation, but an awareness of its limitations and a focus on the wider context of 
deciSion-making. Where economic evaluation might be particularly useful is 
through cost-consequence analysis, which does not assume maximisation of 
QALYs and contrasts different options in tabular form for all the relevant costs and 
benefits, allowing decision makers to impute their own values, thus alleviating the 
potential problem of relevancy of economic evaluation, but still providing an 
explicit approach. Cost-consequence analysis could also inform PBMA. 
Thus, in the UK at least, the clearest role for economic evaluations using CEA or 
CUA is through the NICE process. Here, it might be of interest to health 
economists to focus on producing good quality guidance, since the local level 
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responds to such guidance. The NICE process of decision-making is arguably more 
'rational', since NICE defines a clear research question and commissions research 
on the topic,269 suggesting fewer of the complexities of local decision-making. 
However, it is important to bear in mind the resource implications of NICE 
initiatives. NICE guidance should allow flexibility, since some health areas will be 
unable to afford implementing the guidance and the opportunity cost of 
implementation will be high, in terms of forgone community developments. 
Further, opportunity costs vary across local areas - a factor which is not included in 
NICE assessments: 
51: ... The Government can't measure [quality of care] because they are not 
clinicians ... 50 it is for us to make the judgement, because, at the end of the day, if you 
cannot administer a NICE drug safely, then you shouldn't be using it ... 
Here, S1 felt that if appropriately trained nurses were not available to administer 
particular NICE drugs, it was harmful for patients to receive the treatment. 
Summary 
The literature on the use of economic evaluation has assumed that the 
responsibility for improving the use of studies in practice largely rests with 
decision makers, once the methodology has been improved and the principles of 
economics communicated. However, findings in this thesis suggest that decision 
makers are largely organised in a way that is conducive to priority setting, but need 
to make their decision-making more explicit in order to score priorities for instance. 
This implies the need for health economists to be aware of the local decision-
making process, and potentially to become much more involved in this process. 
Findings further suggest that this would mean being less focused on producing 
typical economic evaluations, which, here, were not found to be particularly useful 
to local decision makers. 
4. Reflection on methodology and methods used 
This thesis has aimed to explore the views and opinions of local decision makers 
and health economists about the use of economic evaluation in decision-making. 
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The studies of both groups used (a modified approach to) grounded theory,315 
located within a constructivist/ interpretative paradigm,302 using qualitative 
methods. The ontological, epistemological, and methodological stance was 
therefore different to that typically used by (health) economists. However, the 
perspective taken in this research enabled the views and opinions of informants to 
emerge and allowed the development of theory over time. Although in depth 
qualitative research has previously been performed in studies exploring the use of 
economic evaluation,48,252 this study has arguably gone further than this, 
attempting to gauge opinions not only about evidence, but also awareness of 
concepts and economic modes of thinking, which has only been possible through 
the paradigm and perspective associated with qualitative research. In contrast, 
previous literature has tended to focus on the direct use of economic evaluation.4 
An important aspect of the research of local decision-making was the use of 
methods triangulation. The model was based upon the direct observation of 
actions, documentary evidence and accounts of individual informants. This further 
enabled insight into how decision makers say they behave and how they behave in 
practice. During interviews, it was possible to cover subjects in depth, and the use 
of interviews and observations in combination allowed a greater depth and breadth 
of subjects to be covered. The use of methods triangulation was particularly 
important during the time of the workshop, in which it was possible to both 
directly observe the workshop and to gain individuals' views and opinions about 
the event. The use of observations allowed topics to arise in their own natural 
setting, which may not have arisen in interviews. In addition, the observations 
allowed rapport to be developed between informants and the researcher, thus 
creating a more favourable environment during interview. Furthermore, the 
iterative nature of the research allowed reflection on the design of the study and, 
for instance, facilitated a response to the needs of the chair of the CG in terms of the 
workshop. 
Of particular importance throughout the study was the fact that local decision 
makers, apart from the chair of the CG, were not aware of any focus on 
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economics.xxii This meant that they had fewer incentives to exaggerate its impact or 
importance. Unlike previous empirical studies in this area, where it has been 
obvious that health economists are performing the study or that the focus of the 
study is economic evaluation, there was no incentive for informants to misconstrue 
their use of economic evaluation. This might explain why, in this study, no use of 
economic evaluation was found, whereas previous studies have suggested a 30% 
use (although the specific meaning of 30% use, when trying to address how 
economic evaluation is used and in what ways, is questionable). 
It has not been possible to extend the research of local decision-making with respect 
to four areas. Firstly, if possible, it would have been desirable to observe other 
programme areas apart from cancer. However, attempts to access other 
programme groups within the time available were unsuccessful. On the other 
hand, the focus of the interviews conducted with decision makers was not cancer 
programmes in particular and it was possible to interview informants from the PCT 
outside the CG. Secondly, the time for the study fieldwork was limited to sixteen 
months. Within the funding constraints it was not possible to extend beyond this 
period, although it would have been ideal to have a longer period to follow-up 
after the workshop, to determine whether it made any difference to decision-
making in the long term. Given the limited impact even in the short term, 
however, this is unlikely to be the case. Thirdly, the views of other stakeholders in 
decision-making, including citizens, patients, and carers were not solicited in this 
study, as this was not the focus of the project. Finally, it would have been desirable 
to extend the study to a different location, to another PCT. However, given that the 
research was in-depth and the focus was to observe and reflect on decision-making 
using a variety of different methods, it would not have been possible to cover more 
than one area in the same depth. In addition, a number of economists who worked 
in other health service areas identified similar issues to those found in the study of 
local decision-making.256 
xxii A situation did not arise during the fieldwork where it was necessary to reveal to the group my background 
as a health economist. 
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In the study with health economists, only semi-structured interviews were used. 
Semi-structured interviews did, however, allow important topics to be covered 
within a short time frame. Participant observation would have been impractical for 
examining health economists' views and opinions of decision-making. Focus 
groups may have allowed topics that the researcher was not aware of to emerge 
through discussion, although, as the researcher is a health economist, this is less of 
a problem than it would have been with an unfamiliar group. Focus groups alone 
would have been unlikely to provide sufficient depth. Additionally, for obtaining 
informants' views and opinions about what could be a sensitive subject, it might 
have not been successful. In addition, informants might have held back 
information related to their potential colleagues (such as, for instance, El' s 
comment that the vast majority of economic evaluations are produced for the 
benefit of other health economists). 
The collection of data from health economists was iterative and data that emerged 
helped to refine the topics contained in the interview schedule. Possible limitations 
of this aspect of the study were the use of telephone interviews, rather than face-to-
face interviews, which meant that potential nuances were lost and it was sometimes 
difficult to establish a strong level of rapport with the informant. However, in view 
of the resource constraints, it was not feasible to conduct face-to-face interviews, 
given the wide geographical spread of informants. 
Although generalis ability is not usually thought of as an aim of qualitative 
research, some researchers, such as Hammersley331 suggest considering the 
typicality of cases in relation to the general population or whether the model 
developed is likely to resonate to other particular contexts. Considering the study 
of decision makers, there are three ways in which this might not be the case. 
Firstly, the selection of individuals participating in the research might not have 
covered all possible roles within the health service. However, those identified by 
informants as important to the decision-making role were all interviewed. 
Potentially a larger study could go beyond the level of decision-making studied 
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here, to include those at a 'higher' level (for example, the SHA) and at a lower level 
(for example, pharmacists and allied health professionals). 
Secondly, the fieldwork for this thesis was conducted at a time during which there 
had been substantial change for the NHS as it moved to peTs. In terms of 
typicality of cases, organisational change and uncertainty are likely to have affected 
all geographical areas, although different areas might have had different levels of 
such uncertainty. However, subsequent changes to the organisation of health care, 
in terms of method of delivery, may make this research less generalisable, although 
there have been no recent major changes. 
Finally, the locality studied may be different to those in other localities such that 
the pressures on local decision-making are different or non-existent. However, 
there is no reason to believe that these pressures would be different in other areas 
given that many of the problems identified relate to national issues (in relation to 
the targets) or organisational issues that are likely to be present in other areas. 
Indeed, the vast majority of health economists interviewed suggested that national 
directives (such as the targets in particular) created a huge obstacle for local 
decision-making. Further, the findings of the fieldwork resonate strongly with the 
comments made by health economists working at the local level [for example, 
regarding the type of decisions being mainly around staff and organisation, rather 
than technologies (E13, page 231, E14, E15, page 243), or around the main interest 
in economic evaluation coming from the director of public health (E6, E13, page 
238-9). On the other hand, the fieldwork area faced severe financial difficulties and 
informants gave the impression of "scrambling to fit within the resources". This 
situation would have been likely to affect the specific context of decision-making 
observed and the particularly severe financial pressures faced by local decision 
makers. In addition, the lack of financial resources cannot account for the weak 
priority setting mechanisms in place: on the contrary, it might be perceived to be 
more likely that decision makers would want to prioritise care, knowing they could 
not possibly hope for all their wish list items to be funded. It was therefore an 
interesting context within which to examine the research topic. 
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Furthermore, the fieldwork area chosen for this study was specific in that it had 
pre-established programme groups delivering care in accordance with various 
NSFs or the national plans (such as the cancer plan). As a result, unique 
programme areas were identifiable, together with the decision makers feeding into 
these groups. Decision makers implied that local care health care delivery in other 
geographical areas would have worked in a similar way to these programme 
groups, although they felt they would be more or less advanced depending on the 
organisational skill of the per. Moreover, the literature on health care decision-
making has identified unique programme areas for delivering care, for instance for 
strokel25 and coronary heart disease.48 It is likely that the fieldwork area is typical 
in many ways of the organisation of local health care decision-making in England. 
During the study with health economists, a wide variety of opinions were sought, 
ranging from health economists with local experience (or priority setting 
experience) to those with only academic careers. Informants were sought from 
England, Scotland, and Wales, in an attempt to gain insight into different 
organisations and patterns of care. In this respect, the study with health 
economists was based on a wider geographical area than the study of decision 
makers. However, it is questionable whether the body of health economists 
represented in this thesis is representative of health economists working in the UK. 
Those in this study tended to be relatively senior, with relatively large amounts of 
experience of economic evaluation, and some had worked at the local level as 
health economists. Given this, it is likely that this study of health economists 
overestimates the level of understanding of health care decision-making and/ or the 
role of economic evaluation in decision-making compared to the understanding of 
health economists more widely. In addition, this study did not attempt to assess 
the views and opinions of health economists working in consultancies or 
pharmaceutical companies, although these individuals might have had 
substantially different viewpoints. 
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5. Further research into this area 
Research in other localities should try to assess how generalisable these findings 
are. If replicated elsewhere, health economists would benefit from moving away 
from questioning the use of economic evaluation, to understanding more about the 
decision-making process, and more about how economics can be of practical use in 
decision-making. 
In further exploration of the decision-making context and process it is likely that 
quantitative techniques would be largely unhelpful and qualitative methodology 
and methods should be adopted instead. Only one study, by McDonald,48 exists 
which is comparable to this research in terms of objectives and methods used. 
McDonald was an active member of the decision-making group, being part of the 
process of decision-making and a decision maker. She was known to be a health 
economist, advocated the use of economic techniques and provided economic 
analyses to the group: 
At this meeting I presented a paper version of a computer model which, I suggested, the 
group could use to examine the costs and benefits of various strategies for the diagnosis and 
management of suspected heart failure ... although the group members passed around a hard 
copy running to about ten pages illustrating model parameters and data-input fields, there 
was agreement that this approach was perhaps a little too sophisticated for the group ... 
(McDonald, p.139-14Q48) 
McDonald's strategy therefore provides a very different perspective from the 
research reported here. Respondents in another qualitative study in this field were 
also aware that the focus of the research was on the use of economic evaluation.252 
However, possible future work would benefit from being conducted across 
different locations and across a broader context with settings involving the SHA, to 
a greater degree, and other groups not included in this study, such as pharmacists 
and allied health professionals. In the international context, further qualitative 
work is required, since all of this work has taken place within a UK setting. It is 
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likely that differing cultures and organisational systems would require re-
examination of the findings in this study. 
Finally, other research might involve qualitative assessments of the value of 
introducing PBMA. Controlled experiments of different interventions might be 
conducted, for instance to find out the outcome when using PBMA in one area 
compared to decision-making without PBMA in another area. 
6. Conclusion 
The problems associated with the use of economic evaluation in decision-making 
are not so much the constraints which health economists are aware of but a lack of 
understanding of the decision-making process and therefore the inability to target 
economic evaluation in the right direction. Understanding rationality is useful for 
understanding the behaviour of decision makers, since they can be seen as being 
rational, but just not in the way that economists perceive rationality. Perhaps more 
importantly, individual rationality does not equate to organisational rationality, 
with a specific objective of acting on behalf of society. This is not usually 
recognised by health economists. The local study found that there were many 
different groups and individuals in decision-making, so that the clinical 'level' was 
often merged with population decision-making. This is also something not 
typically recognised by health economists. This thesis has therefore provided 
insight into how priority setting decisions are made (or more often not made, or are 
avoided) at the local level in the NHS. 
This study found no role for usual economic evaluations, although there is 
potentially a clear role for priority setting approaches based on economics (with 
PBMA being the main example in the literature). Another important contribution of 
this thesis to health services research is that it is has provided further and unique 
evidence of the growing concern that 'technical' health economics approaches to 
priority setting do not fit well with the culture and management processes of the 
NHS. The PBMA approach was recognised as being useful by health economists, 
suggesting its feasibility in theory (although further evidence might be required to 
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assess its feasibility in practice). PBMA offers a way of reconciling the decision-
making context with a more objective criterion based on fundamental notions of 
scarcity and opportunity cost. More so, however, economists can potentially be 
extremely useful to decision makers by enhancing the use of economics principles 
in decision-making, so that this enters into an interactive model of research 
utilisation. Being useful in this respect is likely to create a change of mood of health 
economists who are pessimistic about their work being used, as suggested in 
chapter 2. Thus: 
Because people expect research use to occur through the sequence of stages posited by [the 





Extract 1: Information sheet 
INFORMATION SHEET 
NHS decision-making 
Researchers at Bristol University are carrying out research to understand local 
decision-making in the NHS. We want to find out who makes decisions, how they 
are made and what information is used. We are doing this by observing meetings 
where health service funds are allocated between different alternatives. We would 
also like to talk separately with you about how you feel about these meetings, and 
about local decision-making in general. This would take about an hour and if you 
agree we would like to tape-record the discussion. 
It is up to you to decide whether you take part in the study. If you decide to take 
part you will be given this information sheet to keep and be asked to sign a consent 
form. If you decide to take part you are still free to withdraw at any time and 
without a reason. 
If you have any questions about the study, please contact me, Oya Asim (E-mail 
Oya.Asim@bristol.ac.uk or call 0117 928 7352). 
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Extract 2: Consent for observation of meetings 
CONSENT FORM FOR OBSERVATION OF MEETINGS 
Title of Project: NHS decision-making 
Name of researcher: Oya Asim 
Please Tick 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet 
for the above study and have had the opportunity to ask 
questions. 
2. I have no objections to reG] meetings being observed by Oya 
Asim. 




Name of Attendee: ................................................................................ . 
POsItion: ............................................................................................. . 
Date: ................................................................................................ . 
Signature: .......................................................................................... . 
Name of Observer: ............................................................................. . 
Date: ................................................................................................ . 
Signature: .. , ...... , ................................................... , ............................ . 
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Extract 4: Exercise for workshop 
Exercise for discussion 
Look at the Cancer Local Development Plan, 2004·2010: 
Programmes Develop/ Investment 
Not yet programmed/ 
Programmed Implement 
CO. "TEA. TTS DELETED FOR 
COl T FI DE. TTIALITY REASO IS 
Which f th above programmes are related to the targets or guidance set 
nationally? 
Which of the programmes have evidence on their effectiveness? 
Which of the programmes have evidence on their cost-effectiveness? 
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Look at the adapted Cancer Local Development Plan for programmes not yet 
developed and try and prioritise the programmes: 
Programmes Incremental Cost Incremental Benefit 
CONTENTS DELETED FOR 
COl TFIDEl 'TIALITY REASOl TS 
You should consider the following: 
- Your budget constraint 
- An estimate/ guesstimate of the incremental cost and incremental 
benefit/ outcome 
- What the opportunity cost of each programme might be 
Discuss any problems with this approach 
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Extract 5: Evaluation form for workshop 
Evaluation of Priorities Workshop 
1) Have you attended this kind of workshop before? 
Yes D No D 
2) Do you think what you have learnt today will help you in future decision-
making? 
Yes o No 0 
Why? 
3) Would you like more help of this kind in the future? 
Yes o No D 
4) If so, what would you like covered by future workshops? 
5) If this workshop is run again what suggestions do you have for improving 
the presentation? 
6) Did you find the workshop useful? 
Yes D No 0 
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Extract 6: Pre-workshop invitation to interview 
Title of e-mail: Health Care Decision-Making 
Dear X, 
I am undertaking research on health care decision-making in the local area for my 
PhD. I am aiming to find out how decisions are made in the area and who is 
involved in the decision-making process. As you will be aware, I have been 
observing the [CG meetings]. 
I would be extremely grateful if you could spare the time to talk with me about 
your personal views and opinions of the decision-making process. I would also like 
to tape-record the conversation if possible. I would like to assure you that our 
conversation will be strictly confidential and anonymity will be guaranteed. 
If you are available to meet, please could you tell me the dates and times you are 
free? 
If you have any questiOns about the research you can contact me bye-mail 
(Oya.Asim@bristol.ac.uk) or by telephone on 0117 928 7352. 






Extract 7: Post-workshop invitation to interview 
Title of E-mail: Use of Economic Evaluation in Priority Setting 
Dear X, 
Following from the research I am conducting on local decision-making for my PhD 
at the University of Bristol, I would like to ask whether you would be willing to 
speak with me about the use of economic evaluation in priority setting, by you and 
the group. This is a theme of my project that I am particularly interested in 
pursuing, as a result of the workshop "Decision-making for Cancer Services 
Workshop: An Economist's Approach", held in January 2004. Even if you think 
that you are not the best person to discuss this topic, or you did not attend the 
workshop, I am still ygry interested in whatever you have to say. The interview 
will be completely confidential and anonymous. The interview will be face-to-face 
and will take approximately one hour of your time. If you agree to being 
interviewed could you please tell me: 
-The possible dates you would be free for approximately one hour from March 
onwards? 
-Whether you would agree for the interview to be tape-recorded? 
I will contact you in a few days to find this out, or alternatively in the meantime 
please do not hesitate to contact me bye-mail (Oya.Asim@bristol.ac.uk) or by 




Extract 8: Information sheet for interview 
INFORMATION SHEET 
NHS decision-making 
I am a PhD student at Bristol University carrying out research to understand local 
decision-making in the NHS. I am undertaking interviews to find out who makes 
decisions, how they are made and what information is used. An interview would 
take about an hour and if you agree I would like to tape-record the discussion. 
It is up to you to decide whether you take part in the study. If you decide to take 
part you will be given this information sheet to keep and be asked to sign a consent 
form. If you decide to take part you are still free to withdraw at any time and 
without a reason. 
If you have any questions about the study, please contact me, Oya Asim (E-mail 
Oya.Asim@bristol.ac.ukorcall 0117 928 7352). 
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Extract 9: Consent for interview 
CONSENT FORM FOR INTERVIEW 
Title of Project: NHS decision-making 
Name of researcher: Oya Asim 
Please Tick 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet 
dated ........................ (version ...... ) for the above study and 
have had the opportunity to ask questions. 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am 
free to withdraw at any time, without giving reason. 
3. I agree to take part in the study. 
4. I agree to be interviewed. 






Name of Interviewee: ............................................................................ . 
Date: ................................................................................................ . 
Signature: .......................................................................................... . 
Researcher: ........................................................................................ .. 
Date: ................................................................................................ . 
Signature: .......................................................................................... . 
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\ Interviewees name 
Position/ title 
How long in the position 
Date Day [ ] Month [ ] Year [ ] 
Time [ ] until [ ] 
Location of interview 
o What does your role involve/how does priority setting work in your area? 
o Which types of decisions are made concerning cancer in your area? 
o Who makes these decisions? 
o Where are they made? 
o How are they made? In a meeting? 
o What type of factors are important in priority setting? 
o Which types of decision-making bodies exist in your area that you are aware 
of? 
o How do you make interactions with these groups? 
o Do you think the way decisions are made is the right way? 
o Is there an appeal process? 
o How could it be improved? 
o 00 you usc any 'formal' evidence? 
o Is there anything you would like to ask? 
300 









How long in the position 
Date Day ( ] Month ( ] Year [ ] 
Time ( ] until [ ] 
Location of interview 
THE WORKSHOP 
If did not go: 
o Was it because you were unable to or were not interested? 
If did go: 
o Did you find the presentation useful? 
o Do you think what you learnt at the workshop will help you in future 
priority setting? 
o Had you attended that kind of workshop before? 
o Would other types of workshops (not involving economics) have been more 
useful? 
USE OF ECONOMIC EVALUATION BY YOU 
o Do you think that the priority setting/ decision-making process has changed 
since our last interview? 
(Prompt: Decision makers, communication; relationship between primary 
and secondary care; organisational change/ uncertaintYi financial situation) 
o What do you mean by economic evaluation? /what terms do you associate 
with economics in health care? 
301 
o Do you have any experience of using economic evaluation in the past? 
If so, have you used general economic concepts, or specific 
studies - if latter what topic(s) were they on? 
Where do you obtain (it) them? 
If not, why not? 
o Do you think it is part of your role to interpret and appraise evidence 
relating to economic evaluation? 
Why? 
Why not? 
o What factors do YOU think are important in priority setting? 
USE OF ECONOMIC EVALUATION BY GROUP 
o Does the group use economic evaluation? 
Why? 
Why not? 
Do they understand economics? 
o What factors do think are important TO THE GROUP in priority setting? 
(Prompt: Equity, need, quality of care, risk, effectiveness, politics, cost, 
organisational needs) 
o How important are these factors TO THE GROUP in priority setting relative 
to economic evaluation and why? 
o Should economic evaluation be used more? 
Why? Why not 
Why isn't it used more? 
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Extract 12: Invitation to interview with health economists 
Title of e-mail: Use of Economic Evaluation in Health Care Decision-Making 
Dear X, 
I am undertaking research into the use of economic evaluation in health care 
decision-making. I presented a proposal for this work at the HESG meeting in 
January 2003. One suggestion from this meeting was to compare economist views 
of decision-making with those of NHS decision-makers. 
I have taken up this suggestion and I am therefore conducting telephone interviews 
with leading health economists who have some input into economic evaluations. 
The telephone interviews will last approximately half an hour and they will mainly 
concern the interviewee's perceived use of economic evaluation, the target 
audience, and who the decision makers are thought to be. 
I would be extremely grateful if you could spare the time to talk with me. I would 
also like to tape-record the conversation if possible. I would like to assure you that 
our conversation will be strictly confidential and anonymity will be guaranteed. I 
have attached a consent form for you to sign and return to me by post on the 
address below, if you agree to take part. I would be grateful if you could specify 
possible dates for the interview. 
If you have any questions about the research you can contact me bye-mail 
(Oya.Asim@bristo1.ac.uk) or by telephone on 0117 9287352. 






Extract 13: Consent form for interview with health economists 
Title of Project: Use of Economic Evaluation in Health Care Decision-Making 
Name of researcher: Oya Asim 
Please Tick 
3. I confirm that I am willing to take part in a telephone interview 
with Oya Asim on an agreed date for approximately half an 
hour. 
4. I agree to the interview being tape-recorded. 




Name of Interviewee: ............................................................................ . 
Date: ............... II ............. • ....... ••• .... • .... ••• .. ••••• .. ••• .. •••••• .. •• .. ••••••• .. ••••• .. • .. • ...... • ............. . 
Signature: .......................................................................................... . 
Researcher: ......................................................................................... . 
Date: .................. II •• II •••• II ••••••• -, , ••• II ••••••• II ••••••• e ••••• 11.,1 ••• II II •••••••••••••••• II 
Signature: ........................................... " .......................... " ......................... . 
Possible dates and times for interview: ........................................................ . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . ... . .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . ... 
Upon completion, please send by post to the following address: 
OyaAsim 
Department of Social Medicine 
University of Bristol 
Canynge Hall 
Whiteladies Road 
Bristol BS8 2PR 
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Extract 14: Interview schedule for health economists 
o How many economic evaluations have you performed? 
o Have they been intended to inform local policy, drug companies, national 
policy etc? 
o Have you performed or been involved in performing any economic 
evaluations for NICE? 
o If so, what and how many economic evaluations? 
[Decision-making] 
o Who do you think are responsible for decision-making? 
o How does local decision-making work? 
o Have you been involved in local decision-making? 
[Now focusing on one or more evaluation in their own experience that, In their 
perception, hnd a big impact] 
o What did this evaluation(s) concern? 
o What type of information did it impart? 
o Do the evaluations produce any advice for making system wide decisions? 
o Who are the results from economic evaluations aimed at? 
o Who do you think are the users of health economics information? 
o Do you know whether those making policy decisions take up the findings in 
practice? 
o How do you think they are used? 




o What do you think are the barriers to using economic evaluations? 
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Extract 15: Pre-workshop coding sheet 
Decision-making 
Formal Process 
Different levels and layers 




The decision makers 
Power 
Autonomy 
Lack of explicitness of process 
Reluctance to make rationing decisions 
Non-decision making 
Relationships 
Asymmetry of Information 
Mistrust of l'rima!}, care 
Mistrust of secondary care 
Context of decision-making 
C}zan~e/uncertain tv 





Consequences of change/uncertainty 
Difficulty in plannin~ 
Financial 
The cause of financial difficulty 





Impact of Guidance 
Cancer Plan Targets 
Impact of targets 
Decisions made 
Conflict- local and nat. priorities 
Effect of missing targets 





Use of HE tenninology_ 
Use o/HE rationale 









How use HE 
Access to HEs 

























Extract 16: Post-workshop coding sheet 
Factors in priority setting decisions 
Equity (GPs) 
Risk (clinicians) 
Cost (not usually clinicians, usually GPs) 
Political choices 





Economic II approach" to priority setting 
Directly 
-NICE (clinician) 
..cost effective prescribing (GPs) 
- Published economic evaluations 
Indirectly 
-Way of thinking 
Barriers to the Economic" approach" 
Contextual! cultural factors 
-Politics/ targets 
-Emotive/ press/ public pressure 
-Non-dccision-making 
-Uncertainty (no idea how much money available) 
-Reluctance to make rationing decisions 
- Reluctance to make disinvestments 
- Topics of economic evaluation 
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